additional-base-lib-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer orphaned 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from mirrors.sdu.edu.cn (a Chinese university mirror hosting the Spark Store repository), which is not the official upstream source. The package installs executed binaries (ablrun script and additional-base-lib shared libraries) extracted from this .deb. While mirrors.sdu.edu.cn is a legitimate Chinese university mirror that hosts the Spark Store (a third-party Deepin/Ubuntu app store), it is not the canonical upstream host for this package, and the Gitee URL listed as the project URL is a different location entirely. The sha256sum provides some integrity protection, but if the mirror were compromised or the hash were updated to match a malicious payload, arbitrary code execution would result at runtime. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: prebuilt binaries from a non-canonical third-party host being installed as executable libraries/scripts. The risk is real but not clearly malicious — consistent with a MEDIUM rating.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:16 "https://mirrors.sdu.edu.cn/spark-store-repository/amd64-store/tools/additional-base-lib/additional-base-lib_2.40-4-9_amd64.deb"
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from mirrors.sdu.edu.cn (a Chinese university mirror hosting the Spark Store repository), which is not the official upstream source. The package installs executed binaries (ablrun script and additional-base-lib shared libraries) extracted from this .deb. While mirrors.sdu.edu.cn is a legitimate Chinese university mirror that hosts the Spark Store (a third-party Deepin/Ubuntu app store), it is not the canonical upstream host for this package, and the Gitee URL listed as the project URL is a different location entirely. The sha256sum provides some integrity protection, but if the mirror were compromised or the hash were updated to match a malicious payload, arbitrary code execution would result at runtime. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: prebuilt binaries from a non-canonical third-party host being installed as executable libraries/scripts. The risk is real but not clearly malicious — consistent with a MEDIUM rating.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: MYT1 <MYT1 @ QQ .com>
2pkgname=additional-base-lib-bin
3_pkgname=$pkgname%-bin
4pkgver=2.40
5pkgrel=2
6pkgdesc='网易邮箱additional-base-lib-bin依赖打包'
7arch=('x86_64')
8url="https://gitee.com/deepin-community-store/additional-base-lib"
9license=('custom')
10depends=(
11 'bubblewrap'
12 'bash'
13 'coreutils'
14 )
15source=(
16 "https://mirrors.sdu.edu.cn/spark-store-repository/amd64-store/tools/additional-base-lib/additional-base-lib_2.40-4-9_amd64.deb"
17)
18sha256sums=('51c6361402734f7bd08cc8a74895d650e56c3d5e093850adea8bf125df29c7c9')
19
20package() {
21 bsdtar -xf "${srcdir}/data."*
22 sed '3s/.*/ABL_DIR_PREFIX=lib/g' -i "${srcdir}/usr/bin/ablrun"
23 install -m755 -d "${pkgdir}/usr/lib"
24 cp -r "${srcdir}/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/additional-base-lib" "${pkgdir}/usr/lib"
25 install -Dm755 ${srcdir}/usr/bin/ablrun "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/ablrun"
26}
27

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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