3dslicer-bin

maintainer hottea · 6 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball of 3D Slicer from download.slicer.org, which is the official Slicer project download host (slicer.org is the legitimate upstream). However, two real concerns remain: (1) the sha512sum for the binary tarball is 'SKIP', meaning there is no integrity verification — if the download.slicer.org server were compromised or the download redirected (the URL uses HTTP, not HTTPS), a malicious binary could be installed without detection; (2) the source URL uses plain HTTP rather than HTTPS, making it susceptible to MITM substitution. The combination of an executed prebuilt binary with no checksum verification and an unencrypted transport is a genuine supply-chain concern, even though the host itself is the legitimate upstream. This warrants medium severity rather than clean/low.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:18 "${_name}-${pkgver}.tar.gz::http://download.slicer.org/download?os=linux&stability=release"
  • PKGBUILD:19 "${_pkgname}.svg::https://www.slicer.org/assets/img/3D-Slicer-Mark.svg"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball of 3D Slicer from download.slicer.org, which is the official Slicer project download host (slicer.org is the legitimate upstream). However, two real concerns remain: (1) the sha512sum for the binary tarball is 'SKIP', meaning there is no integrity verification — if the download.slicer.org server were compromised or the download redirected (the URL uses HTTP, not HTTPS), a malicious binary could be installed without detection; (2) the source URL uses plain HTTP rather than HTTPS, making it susceptible to MITM substitution. The combination of an executed prebuilt binary with no checksum verification and an unencrypted transport is a genuine supply-chain concern, even though the host itself is the legitimate upstream. This warrants medium severity rather than clean/low.

PKGBUILD

2 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Butui Hu <hot123tea123@gmail.com>
2
3pkgname=3dslicer-bin
4_pkgname=3dslicer
5_name=Slicer
6pkgver=5.10.0
7pkgrel=1
8pkgdesc='A free, open source and multi-platform software package widely used for medical, biomedical, and related imaging research'
9arch=('x86_64')
10url='https://www.slicer.org'
11license=('BSD-3-Clause')
12depends=('dbus' 'glib2')
13makedepends=('gendesk')
14provides=('3dslicer')
15conflicts=('3dslicer')
16options=(!strip !emptydirs)
17source=(
18 "${_name}-${pkgver}.tar.gz::http://download.slicer.org/download?os=linux&stability=release"
19 "${_pkgname}.svg::https://www.slicer.org/assets/img/3D-Slicer-Mark.svg"
20)
21sha512sums=('SKIP'
22 '3422d244f819a7ec4c475d3d8a90c79fcb73738920c0830b100c6342ca24d5be607ba60ee3d91892402036a0adf31d5ab7c8fc83f451121a7b537f7de5306014')
23
24prepare() {
25 echo "Creating desktop file"
26 gendesk -f -n \
27 --categories "Science;MedicalSoftware;Education;MedicalSoftware" \
28 --custom="StartupWMClass=Slicer" \
29 --exec "Slicer" \
30 --icon "${_pkgname}" \
31 --pkgdesc "${pkgdesc}" \
32 --pkgname ${_pkgname} \
33 --startupnotify
34}
35
36package() {
37 install -d "${pkgdir}/opt" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
38 cp -a "${srcdir}/${_name}-${pkgver}-linux-amd64" "${pkgdir}/opt/${_pkgname}"
39 ln -s /opt/${_pkgname}/Slicer "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/Slicer"
40 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/${_pkgname}.desktop" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/${_pkgname}.desktop"
41 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/${_pkgname}.svg" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/pixmaps/${_pkgname}.svg"
42}
43# vim:set ts=2 sw=2 et:
44

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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