alisase

MEDIUM
maintainer witt.9099 1 votes scanned 2026-11-01 00:21:48.120785
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Why flagged

This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com (Alibaba Cloud OSS), which is plausibly the official Aliyun SASE client distribution channel. However, the URL uses a 'latest' path component (sase-app-latest.deb) rather than a versioned artifact path, meaning the actual file served could change at any time on the server side — the sha256sum only protects against network tampering at download time but does not guarantee the file matches the declared pkgver=3.4.2. The package installs a closed-source VPN/network-access client binary plus a systemd service that runs at boot, giving it persistent elevated network access. The combination of: (1) a prebuilt closed-source binary, (2) a mutable 'latest' URL that could serve a different binary than what was checksummed, and (3) a systemd service granting persistent system-level network access constitutes a genuine supply-chain concern. The sha256sum mitigates the risk somewhat but the mutable URL pattern is a real weakness. This is a legitimate medium-severity concern, not a false positive.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:18 "${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::https://sase-app.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/linux/sase-app-latest.deb"
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com (Alibaba Cloud OSS), which is plausibly the official Aliyun SASE client distribution channel. However, the URL uses a 'latest' path component (sase-app-latest.deb) rather than a versioned artifact path, meaning the actual file served could change at any time on the server side — the sha256sum only protects against network tampering at download time but does not guarantee the file matches the declared pkgver=3.4.2. The package installs a closed-source VPN/network-access client binary plus a systemd service that runs at boot, giving it persistent elevated network access. The combination of: (1) a prebuilt closed-source binary, (2) a mutable 'latest' URL that could serve a different binary than what was checksummed, and (3) a systemd service granting persistent system-level network access constitutes a genuine supply-chain concern. The sha256sum mitigates the risk somewhat but the mutable URL pattern is a real weakness. This is a legitimate medium-severity concern, not a false positive.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: witt <1989161762 at qq dot com>
2pkgname=alisase
3pkgver=3.4.2
4pkgrel=4
5pkgdesc="Aliyun sase client."
6arch=(
7 'x86_64'
8)
9url="https://www.aliyun.com/product/security/csas"
10license=('custom')
11conflicts=("${pkgname}" "${pkgname}-bin")
12provides=("${pkgname}-bin" "${pkgname}")
13options=(
14 '!strip'
15)
16install="${pkgname}.install";
17source=(
18 "${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::https://sase-app.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/linux/sase-app-latest.deb"
19 "alisase.service"
20)
21sha256sums=('34032a08479ca6f41e5e0574bad5a0740245a3d4a28706c7b9b3c0e659d0e53d'
22 'a1df4fed3d17a4f52394037129410de342fcc8eb4eab9131b3dece4ba2ebaea4')
23
24build() {
25 bsdtar -xf "${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb"
26 bsdtar -xf "${srcdir}/data."*
27}
28
29package() {
30 install -Dm755 "${srcdir}/usr/local/bin/${pkgname}" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/local/bin/"
31 install -Dm755 "${srcdir}/alisase.service" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/systemd/system/"
32 cp -r "${srcdir}/usr/local/bin/${pkgname}-bin" "${pkgdir}/usr/local/bin/"
33 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/usr/share/applications/${pkgname}.desktop" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/"
34}
35

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-11-01 00:21:48 Medium 2
2026-10-31 00:07:41 Medium 2
2026-10-30 00:29:30 Medium 2
2026-10-29 00:13:55 Medium 2
2026-10-28 00:06:54 Medium 2
2026-10-27 00:23:28 Medium 2
2026-10-26 00:12:40 Medium 2
2026-10-25 00:20:48 Medium 2
2026-10-24 00:14:55 Medium 2
2026-10-23 00:02:19 Medium 2
2026-10-22 00:13:10 Medium 2
2026-10-21 00:12:50 Medium 2
2026-10-20 00:10:31 Medium 2
2026-10-19 00:03:55 Medium 2
2026-10-18 00:06:55 Medium 2
2026-10-17 00:21:55 Medium 2
2026-10-16 00:12:47 Medium 2
2026-10-15 00:28:05 Medium 2
2026-10-14 00:06:47 Medium 2
2026-10-13 00:23:45 Medium 2

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