acme-sac

maintainer fmoralesc · 10 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt i386 .deb binary from Google Code Archive (storage.googleapis.com), which is a Google-operated static archive of the old Google Code hosting service. The host itself is legitimate infrastructure, not a personal or rogue server. However, the artifact is a precompiled binary (not source-built), verified only by an MD5 checksum (cryptographically weak, collision-prone), and the package is old (0.14, pkgrel=5) with no stronger integrity guarantee (no sha256sums, no GPG signature). The binary is then extracted and installed directly into the system. This constitutes a real supply-chain concern: a prebuilt executable from an archived, unmaintained source with only MD5 verification. The Google Archive host reduces but does not eliminate the risk (Google does not re-sign or audit these artifacts). The medium rating is appropriate — not clearly malicious, but a genuine concern due to prebuilt binary + weak checksum + unmaintained archive.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 source=(https://storage.googleapis.com/google-code-archive-downloads/v2/code.google.com/acme-sac/acme-sac_0.14_i386.deb)
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt i386 .deb binary from Google Code Archive (storage.googleapis.com), which is a Google-operated static archive of the old Google Code hosting service. The host itself is legitimate infrastructure, not a personal or rogue server. However, the artifact is a precompiled binary (not source-built), verified only by an MD5 checksum (cryptographically weak, collision-prone), and the package is old (0.14, pkgrel=5) with no stronger integrity guarantee (no sha256sums, no GPG signature). The binary is then extracted and installed directly into the system. This constitutes a real supply-chain concern: a prebuilt executable from an archived, unmaintained source with only MD5 verification. The Google Archive host reduces but does not eliminate the risk (Google does not re-sign or audit these artifacts). The medium rating is appropriate — not clearly malicious, but a genuine concern due to prebuilt binary + weak checksum + unmaintained archive.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Felipe Morales <hel.sheep@gmail.com>
2pkgname=acme-sac
3pkgver=0.14
4pkgrel=5
5pkgdesc="Programmer's editor and shell, running over Inferno"
6arch=('x86_64')
7#arch=('i386')
8url="http://code.google.com/p/acme-sac/"
9license=('GPL')
10depends=('lib32-libx11' 'lib32-libxext' 'gcc-multilib')
11#depends=('gcc' 'libx11' 'libxext')
12provides=('acme')
13source=(https://storage.googleapis.com/google-code-archive-downloads/v2/code.google.com/acme-sac/acme-sac_0.14_i386.deb)
14noextract=()
15md5sums=(178477dd90abb650fd6b1f1babb3edf8)
16
17package() {
18 cd "$srcdir/"
19 tar -xzf data.tar.gz
20 mv usr/bin/acme usr/bin/acme-sac
21 cp -r usr "$pkgdir/"
22}
23

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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