alilang
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from alilang.alibaba-inc.com, which is the official Alibaba intranet client portal. The domain is Alibaba's own infrastructure (alibaba-inc.com), so this is not a random personal host — it is the vendor's own distribution endpoint. However, the package installs a closed-source, prebuilt binary that runs as root (via gksu), is linked into /etc/init.d as a service, and has no integrity verification beyond a single MD5 checksum (which is cryptographically weak). The binary is executed directly on the user's system with elevated privileges. The combination of: (1) a prebuilt proprietary binary, (2) weak integrity check only (MD5, no GPG), (3) root execution via gksu, and (4) installation as an init.d service constitutes a genuine supply-chain risk — if the upstream URL were ever compromised or the file silently replaced, the MD5 would not provide meaningful protection. This meets the medium threshold: an executed binary from a host that, while plausibly official, is not independently verifiable and lacks strong integrity guarantees.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:11
source=("https://alilang.alibaba-inc.com/alilang/alilang.deb")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from alilang.alibaba-inc.com, which is the official Alibaba intranet client portal. The domain is Alibaba's own infrastructure (alibaba-inc.com), so this is not a random personal host — it is the vendor's own distribution endpoint. However, the package installs a closed-source, prebuilt binary that runs as root (via gksu), is linked into /etc/init.d as a service, and has no integrity verification beyond a single MD5 checksum (which is cryptographically weak). The binary is executed directly on the user's system with elevated privileges. The combination of: (1) a prebuilt proprietary binary, (2) weak integrity check only (MD5, no GPG), (3) root execution via gksu, and (4) installation as an init.d service constitutes a genuine supply-chain risk — if the upstream URL were ever compromised or the file silently replaced, the MD5 would not provide meaningful protection. This meets the medium threshold: an executed binary from a host that, while plausibly official, is not independently verifiable and lacks strong integrity guarantees.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Jingrong Chen <crazyboycjr at gmail dot com>
pkgname=alilang
_pkgname=${pkgname//-/_}
pkgver=1.0.0
pkgrel=3
pkgdesc="Alilang is an integrated software for access to Alibaba intranet. https://alilang.alibaba-inc.com/portal/help.htm?language=en"
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://alilang.alibaba-inc.com"
license=('none')
depends=('qtwebkit' 'openssl')
source=("https://alilang.alibaba-inc.com/alilang/alilang.deb")
pkgver() {
cd "${srcdir}"
tar xzvf control.tar.gz -C "${srcdir}" 2>&1 >/dev/null
echo "$(sed -ne 's/^Version: \([^-]\+\).*/\1/p' ${srcdir}/control)"
}
install="${_pkgname}.install"
package() {
tar xJvf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}"
sed -ine 's/^Exec=.*/Exec=gksu QT_X11_NO_MITSHM=1 alilang/' "${pkgdir}"/usr/share/applications/alilang.desktop
find "${pkgdir}" -type d | xargs chmod 755
ln -fs /usr/bin/AliLangAgent "${pkgdir}"/usr/bin/alilang
mkdir -p "${pkgdir}"/etc/init.d
ln -fs /usr/bin/AliLangAgent "${pkgdir}"/etc/init.d/alilang
find "${pkgdir}" -type f | xargs chown root:root
}
md5sums=('05c59383a8c7c8f27f55ccd37c7e3558')
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |