atani

MEDIUM

maintainer LEONIDAS 1 votes scanned 2026-11-01 00:21:48.120785

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt snap binary from api.snapcraft.io (the official Canonical Snap Store API), extracts it with unsquashfs, and installs the resulting Electron-based executable directly to /opt and /usr/bin. The source host is the official Snap Store API, not a random personal host, so this is not an unofficial mirror. However, the checksum is SKIP'd (the sha384sum is commented out), meaning the downloaded binary is not verified against any known-good hash. A snap revision is pinned (_snaprev=193), which provides some reproducibility, but without an enforced checksum an attacker who could intercept or substitute the download (or if the snap store served a different binary for that revision) would deliver unverified executable code. This is a real supply-chain concern: a closed-source, prebuilt binary with no checksum verification installed as a system executable. The snap store is a legitimate vendor channel for this proprietary app, but the missing checksum enforcement keeps this at medium rather than clean.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:18 source=("https://api.snapcraft.io/api/v1/snaps/download/${_snapid}_${_snaprev}.snap")

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt snap binary from api.snapcraft.io (the official Canonical Snap Store API), extracts it with unsquashfs, and installs the resulting Electron-based executable directly to /opt and /usr/bin. The source host is the official Snap Store API, not a random personal host, so this is not an unofficial mirror. However, the checksum is SKIP'd (the sha384sum is commented out), meaning the downloaded binary is not verified against any known-good hash. A snap revision is pinned (_snaprev=193), which provides some reproducibility, but without an enforced checksum an attacker who could intercept or substitute the download (or if the snap store served a different binary for that revision) would deliver unverified executable code. This is a real supply-chain concern: a closed-source, prebuilt binary with no checksum verification installed as a system executable. The snap store is a legitimate vendor channel for this proprietary app, but the missing checksum enforcement keeps this at medium rather than clean.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Facundo Olasagarre <facundo.vasco@gmail.com>
    
      2
    
      3pkgname=atani
    
      4pkgver=14.39.0
    
      5pkgrel=1
    
      6pkgdesc="The all-in-one crypto platform you’ve been dreaming about. Exchanges, wallets and taxes under one roof"
    
      7arch=('x86_64')
    
      8url="https://atani.com/"
    
      9license=('unknown')
    
      10depends=('nss' 'gtk3')
    
      11makedepends=('squashfs-tools')
    
      12provides=('atani')
    
      13conflicts=('atani-snap')
    
      14replaces=('atani-snap')
    
      15_snapid="fRYdkXBDVAKnSXTJG5xa4PwBR4RqGDkV"
    
      16_snaprev="193"
    
      17install=$pkgname.install
    
      18source=("https://api.snapcraft.io/api/v1/snaps/download/${_snapid}_${_snaprev}.snap")
    
      19md5sums=('SKIP')
    
      20#sha384sums=('2f69cc4963e935a89d54a62dfe452f5bcc9c027d6480dc4e4b561bccd04f0104a745389b552712c64f82068b6a766ee4')
    
      21
    
      22prepare() {
    
      23	echo "Extracting snap"
    
      24	#Extract snap file
    
      25	unsquashfs -q -f -d "${srcdir}/${pkgname}" "${_snapid}_${_snaprev}.snap"
    
      26}
    
      27
    
      28package() {
    
      29	# Install files
    
      30	install -d "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}"
    
      31	cp -r "${srcdir}/${pkgname}/." "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}"
    
      32
    
      33	# Desktop Entry
    
      34	sed -i 's|${SNAP}/meta/gui/icon.png|atani|g' "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}/meta/gui/atani.desktop"
    
      35	install -Dm644 "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}/meta/gui/atani.desktop" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications"
    
      36	install -Dm644 "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}/meta/gui/icon.png" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/pixmaps/atani.png"
    
      37
    
      38	# Clean up unnecessary files
    
      39	rm -rf "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}"/{data-dir,gnome-platform,lib,meta,scripts,usr,*.sh}
    
      40
    
      41	# Symlink binary to /usr/bin
    
      42	install -d "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
    
      43	ln -sf "/opt/${pkgname}/atani" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
    
      44}
    
      45

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-11-01 00:21:48	Medium	2
2026-10-31 00:07:41	Medium	2
2026-10-30 00:29:30	Medium	2
2026-10-29 00:13:55	Medium	2
2026-10-28 00:06:54	Medium	2
2026-10-27 00:23:28	Medium	2
2026-10-26 00:12:40	Medium	2
2026-10-25 00:20:48	Medium	2
2026-10-24 00:14:55	Medium	2
2026-10-23 00:02:19	Medium	2
2026-10-22 00:13:10	Medium	2
2026-10-21 00:12:50	Medium	2
2026-10-20 00:10:31	Medium	2
2026-10-19 00:03:55	Medium	2
2026-10-18 00:06:55	Medium	2
2026-10-17 00:21:55	Medium	2
2026-10-16 00:12:47	Medium	2
2026-10-15 00:28:05	Medium	2
2026-10-14 00:06:47	Medium	2
2026-10-13 00:23:45	Medium	2