after-school

maintainer dcelasun · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt game binary (AfterSchool.x86) at build time via a dynamically constructed URL fetched from itch.io, with no checksum verification. The binary is then installed as an executable. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: the download URL is resolved at package() time rather than declared in source=(), meaning makepkg's integrity checking is completely bypassed. The itch.io CDN URL could change or be substituted without any detection. While itch.io is a legitimate game distribution platform and the game appears to be a real indie title, the pattern of fetching and executing an unverified binary from a dynamically resolved URL is a real medium-severity supply-chain risk — not a false positive.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM External download from an untrusted host, not in source=() external_download_not_in_source

curl/wget fetches a URL on a non-allowlisted host that is not part of source=(), so it is not checksum-verified by makepkg.

  • PKGBUILD:18 game_url=$(curl -s -XPOST "https://ateliersento.itch.io/after-school/file/125815?after_download_lightbox=true" | grep -Po '"url":.*?[^\\]",' | cut -c8- | rev |cut -c3- | rev | sed 's/\\\//\//g')
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 85%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt game binary (AfterSchool.x86) at build time via a dynamically constructed URL fetched from itch.io, with no checksum verification. The binary is then installed as an executable. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: the download URL is resolved at package() time rather than declared in source=(), meaning makepkg's integrity checking is completely bypassed. The itch.io CDN URL could change or be substituted without any detection. While itch.io is a legitimate game distribution platform and the game appears to be a real indie title, the pattern of fetching and executing an unverified binary from a dynamically resolved URL is a real medium-severity supply-chain risk — not a false positive.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Can Celasun <can[at]dcc[dot]im>
2pkgname=after-school
3pkgver=1
4pkgrel=2
5pkgdesc="After School is a short videogame entirely handpainted on paper, using pencils and watercolors."
6arch=(i686 x86_64)
7url="https://ateliersento.itch.io/after-school"
8license=('custom')
9depends=(lib32-libgl lib32-gdk-pixbuf2 lib32-libxcursor lib32-libxrandr)
10makedepends=(unzip)
11source=(after-school.desktop
12 after-school.png)
13md5sums=('27d65a6caf3d071c04ff0fe4753d327d'
14 '6b30fc39b12b080053f8063d51b76e70')
15package() {
16 cd "${srcdir}"
17 # Hacky way to get the actual download URL
18 game_url=$(curl -s -XPOST "https://ateliersento.itch.io/after-school/file/125815?after_download_lightbox=true" | grep -Po '"url":.*?[^\\]",' | cut -c8- | rev |cut -c3- | rev | sed 's/\\\//\//g')
19 curl -o after_school.zip ${game_url}
20 unzip -o after_school.zip
21
22 mkdir -p "${pkgdir}"/usr/bin
23 mkdir -p "${pkgdir}"/usr/share/${pkgname}
24 mkdir -p "${pkgdir}"/usr/share/{applications,icons}
25
26 cp "${srcdir}"/AfterSchool* "${pkgdir}"/usr/share/${pkgname} -R
27
28 install -m755 "${srcdir}"/AfterSchool.x86 "${pkgdir}"/usr/share/${pkgname}/AfterSchool
29
30 find "${pkgdir}/usr/share/${pkgname}" -type d -exec chmod 755 "{}" \;
31 find "${pkgdir}/usr/share/${pkgname}" -type f -exec chmod 644 "{}" \;
32
33 install -m644 "${srcdir}"/${pkgname}.png "${pkgdir}"/usr/share/icons
34 install -m644 "${srcdir}"/${pkgname}.desktop "${pkgdir}"/usr/share/applications
35
36 chmod +x "${pkgdir}"/usr/share/${pkgname}/AfterSchool
37
38 ln -s /usr/share/${pkgname}/AfterSchool "${pkgdir}"/usr/bin/${pkgname}
39}
40

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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