amuletml-bin

maintainer hydraz · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads and executes a shell script (install-amulet.sh) from a personal/project host (hydraz.semi.works) at build time. The script itself likely fetches and installs a pre-built binary, meaning the actual executed code is not fully auditable from the PKGBUILD alone — the install script could download additional binaries from arbitrary locations at runtime. There is no cryptographic verification beyond an MD5 checksum (which is weak and collision-prone), and no PGP signature. The host is non-standard/personal rather than an official distribution mirror or well-known vendor CDN. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: if the install script or the binaries it fetches are replaced, arbitrary code executes during package installation. The sed fixups suggest the script installs pre-compiled binaries with hardcoded paths, confirming binary execution from an unofficial source. This matches the medium severity definition: executed binaries/compiled code from an unofficial host, not clearly malicious but a real concern.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:16 source=("https://hydraz.semi.works/amulet/install-amulet.sh")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads and executes a shell script (install-amulet.sh) from a personal/project host (hydraz.semi.works) at build time. The script itself likely fetches and installs a pre-built binary, meaning the actual executed code is not fully auditable from the PKGBUILD alone — the install script could download additional binaries from arbitrary locations at runtime. There is no cryptographic verification beyond an MD5 checksum (which is weak and collision-prone), and no PGP signature. The host is non-standard/personal rather than an official distribution mirror or well-known vendor CDN. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: if the install script or the binaries it fetches are replaced, arbitrary code executes during package installation. The sed fixups suggest the script installs pre-compiled binaries with hardcoded paths, confirming binary execution from an unofficial source. This matches the medium severity definition: executed binaries/compiled code from an unofficial host, not clearly malicious but a real concern.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# This is an example PKGBUILD file. Use this as a start to creating your own,
2# and remove these comments. For more information, see 'man PKGBUILD'.
3# NOTE: Please fill out the license field for your package! If it is unknown,
4# then please put 'unknown'.
5
6# Maintainer: Matheus Magalhães de Alcantara <matheus.de.alcantara@gmail.com>
7pkgname=amuletml-bin
8provides=('amuletml')
9conflicts=('amuletml')
10pkgver=0.4.0.0
11pkgrel=1
12pkgdesc="The Amulet programming language"
13arch=(x86_64)
14url="https://hydraz.semi.works/amulet/"
15license=('BSD')
16source=("https://hydraz.semi.works/amulet/install-amulet.sh")
17noextract=()
18md5sums=('73b8390cf7974c38dcfd850d7810f0c4')
19validpgpkeys=()
20
21package() {
22 env PREFIX=$pkgdir/usr/ bash install-amulet.sh
23 sed -re "s;exec $pkgdir/;exec /;g" -i $pkgdir/usr/bin/amc
24 sed -re "s;exec $pkgdir/;exec /;g" -i $pkgdir/usr/bin/amc-prove
25}
26

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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