additional-base-lib-bin
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from mirrors.sdu.edu.cn (a Chinese university mirror hosting the Spark Store repository), which is not the official upstream source. The package installs executed binaries (ablrun script and additional-base-lib shared libraries) extracted from this .deb. While mirrors.sdu.edu.cn is a legitimate Chinese university mirror that hosts the Spark Store (a third-party Deepin/Ubuntu app store), it is not the canonical upstream host for this package, and the Gitee URL listed as the project URL is a different location entirely. The sha256sum provides some integrity protection, but if the mirror were compromised or the hash were updated to match a malicious payload, arbitrary code execution would result at runtime. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: prebuilt binaries from a non-canonical third-party host being installed as executable libraries/scripts. The risk is real but not clearly malicious — consistent with a MEDIUM rating.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:16
"https://mirrors.sdu.edu.cn/spark-store-repository/amd64-store/tools/additional-base-lib/additional-base-lib_2.40-4-9_amd64.deb"
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from mirrors.sdu.edu.cn (a Chinese university mirror hosting the Spark Store repository), which is not the official upstream source. The package installs executed binaries (ablrun script and additional-base-lib shared libraries) extracted from this .deb. While mirrors.sdu.edu.cn is a legitimate Chinese university mirror that hosts the Spark Store (a third-party Deepin/Ubuntu app store), it is not the canonical upstream host for this package, and the Gitee URL listed as the project URL is a different location entirely. The sha256sum provides some integrity protection, but if the mirror were compromised or the hash were updated to match a malicious payload, arbitrary code execution would result at runtime. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: prebuilt binaries from a non-canonical third-party host being installed as executable libraries/scripts. The risk is real but not clearly malicious — consistent with a MEDIUM rating.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: MYT1 <MYT1 @ QQ .com>
pkgname=additional-base-lib-bin
_pkgname=$pkgname%-bin
pkgver=2.40
pkgrel=2
pkgdesc='网易邮箱additional-base-lib-bin依赖打包'
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://gitee.com/deepin-community-store/additional-base-lib"
license=('custom')
depends=(
'bubblewrap'
'bash'
'coreutils'
)
source=(
"https://mirrors.sdu.edu.cn/spark-store-repository/amd64-store/tools/additional-base-lib/additional-base-lib_2.40-4-9_amd64.deb"
)
sha256sums=('51c6361402734f7bd08cc8a74895d650e56c3d5e093850adea8bf125df29c7c9')
package() {
bsdtar -xf "${srcdir}/data."*
sed '3s/.*/ABL_DIR_PREFIX=lib/g' -i "${srcdir}/usr/bin/ablrun"
install -m755 -d "${pkgdir}/usr/lib"
cp -r "${srcdir}/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/additional-base-lib" "${pkgdir}/usr/lib"
install -Dm755 ${srcdir}/usr/bin/ablrun "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/ablrun"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |