arc-bin
This PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary ('arc') from registry.eui.io, which is the Electric UI project's own package registry (matching the maintainer's email domain @electricui.com and the official URL electricui.com). The host is not a well-known, independently audited distribution channel (like GitHub releases or an official distro mirror), but it does appear to be the vendor's own infrastructure. The binary is executed directly and installed to /usr/bin. The sha256 checksum provides integrity verification against tampering in transit, but does not protect against the upstream host serving a malicious binary. Since this is a prebuilt binary from a non-standard host (even if it is the vendor's own registry), it represents a genuine supply-chain concern: if registry.eui.io is compromised or the maintainer's control over it lapses, a malicious binary could be distributed. This is a textbook medium-severity case: not clearly malicious, but a real concern due to the executed binary from a non-mainstream host.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:12
source=("$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz::https://registry.eui.io/arc/${pkgver}/arc_${pkgver}_linux_amd64.tar.gz"
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary ('arc') from registry.eui.io, which is the Electric UI project's own package registry (matching the maintainer's email domain @electricui.com and the official URL electricui.com). The host is not a well-known, independently audited distribution channel (like GitHub releases or an official distro mirror), but it does appear to be the vendor's own infrastructure. The binary is executed directly and installed to /usr/bin. The sha256 checksum provides integrity verification against tampering in transit, but does not protect against the upstream host serving a malicious binary. Since this is a prebuilt binary from a non-standard host (even if it is the vendor's own registry), it represents a genuine supply-chain concern: if registry.eui.io is compromised or the maintainer's control over it lapses, a malicious binary could be distributed. This is a textbook medium-severity case: not clearly malicious, but a real concern due to the executed binary from a non-mainstream host.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Scott Rapson <scott@electricui.com>
pkgname="arc-bin"
pkgver=0.5.8
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="CLI helper for Electric UI project creation, sandbox development and building releases."
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://electricui.com/"
license=('custom')
optdepends=('nodejs: Electric UI projects run on node')
provides=('arc')
source=("$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz::https://registry.eui.io/arc/${pkgver}/arc_${pkgver}_linux_amd64.tar.gz"
"LICENSE"
)
sha256sums=('690a3018f4c77e367fd63bcebf3ffac324ca472c80553dde08714a287bf65517'
'2eb92ca0796a09ccb80ccf5a55c5513bcbd840407da149edcb4a1073db8aa60e'
)
package() {
install -Dm755 "$srcdir"/arc -t "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
install -Dm644 LICENSE "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/LICENSE"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |