aliyunpan-cli-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer cygn 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
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Why flagged

The PKGBUILD runs `pip install -r requirements.txt` and `pip install pyinstaller` during the prepare() phase, pulling Python packages from PyPI without pinned versions or checksums. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: any of those PyPI packages could be compromised or typosquatted, and the installed code gets compiled into a standalone binary via PyInstaller and then installed to /usr/bin. Additionally, the dlnap dependency is pulled from a GitHub master branch tarball with SKIP checksum, meaning it is not integrity-verified. The combination of unverified external code execution during build and bundling into a shipped binary represents a real (if not clearly malicious) supply-chain risk. The source tarball itself comes from the official GitHub releases page, which is fine, but the pip-based dependency resolution without lockfile/hashes undermines reproducibility and security.

Triggered rules

Medium pip install of an external package pip_install_external

`pip install <package>` fetches an unpinned package from PyPI at build time, outside source=() and makepkg's checksums.

  • PKGBUILD:25 pip install -r requirements.txt
  • PKGBUILD:26 pip install pyinstaller
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 75%): The PKGBUILD runs `pip install -r requirements.txt` and `pip install pyinstaller` during the prepare() phase, pulling Python packages from PyPI without pinned versions or checksums. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: any of those PyPI packages could be compromised or typosquatted, and the installed code gets compiled into a standalone binary via PyInstaller and then installed to /usr/bin. Additionally, the dlnap dependency is pulled from a GitHub master branch tarball with SKIP checksum, meaning it is not integrity-verified. The combination of unverified external code execution during build and bundling into a shipped binary represents a real (if not clearly malicious) supply-chain risk. The source tarball itself comes from the official GitHub releases page, which is fine, but the pip-based dependency resolution without lockfile/hashes undermines reproducibility and security.

PKGBUILD

2 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Atom Long <atom.long@hotmail.com>
2
3_pkgname=aliyunpan
4pkgname=${_pkgname}-cli-bin
5pkgver=3.0.9
6pkgrel=1
7pkgdesc="Aliyunpan CLI"
8arch=('any')
9url="https://github.com/wxy1343/aliyunpan"
10license=("GPL-3.0")
11makedepends=('python-pip')
12provides=("aliyunpan" "aliyunpan-cli")
13conflicts=("aliyunpan" "aliyunpan-cli")
14source=(${_pkgname}-${pkgver}.tar.gz::"${url}/archive/refs/tags/v${pkgver}.tar.gz"
15 dlnap-master.tar::"https://github.com/cherezov/dlnap/archive/master.tar.gz"
16 "0001-upgrade-requirements.patch")
17sha256sums=('bcf6aefbf2990dd1f81a24b9307363b2198d5540b22c6099d4a56ff25010cba4'
18 'SKIP'
19 '130eae5955b74cdc9984c1bc69982480d0b38fdbe719de068a7a12dcc4c8b3d3')
20
21prepare() {
22 cd "${_pkgname}-${pkgver}"
23 mv -vTf "${srcdir}"/dlnap-master dlnap
24 patch -Np1 -i "${srcdir}/0001-upgrade-requirements.patch"
25 pip install -r requirements.txt
26 pip install pyinstaller
27 export PATH=${HOME}/.local/bin:${PATH}
28}
29
30build() {
31 cd ${_pkgname}-${pkgver}
32 pyinstaller -F aliyunpan/main.py -n aliyunpan-cli
33}
34
35package() {
36 cd ${_pkgname}-${pkgver}
37 install -Dm755 ./dist/aliyunpan-cli "$pkgdir/usr/bin/aliyunpan-cli"
38 ln -vsf aliyunpan-cli $pkgdir/usr/bin/aliyunpan
39}
40
41# vim: set et ts=2 sw=2:
42

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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