asleap

maintainer bryanjhv · 8 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads prebuilt .deb binaries (libxcrypt1 and libxcrypt-dev) from archive.debian.org, which is the official Debian archive mirror — not a personal or unofficial host. However, all checksums for these .deb files are set to SKIP, meaning there is no integrity verification for the downloaded binaries. The shared library (libxcrypt.so.1.2.4) extracted from these .deb files is installed into the system and linked against the built binary. While archive.debian.org is a legitimate source, the complete absence of checksum verification means a MITM or server-side substitution would go undetected. The main source tarball from willhackforsushi.com (the upstream author's own site) does have an md5sum. The concern is real but not severe: archive.debian.org is a trusted official Debian host, the package is old (libxcrypt 2.4-4 from Debian), and the use case (building against an older libxcrypt for compatibility) is a known pattern. The SKIP checksums are the primary concern here, making this a low-to-medium supply chain risk rather than a clear attack.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:12 source=("https://www.willhackforsushi.com/code/$pkgname/$pkgver/$pkgname-$pkgver.tgz"

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads prebuilt .deb binaries (libxcrypt1 and libxcrypt-dev) from archive.debian.org, which is the official Debian archive mirror — not a personal or unofficial host. However, all checksums for these .deb files are set to SKIP, meaning there is no integrity verification for the downloaded binaries. The shared library (libxcrypt.so.1.2.4) extracted from these .deb files is installed into the system and linked against the built binary. While archive.debian.org is a legitimate source, the complete absence of checksum verification means a MITM or server-side substitution would go undetected. The main source tarball from willhackforsushi.com (the upstream author's own site) does have an md5sum. The concern is real but not severe: archive.debian.org is a trusted official Debian host, the package is old (libxcrypt 2.4-4 from Debian), and the use case (building against an older libxcrypt for compatibility) is a known pattern. The SKIP checksums are the primary concern here, making this a low-to-medium supply chain risk rather than a clear attack.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Bryan Horna <bryanjhv@gmail.com>
    
      2# Contributor: Henning Mueller <henning@orgizm.net>
    
      3
    
      4pkgname=asleap
    
      5pkgver=2.2
    
      6pkgrel=8
    
      7pkgdesc="Actively recover LEAP/PPTP passwords."
    
      8arch=("x86_64" "i686" "armv6h" "armv7h" "aarch64")
    
      9url="https://www.willhackforsushi.com/?page_id=41"
    
      10license=("GPL")
    
      11depends=("libpcap" "openssl")
    
      12source=("https://www.willhackforsushi.com/code/$pkgname/$pkgver/$pkgname-$pkgver.tgz"
    
      13        "libxcrypt.patch"
    
      14        "fixtimeout.patch"
    
      15        "fixsignal.patch")
    
      16noextract=("libxcrypt1.deb"
    
      17           "libxcrypt-dev.deb")
    
      18md5sums=("a1d06729fb2addcc5b09bfc14f9b3173"
    
      19         "cb9cf76a3e7bee1e546ce9a982b0f912"
    
      20         "e0041a0a74428051cd7d19e0a7c5c5d8"
    
      21         "667aaa95b76327cae3203944f2eb6771")
    
      22
    
      23# Dynamically generate sources and skip sums
    
      24_arch=("amd64" "i386" "armel" "armhf" "arm64")
    
      25_repo="http://archive.debian.org/debian/pool/main/libx/libxcrypt/"
    
      26_vers="2.4-4"
    
      27_pkgs=("libxcrypt1" "libxcrypt-dev")
    
      28for _i in "${!arch[@]}"; do
    
      29	_darch="${arch[$_i]}"
    
      30	_sarch="${_arch[$_i]}"
    
      31	eval "source_$_darch"=\(\)
    
      32	eval "md5sums_$_darch"=\(\)
    
      33	for _p in "${_pkgs[@]}"; do
    
      34		eval "md5sums_$_darch"+=\("SKIP"\)
    
      35		eval "source_$_darch"+=\("$_p.deb::$_repo${_p}_${_vers}_$_sarch.deb"\)
    
      36	done
    
      37done
    
      38
    
      39prepare() {
    
      40	mkdir deb
    
      41	for _p in "${_pkgs[@]}"; do
    
      42		ar p "$_p.deb" data.tar.xz | tar xJC deb
    
      43	done
    
      44	ln -sfr deb/lib/libxcrypt.so.1 deb/lib/libxcrypt.so
    
      45
    
      46	cd "$pkgname-$pkgver"
    
      47	patch -Nup1 -i "$srcdir/libxcrypt.patch"
    
      48	patch -Nup1 -i "$srcdir/fixtimeout.patch"
    
      49	patch -Nup1 -i "$srcdir/fixsignal.patch"
    
      50}
    
      51
    
      52build() {
    
      53	cd "$pkgname-$pkgver"
    
      54	make
    
      55}
    
      56
    
      57package() {
    
      58	cd "$pkgname-$pkgver"
    
      59	install -D asleap "$pkgdir/usr/bin/asleap"
    
      60	install -D genkeys "$pkgdir/usr/bin/genkeys"
    
      61
    
      62	cd "$srcdir/deb"
    
      63	_so=lib/libxcrypt.so.1.2.4
    
      64	install -D $_so -t "$pkgdir/usr/lib"
    
      65	ln -s /usr/$_so "$pkgdir/usr/lib/libxcrypt.so"
    
      66	ln -s /usr/$_so "$pkgdir/usr/lib/libxcrypt.so.1"
    
      67}
    
      68

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2