ampinstmgr

maintainer Wrxn · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The package downloads a prebuilt binary tarball (ampinstmgr-2.7.2.8.x86_64.tgz) from repo.cubecoders.com, which is CubeCoder's own release infrastructure for their AMP product. This is the official vendor host, not a personal or third-party mirror. However, the concern is real: it is a prebuilt executable blob (not source-built), served over plain HTTP (not HTTPS), with a sha256sum check. The HTTP-only download means the checksum is the only integrity protection — there is no TLS to prevent MITM substitution before the hash check. The binary is installed system-wide and executed as a privileged service. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern (prebuilt binary from vendor over plain HTTP), but not a high-severity attack — the host is the legitimate vendor, the checksum is present, and there is no obfuscation or exfiltration. The license is listed as 'unknown', which is a minor issue but not a security flag.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:22 source=("http://repo.cubecoders.com/$pkgname-$pkgver.x86_64.tgz"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt binary tarball (ampinstmgr-2.7.2.8.x86_64.tgz) from repo.cubecoders.com, which is CubeCoder's own release infrastructure for their AMP product. This is the official vendor host, not a personal or third-party mirror. However, the concern is real: it is a prebuilt executable blob (not source-built), served over plain HTTP (not HTTPS), with a sha256sum check. The HTTP-only download means the checksum is the only integrity protection — there is no TLS to prevent MITM substitution before the hash check. The binary is installed system-wide and executed as a privileged service. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern (prebuilt binary from vendor over plain HTTP), but not a high-severity attack — the host is the legitimate vendor, the checksum is present, and there is no obfuscation or exfiltration. The license is listed as 'unknown', which is a minor issue but not a security flag.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Wrxn <arch@rnny.xyz>
2pkgname=ampinstmgr
3pkgver=2.7.2.8
4pkgrel=1
5epoch=
6pkgdesc="AMP (Application Management Panel) is a simple to use and easy to install control panel and management system for hosting game servers."
7arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
8url="https://cubecoders.com/AMP"
9license=(unknown)
10groups=()
11depends=(tmux socat dnsutils jq qrencode mono)
12makedepends=()
13checkdepends=()
14optdepends=(jre8-openjdk-headless jre-openjdk-headless steamcmd docker)
15provides=()
16conflicts=()
17replaces=()
18backup=()
19options=(!strip)
20install=
21changelog=
22source=("http://repo.cubecoders.com/$pkgname-$pkgver.x86_64.tgz"
23 sysusers.conf
24 tmpfiles.conf
25 )
26sha256sums=('b91c0b87e9e11e5caf0c34735580105c43ee4eb9325b96d9849cdbdf06d7210b'
27 '54478340926d4f49dd784c7cffe8e191a0b5b1dc29b72694f02b40a9672d9237'
28 '5c6a673550c8243556e2c770c8e85f5892cdee334d063e49aa398175b00fce11')
29noextract=()
30
31package() {
32 cd "$srcdir/"
33
34 cp -r . "$pkgdir/"
35
36 rm "$pkgdir/$pkgname-$pkgver.x86_64.tgz"
37
38 # move system units to the correct place
39 install -dm755 "$pkgdir/usr/lib"
40 mv "$pkgdir/etc/systemd" "$pkgdir/usr/lib"
41
42 # add amp user
43 install -Dm644 sysusers.conf "$pkgdir/usr/lib/sysusers.d/ampinstmgr.conf"
44 install -Dm644 tmpfiles.conf "$pkgdir/usr/lib/tmpfiles.d/ampinstmgr.conf"
45}
46
47# vim:set ts=2 sw=2 et:
48

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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