appstart-bin

maintainer orphaned · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary ('appstart') from a personal Gitee repository's attachment storage (not a tagged release artifact, but a raw file attachment with a numeric ID). The binary is installed directly to /usr/bin with 777 permissions. The source host is a personal Gitee project with no verifiable build provenance — the attachment URL format (attach_files/905085/download/) is not tied to any tagged release or reproducible build. MD5 checksums are present but MD5 is cryptographically weak and insufficient to establish trust in an unverified binary. The combination of: (1) prebuilt binary from a personal/unofficial host, (2) no source code build, (3) weak integrity check, and (4) direct installation as an executable constitutes a genuine supply-chain concern. The cheaper model's MEDIUM rating is correct.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:14 source=("https://gitee.com/duapple/go_projects/attach_files/905085/download/appstart"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 85%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary ('appstart') from a personal Gitee repository's attachment storage (not a tagged release artifact, but a raw file attachment with a numeric ID). The binary is installed directly to /usr/bin with 777 permissions. The source host is a personal Gitee project with no verifiable build provenance — the attachment URL format (attach_files/905085/download/) is not tied to any tagged release or reproducible build. MD5 checksums are present but MD5 is cryptographically weak and insufficient to establish trust in an unverified binary. The combination of: (1) prebuilt binary from a personal/unofficial host, (2) no source code build, (3) weak integrity check, and (4) direct installation as an executable constitutes a genuine supply-chain concern. The cheaper model's MEDIUM rating is correct.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: duapple <2832893880@qq.com>
2
3pkgname=appstart-bin
4basename=appstart
5pkgver=0.1.0
6pkgrel=1
7pkgdesc="app batch start up"
8arch=('x86_64')
9url="https://gitee.com/duapple/go_projects"
10license=('unknow')
11depends=()
12makedepends=("git")
13optdepends=()
14source=("https://gitee.com/duapple/go_projects/attach_files/905085/download/appstart"
15 "https://gitee.com/duapple/go_projects/attach_files/905110/download/AppInfo.json")
16noextract=()
17md5sums=("1e2085c2279a0f2ca84eece9d0d53a9b" "061e319a6a66affc7fe345ddb38ad68c")
18
19prepare() {
20 rm -rf ${pkgname}-${pkgver}
21 mkdir -p ${pkgname}-${pkgver}
22 mv ${basename} ${pkgname}-${pkgver}
23 mv AppInfo.json ${pkgname}-${pkgver}
24}
25
26package() {
27 mkdir -p ${pkgdir}/usr/share/${basename}/
28 mkdir -p ${pkgdir}/usr/share/${basename}/config
29 cd ${pkgname}-${pkgver}
30 install -Dm777 ${basename} ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${basename}
31 cp AppInfo.json ${pkgdir}/usr/share/${basename}/config/
32}

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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