aksusbd

maintainer fennekuiper · 7 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The package downloads a prebuilt binary tarball from fdsext.gemalto.com (Gemalto/Thales, the actual vendor of Sentinel/HASP hardware security keys), extracts an RPM from it, and installs the aksusbd and hasplmd daemons that run as system services. Gemalto is the legitimate upstream vendor (now Thales Group), so this is not a random personal host — it is the official vendor download portal. However, the download URL is an opaque file-store endpoint (not a versioned release page), the host is not a well-known public forge, and the binaries are closed-source executables installed as root-level system daemons with udev rules. The sha256sums are pinned, which mitigates substitution risk significantly. The concern is real but modest: closed-source vendor binaries from a semi-obscure vendor CDN endpoint, installed as privileged daemons. This is a legitimate vendor package with a non-standard distribution mechanism, not clearly malicious, but the executed-binary-from-unofficial-endpoint pattern warrants medium rather than clean.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:19 source=("${_tarballname}-${pkgver}.tar.gz::https://fdsext.gemalto.com/filesSN/Index/$_dl_hash?sid=$_dl_id"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt binary tarball from fdsext.gemalto.com (Gemalto/Thales, the actual vendor of Sentinel/HASP hardware security keys), extracts an RPM from it, and installs the aksusbd and hasplmd daemons that run as system services. Gemalto is the legitimate upstream vendor (now Thales Group), so this is not a random personal host — it is the official vendor download portal. However, the download URL is an opaque file-store endpoint (not a versioned release page), the host is not a well-known public forge, and the binaries are closed-source executables installed as root-level system daemons with udev rules. The sha256sums are pinned, which mitigates substitution risk significantly. The concern is real but modest: closed-source vendor binaries from a semi-obscure vendor CDN endpoint, installed as privileged daemons. This is a legitimate vendor package with a non-standard distribution mechanism, not clearly malicious, but the executed-binary-from-unofficial-endpoint pattern warrants medium rather than clean.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# $Id$
2# Maintainer: jakob <grandchild@gmx.net>
3# Contributor: Ido Rosen (ido) <ido@kernel.org>
4# Contributor: Alexander Konarev (kale-ru) <AVKonarev@gmail.com>
5# Contributor: Alexander Konarev <avkonarev@gmail.com.cc>
6# Contributor: Andre Bartke (andre) <andrew@archlinux.us>
7
8pkgname=aksusbd
9pkgver=8.21
10pkgrel=2
11_tarballname=Sentinel_LDK_RedHat_and_SuSE_RPM_Run-time_Installer
12_rpm_pkgrel=1
13_dl_hash=e4e1722f4c6a46e1ac2243f0c1e3ca5d
14_dl_id=4a5e2d551bc9bc50e2af520f6e4bcb2b
15pkgdesc="Sentinel AKSUSB daemon supporting Sentinel HASP, HASP HL, HASP4 and Hardlock keys."
16arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
17url="https://supportportal.thalesgroup.com/csm?sys_id=54303b92db852e00d298728dae96199c&id=csm_product"
18license=('custom')
19source=("${_tarballname}-${pkgver}.tar.gz::https://fdsext.gemalto.com/filesSN/Index/$_dl_hash?sid=$_dl_id"
20 "service-usr-bin-i386.patch"
21 "service-usr-bin-x86_64.patch"
22 "LICENSE")
23sha256sums=('83a07df5ed04be1d78e96bc70133c5b4adbdea5dc1f75b3aad5f734298450555'
24 '75c02721799e3f2b498d67265201445c963063b331c61402205db2ad91e72ec3'
25 'd63548bac27eab7cf4a524830643705bafc63349d2e3c5276a37d3382e5598ec'
26 'c67d1383c94e2fda4c25a70d5a5d4a90d692586ff7977eb5e9e82139f85e22dd')
27makedepends=('libarchive')
28conflicts=('ehaspd')
29options=('!strip')
30
31prepare(){
32 cd $srcdir
33
34 # Extract RPM into $srcdir:
35 bsdtar -xvf ${_tarballname}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${_rpm_pkgrel}.${CARCH}.rpm
36
37 # Change /usr/sbin/ to /usr/bin/
38 patch -p1 < service-usr-bin-i386.patch
39 patch -p1 < service-usr-bin-x86_64.patch
40}
41
42package() {
43 cd $srcdir
44 if [ "${CARCH}" == "x86_64" ]; then
45 arch_suffix=_${CARCH}
46 fi
47
48 # Binaries:
49 install -dm755 ${pkgdir}/usr/bin
50 install -Dm755 ${srcdir}/usr/sbin/{aksusbd,hasplmd}${arch_suffix} \
51 ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/
52
53 # udev rules:
54 install -dm755 ${pkgdir}/usr/lib/udev/rules.d
55 install -m644 ${srcdir}/etc/udev/rules.d/* \
56 ${pkgdir}/usr/lib/udev/rules.d/
57
58 # systemd service
59 install -dm755 ${pkgdir}/usr/lib/systemd/system/
60 install -m644 ${srcdir}/var/hasplm/init/aksusbd${arch_suffix}.service \
61 ${pkgdir}/usr/lib/systemd/system/aksusbd.service
62 install -m644 ${srcdir}/var/hasplm/init/hasplmd${arch_suffix}.service \
63 ${pkgdir}/usr/lib/systemd/system/hasplmd.service
64
65 # LICENSE and readme.html:
66 install -Dm644 ${srcdir}/${_tarballname}/Readme.html \
67 ${pkgdir}/usr/share/${pkgname}/readme.html
68 install -Dm644 ${srcdir}/LICENSE \
69 ${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE
70}
71

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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