arc-bin
This PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary ('arc') from registry.eui.io, which is the Electric UI project's own package registry (matching the maintainer's email domain @electricui.com and the official URL electricui.com). The host is not a well-known, independently audited distribution channel (like GitHub releases or an official distro mirror), but it does appear to be the vendor's own infrastructure. The binary is executed directly and installed to /usr/bin. The sha256 checksum provides integrity verification against tampering in transit, but does not protect against the upstream host serving a malicious binary. Since this is a prebuilt binary from a non-standard host (even if it is the vendor's own registry), it represents a genuine supply-chain concern: if registry.eui.io is compromised or the maintainer's control over it lapses, a malicious binary could be distributed. This is a textbook medium-severity case: not clearly malicious, but a real concern due to the executed binary from a non-mainstream host.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:12
source=("$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz::https://registry.eui.io/arc/${pkgver}/arc_${pkgver}_linux_amd64.tar.gz"
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary ('arc') from registry.eui.io, which is the Electric UI project's own package registry (matching the maintainer's email domain @electricui.com and the official URL electricui.com). The host is not a well-known, independently audited distribution channel (like GitHub releases or an official distro mirror), but it does appear to be the vendor's own infrastructure. The binary is executed directly and installed to /usr/bin. The sha256 checksum provides integrity verification against tampering in transit, but does not protect against the upstream host serving a malicious binary. Since this is a prebuilt binary from a non-standard host (even if it is the vendor's own registry), it represents a genuine supply-chain concern: if registry.eui.io is compromised or the maintainer's control over it lapses, a malicious binary could be distributed. This is a textbook medium-severity case: not clearly malicious, but a real concern due to the executed binary from a non-mainstream host.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Scott Rapson <scott@electricui.com>
pkgname="arc-bin"
pkgver=0.5.8
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="CLI helper for Electric UI project creation, sandbox development and building releases."
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://electricui.com/"
license=('custom')
optdepends=('nodejs: Electric UI projects run on node')
provides=('arc')
source=("$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz::https://registry.eui.io/arc/${pkgver}/arc_${pkgver}_linux_amd64.tar.gz"
"LICENSE"
)
sha256sums=('690a3018f4c77e367fd63bcebf3ffac324ca472c80553dde08714a287bf65517'
'2eb92ca0796a09ccb80ccf5a55c5513bcbd840407da149edcb4a1073db8aa60e'
)
package() {
install -Dm755 "$srcdir"/arc -t "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
install -Dm644 LICENSE "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/LICENSE"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |