alilang

MEDIUM
maintainer crazyboycjr 1 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from alilang.alibaba-inc.com, which is the official Alibaba intranet client portal. The domain is Alibaba's own infrastructure (alibaba-inc.com), so this is not a random personal host — it is the vendor's own distribution endpoint. However, the package installs a closed-source, prebuilt binary that runs as root (via gksu), is linked into /etc/init.d as a service, and has no integrity verification beyond a single MD5 checksum (which is cryptographically weak). The binary is executed directly on the user's system with elevated privileges. The combination of: (1) a prebuilt proprietary binary, (2) weak integrity check only (MD5, no GPG), (3) root execution via gksu, and (4) installation as an init.d service constitutes a genuine supply-chain risk — if the upstream URL were ever compromised or the file silently replaced, the MD5 would not provide meaningful protection. This meets the medium threshold: an executed binary from a host that, while plausibly official, is not independently verifiable and lacks strong integrity guarantees.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:11 source=("https://alilang.alibaba-inc.com/alilang/alilang.deb")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from alilang.alibaba-inc.com, which is the official Alibaba intranet client portal. The domain is Alibaba's own infrastructure (alibaba-inc.com), so this is not a random personal host — it is the vendor's own distribution endpoint. However, the package installs a closed-source, prebuilt binary that runs as root (via gksu), is linked into /etc/init.d as a service, and has no integrity verification beyond a single MD5 checksum (which is cryptographically weak). The binary is executed directly on the user's system with elevated privileges. The combination of: (1) a prebuilt proprietary binary, (2) weak integrity check only (MD5, no GPG), (3) root execution via gksu, and (4) installation as an init.d service constitutes a genuine supply-chain risk — if the upstream URL were ever compromised or the file silently replaced, the MD5 would not provide meaningful protection. This meets the medium threshold: an executed binary from a host that, while plausibly official, is not independently verifiable and lacks strong integrity guarantees.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Jingrong Chen <crazyboycjr at gmail dot com>
2pkgname=alilang
3_pkgname=${pkgname//-/_}
4pkgver=1.0.0
5pkgrel=3
6pkgdesc="Alilang is an integrated software for access to Alibaba intranet. https://alilang.alibaba-inc.com/portal/help.htm?language=en"
7arch=('x86_64')
8url="https://alilang.alibaba-inc.com"
9license=('none')
10depends=('qtwebkit' 'openssl')
11source=("https://alilang.alibaba-inc.com/alilang/alilang.deb")
12
13pkgver() {
14 cd "${srcdir}"
15
16 tar xzvf control.tar.gz -C "${srcdir}" 2>&1 >/dev/null
17
18 echo "$(sed -ne 's/^Version: \([^-]\+\).*/\1/p' ${srcdir}/control)"
19}
20
21install="${_pkgname}.install"
22
23package() {
24 tar xJvf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}"
25 sed -ine 's/^Exec=.*/Exec=gksu QT_X11_NO_MITSHM=1 alilang/' "${pkgdir}"/usr/share/applications/alilang.desktop
26
27 find "${pkgdir}" -type d | xargs chmod 755
28
29 ln -fs /usr/bin/AliLangAgent "${pkgdir}"/usr/bin/alilang
30 mkdir -p "${pkgdir}"/etc/init.d
31 ln -fs /usr/bin/AliLangAgent "${pkgdir}"/etc/init.d/alilang
32
33 find "${pkgdir}" -type f | xargs chown root:root
34}
35
36md5sums=('05c59383a8c7c8f27f55ccd37c7e3558')
37

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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