arch-quiz

MEDIUM

maintainer dexield 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

View on AUR

Why flagged

A prebuilt x86_64 binary is fetched from a personal DDNS host (dexieldvpn.ddns.net) rather than from the GitHub releases page listed as the upstream URL. DDNS hostnames are dynamic and can be reassigned; the host is not an official or well-known distribution mirror. While a sha256 checksum is present, it only verifies the current content — if the host is compromised or the DNS entry is redirected, a future user gets a different binary with no integrity guarantee (AUR helpers re-download on each install). The binary is installed directly into /usr/bin and executed as a user-space program, so any malicious payload would run with user privileges. The mismatch between the stated upstream (GitHub) and the actual download host is a genuine supply-chain concern: there is no verifiable chain of custody from source code to binary. This is a textbook medium-severity case: an executed binary from an unofficial/personal host.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:10 source=("$pkgname-$pkgver-x86_64.tar.gz::http://dexieldvpn.ddns.net/arch-quiz-$pkgver-x86_64.tar.gz")

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 85%): A prebuilt x86_64 binary is fetched from a personal DDNS host (dexieldvpn.ddns.net) rather than from the GitHub releases page listed as the upstream URL. DDNS hostnames are dynamic and can be reassigned; the host is not an official or well-known distribution mirror. While a sha256 checksum is present, it only verifies the current content — if the host is compromised or the DNS entry is redirected, a future user gets a different binary with no integrity guarantee (AUR helpers re-download on each install). The binary is installed directly into /usr/bin and executed as a user-space program, so any malicious payload would run with user privileges. The mismatch between the stated upstream (GitHub) and the actual download host is a genuine supply-chain concern: there is no verifiable chain of custody from source code to binary. This is a textbook medium-severity case: an executed binary from an unofficial/personal host.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Dexield
    
      2pkgname=arch-quiz
    
      3pkgver=0.1.0
    
      4pkgrel=1
    
      5pkgdesc="Arch Linux trivia quiz game"
    
      6arch=('x86_64')
    
      7url="https://github.com/dexield/arch-quiz"
    
      8license=('MIT')
    
      9depends=('glibc')
    
      10source=("$pkgname-$pkgver-x86_64.tar.gz::http://dexieldvpn.ddns.net/arch-quiz-$pkgver-x86_64.tar.gz")
    
      11sha256sums=('da155cb2246b74bf36058de51a0938a584571368d990005256b0040b38688d51')
    
      12
    
      13package() {
    
      14  cd "$srcdir"
    
      15  install -Dm755 "arch-quiz" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/arch-quiz"
    
      16}
    
      17

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2