acme-sac
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt i386 .deb binary from Google Code Archive (storage.googleapis.com), which is a Google-operated static archive of the old Google Code hosting service. The host itself is legitimate infrastructure, not a personal or rogue server. However, the artifact is a precompiled binary (not source-built), verified only by an MD5 checksum (cryptographically weak, collision-prone), and the package is old (0.14, pkgrel=5) with no stronger integrity guarantee (no sha256sums, no GPG signature). The binary is then extracted and installed directly into the system. This constitutes a real supply-chain concern: a prebuilt executable from an archived, unmaintained source with only MD5 verification. The Google Archive host reduces but does not eliminate the risk (Google does not re-sign or audit these artifacts). The medium rating is appropriate — not clearly malicious, but a genuine concern due to prebuilt binary + weak checksum + unmaintained archive.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:13
source=(https://storage.googleapis.com/google-code-archive-downloads/v2/code.google.com/acme-sac/acme-sac_0.14_i386.deb)
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt i386 .deb binary from Google Code Archive (storage.googleapis.com), which is a Google-operated static archive of the old Google Code hosting service. The host itself is legitimate infrastructure, not a personal or rogue server. However, the artifact is a precompiled binary (not source-built), verified only by an MD5 checksum (cryptographically weak, collision-prone), and the package is old (0.14, pkgrel=5) with no stronger integrity guarantee (no sha256sums, no GPG signature). The binary is then extracted and installed directly into the system. This constitutes a real supply-chain concern: a prebuilt executable from an archived, unmaintained source with only MD5 verification. The Google Archive host reduces but does not eliminate the risk (Google does not re-sign or audit these artifacts). The medium rating is appropriate — not clearly malicious, but a genuine concern due to prebuilt binary + weak checksum + unmaintained archive.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Felipe Morales <hel.sheep@gmail.com>
pkgname=acme-sac
pkgver=0.14
pkgrel=5
pkgdesc="Programmer's editor and shell, running over Inferno"
arch=('x86_64')
#arch=('i386')
url="http://code.google.com/p/acme-sac/"
license=('GPL')
depends=('lib32-libx11' 'lib32-libxext' 'gcc-multilib')
#depends=('gcc' 'libx11' 'libxext')
provides=('acme')
source=(https://storage.googleapis.com/google-code-archive-downloads/v2/code.google.com/acme-sac/acme-sac_0.14_i386.deb)
noextract=()
md5sums=(178477dd90abb650fd6b1f1babb3edf8)
package() {
cd "$srcdir/"
tar -xzf data.tar.gz
mv usr/bin/acme usr/bin/acme-sac
cp -r usr "$pkgdir/"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |