arch-quiz

MEDIUM

maintainer dexield 0 votes scanned 2026-11-01 00:21:48.120785

View on AUR

Why flagged

A prebuilt x86_64 binary is fetched from a personal DDNS host (dexieldvpn.ddns.net) rather than from the GitHub releases page listed as the upstream URL. DDNS hostnames are dynamic and can be reassigned; the host is not an official or well-known distribution mirror. While a sha256 checksum is present, it only verifies the current content — if the host is compromised or the DNS entry is redirected, a future user gets a different binary with no integrity guarantee (AUR helpers re-download on each install). The binary is installed directly into /usr/bin and executed as a user-space program, so any malicious payload would run with user privileges. The mismatch between the stated upstream (GitHub) and the actual download host is a genuine supply-chain concern: there is no verifiable chain of custody from source code to binary. This is a textbook medium-severity case: an executed binary from an unofficial/personal host.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:10 source=("$pkgname-$pkgver-x86_64.tar.gz::http://dexieldvpn.ddns.net/arch-quiz-$pkgver-x86_64.tar.gz")

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 85%): A prebuilt x86_64 binary is fetched from a personal DDNS host (dexieldvpn.ddns.net) rather than from the GitHub releases page listed as the upstream URL. DDNS hostnames are dynamic and can be reassigned; the host is not an official or well-known distribution mirror. While a sha256 checksum is present, it only verifies the current content — if the host is compromised or the DNS entry is redirected, a future user gets a different binary with no integrity guarantee (AUR helpers re-download on each install). The binary is installed directly into /usr/bin and executed as a user-space program, so any malicious payload would run with user privileges. The mismatch between the stated upstream (GitHub) and the actual download host is a genuine supply-chain concern: there is no verifiable chain of custody from source code to binary. This is a textbook medium-severity case: an executed binary from an unofficial/personal host.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Dexield
    
      2pkgname=arch-quiz
    
      3pkgver=0.1.0
    
      4pkgrel=1
    
      5pkgdesc="Arch Linux trivia quiz game"
    
      6arch=('x86_64')
    
      7url="https://github.com/dexield/arch-quiz"
    
      8license=('MIT')
    
      9depends=('glibc')
    
      10source=("$pkgname-$pkgver-x86_64.tar.gz::http://dexieldvpn.ddns.net/arch-quiz-$pkgver-x86_64.tar.gz")
    
      11sha256sums=('da155cb2246b74bf36058de51a0938a584571368d990005256b0040b38688d51')
    
      12
    
      13package() {
    
      14  cd "$srcdir"
    
      15  install -Dm755 "arch-quiz" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/arch-quiz"
    
      16}
    
      17

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-11-01 00:21:48	Medium	2
2026-10-31 00:07:41	Medium	2
2026-10-30 00:29:30	Medium	2
2026-10-29 00:13:55	Medium	2
2026-10-28 00:06:54	Medium	2
2026-10-27 00:23:28	Medium	2
2026-10-26 00:12:40	Medium	2
2026-10-25 00:20:48	Medium	2
2026-10-24 00:14:55	Medium	2
2026-10-23 00:02:19	Medium	2
2026-10-22 00:13:10	Medium	2
2026-10-21 00:12:50	Medium	2
2026-10-20 00:10:31	Medium	2
2026-10-19 00:03:55	Medium	2
2026-10-18 00:06:55	Medium	2
2026-10-17 00:21:55	Medium	2
2026-10-16 00:12:47	Medium	2
2026-10-15 00:28:05	Medium	2
2026-10-14 00:06:47	Medium	2
2026-10-13 00:23:45	Medium	2