alisase
This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com (Alibaba Cloud OSS), which is plausibly the official Aliyun SASE client distribution channel. However, the URL uses a 'latest' path component (sase-app-latest.deb) rather than a versioned artifact path, meaning the actual file served could change at any time on the server side — the sha256sum only protects against network tampering at download time but does not guarantee the file matches the declared pkgver=3.4.2. The package installs a closed-source VPN/network-access client binary plus a systemd service that runs at boot, giving it persistent elevated network access. The combination of: (1) a prebuilt closed-source binary, (2) a mutable 'latest' URL that could serve a different binary than what was checksummed, and (3) a systemd service granting persistent system-level network access constitutes a genuine supply-chain concern. The sha256sum mitigates the risk somewhat but the mutable URL pattern is a real weakness. This is a legitimate medium-severity concern, not a false positive.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:18
"${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::https://sase-app.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/linux/sase-app-latest.deb"
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com (Alibaba Cloud OSS), which is plausibly the official Aliyun SASE client distribution channel. However, the URL uses a 'latest' path component (sase-app-latest.deb) rather than a versioned artifact path, meaning the actual file served could change at any time on the server side — the sha256sum only protects against network tampering at download time but does not guarantee the file matches the declared pkgver=3.4.2. The package installs a closed-source VPN/network-access client binary plus a systemd service that runs at boot, giving it persistent elevated network access. The combination of: (1) a prebuilt closed-source binary, (2) a mutable 'latest' URL that could serve a different binary than what was checksummed, and (3) a systemd service granting persistent system-level network access constitutes a genuine supply-chain concern. The sha256sum mitigates the risk somewhat but the mutable URL pattern is a real weakness. This is a legitimate medium-severity concern, not a false positive.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: witt <1989161762 at qq dot com>
pkgname=alisase
pkgver=3.4.2
pkgrel=4
pkgdesc="Aliyun sase client."
arch=(
'x86_64'
)
url="https://www.aliyun.com/product/security/csas"
license=('custom')
conflicts=("${pkgname}" "${pkgname}-bin")
provides=("${pkgname}-bin" "${pkgname}")
options=(
'!strip'
)
install="${pkgname}.install";
source=(
"${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::https://sase-app.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/linux/sase-app-latest.deb"
"alisase.service"
)
sha256sums=('34032a08479ca6f41e5e0574bad5a0740245a3d4a28706c7b9b3c0e659d0e53d'
'a1df4fed3d17a4f52394037129410de342fcc8eb4eab9131b3dece4ba2ebaea4')
build() {
bsdtar -xf "${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb"
bsdtar -xf "${srcdir}/data."*
}
package() {
install -Dm755 "${srcdir}/usr/local/bin/${pkgname}" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/local/bin/"
install -Dm755 "${srcdir}/alisase.service" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/systemd/system/"
cp -r "${srcdir}/usr/local/bin/${pkgname}-bin" "${pkgdir}/usr/local/bin/"
install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/usr/share/applications/${pkgname}.desktop" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |