acme-sac
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt i386 .deb binary from Google Code Archive (storage.googleapis.com), which is a Google-operated static archive of the old Google Code hosting service. The host itself is legitimate infrastructure, not a personal or rogue server. However, the artifact is a precompiled binary (not source-built), verified only by an MD5 checksum (cryptographically weak, collision-prone), and the package is old (0.14, pkgrel=5) with no stronger integrity guarantee (no sha256sums, no GPG signature). The binary is then extracted and installed directly into the system. This constitutes a real supply-chain concern: a prebuilt executable from an archived, unmaintained source with only MD5 verification. The Google Archive host reduces but does not eliminate the risk (Google does not re-sign or audit these artifacts). The medium rating is appropriate — not clearly malicious, but a genuine concern due to prebuilt binary + weak checksum + unmaintained archive.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:13
source=(https://storage.googleapis.com/google-code-archive-downloads/v2/code.google.com/acme-sac/acme-sac_0.14_i386.deb)
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt i386 .deb binary from Google Code Archive (storage.googleapis.com), which is a Google-operated static archive of the old Google Code hosting service. The host itself is legitimate infrastructure, not a personal or rogue server. However, the artifact is a precompiled binary (not source-built), verified only by an MD5 checksum (cryptographically weak, collision-prone), and the package is old (0.14, pkgrel=5) with no stronger integrity guarantee (no sha256sums, no GPG signature). The binary is then extracted and installed directly into the system. This constitutes a real supply-chain concern: a prebuilt executable from an archived, unmaintained source with only MD5 verification. The Google Archive host reduces but does not eliminate the risk (Google does not re-sign or audit these artifacts). The medium rating is appropriate — not clearly malicious, but a genuine concern due to prebuilt binary + weak checksum + unmaintained archive.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Felipe Morales <hel.sheep@gmail.com>
pkgname=acme-sac
pkgver=0.14
pkgrel=5
pkgdesc="Programmer's editor and shell, running over Inferno"
arch=('x86_64')
#arch=('i386')
url="http://code.google.com/p/acme-sac/"
license=('GPL')
depends=('lib32-libx11' 'lib32-libxext' 'gcc-multilib')
#depends=('gcc' 'libx11' 'libxext')
provides=('acme')
source=(https://storage.googleapis.com/google-code-archive-downloads/v2/code.google.com/acme-sac/acme-sac_0.14_i386.deb)
noextract=()
md5sums=(178477dd90abb650fd6b1f1babb3edf8)
package() {
cd "$srcdir/"
tar -xzf data.tar.gz
mv usr/bin/acme usr/bin/acme-sac
cp -r usr "$pkgdir/"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |