additional-base-lib-bin
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from mirrors.sdu.edu.cn (a Chinese university mirror hosting the Spark Store repository), which is not the official upstream source. The package installs executed binaries (ablrun script and additional-base-lib shared libraries) extracted from this .deb. While mirrors.sdu.edu.cn is a legitimate Chinese university mirror that hosts the Spark Store (a third-party Deepin/Ubuntu app store), it is not the canonical upstream host for this package, and the Gitee URL listed as the project URL is a different location entirely. The sha256sum provides some integrity protection, but if the mirror were compromised or the hash were updated to match a malicious payload, arbitrary code execution would result at runtime. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: prebuilt binaries from a non-canonical third-party host being installed as executable libraries/scripts. The risk is real but not clearly malicious — consistent with a MEDIUM rating.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:16
"https://mirrors.sdu.edu.cn/spark-store-repository/amd64-store/tools/additional-base-lib/additional-base-lib_2.40-4-9_amd64.deb"
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from mirrors.sdu.edu.cn (a Chinese university mirror hosting the Spark Store repository), which is not the official upstream source. The package installs executed binaries (ablrun script and additional-base-lib shared libraries) extracted from this .deb. While mirrors.sdu.edu.cn is a legitimate Chinese university mirror that hosts the Spark Store (a third-party Deepin/Ubuntu app store), it is not the canonical upstream host for this package, and the Gitee URL listed as the project URL is a different location entirely. The sha256sum provides some integrity protection, but if the mirror were compromised or the hash were updated to match a malicious payload, arbitrary code execution would result at runtime. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: prebuilt binaries from a non-canonical third-party host being installed as executable libraries/scripts. The risk is real but not clearly malicious — consistent with a MEDIUM rating.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: MYT1 <MYT1 @ QQ .com>
pkgname=additional-base-lib-bin
_pkgname=$pkgname%-bin
pkgver=2.40
pkgrel=2
pkgdesc='网易邮箱additional-base-lib-bin依赖打包'
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://gitee.com/deepin-community-store/additional-base-lib"
license=('custom')
depends=(
'bubblewrap'
'bash'
'coreutils'
)
source=(
"https://mirrors.sdu.edu.cn/spark-store-repository/amd64-store/tools/additional-base-lib/additional-base-lib_2.40-4-9_amd64.deb"
)
sha256sums=('51c6361402734f7bd08cc8a74895d650e56c3d5e093850adea8bf125df29c7c9')
package() {
bsdtar -xf "${srcdir}/data."*
sed '3s/.*/ABL_DIR_PREFIX=lib/g' -i "${srcdir}/usr/bin/ablrun"
install -m755 -d "${pkgdir}/usr/lib"
cp -r "${srcdir}/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/additional-base-lib" "${pkgdir}/usr/lib"
install -Dm755 ${srcdir}/usr/bin/ablrun "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/ablrun"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |