autopanovideopro

maintainer Emeric · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball (AutopanoVideoPro_Linux64_262_2017-05-23.tar.xz) from a personal domain (emeric.io) rather than from the official Kolor/GoPro distribution servers. The software itself is a commercial trial binary that is installed directly into /opt and executed. While the sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, the root of trust is the personal host — if emeric.io were compromised or the file swapped, users would execute arbitrary code. The original upstream (kolor.com) is defunct (the URL points to web.archive.org), so the maintainer is re-hosting the binary themselves, which is a legitimate workaround but still represents a supply-chain concern: there is no way to verify this binary matches what Kolor originally distributed. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain risk: an executed prebuilt binary from a non-official personal host with no upstream verification path.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:14 source=("https://emeric.io/CI/kolor/AutopanoVideoPro_Linux64_262_2017-05-23.tar.xz"

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball (AutopanoVideoPro_Linux64_262_2017-05-23.tar.xz) from a personal domain (emeric.io) rather than from the official Kolor/GoPro distribution servers. The software itself is a commercial trial binary that is installed directly into /opt and executed. While the sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, the root of trust is the personal host — if emeric.io were compromised or the file swapped, users would execute arbitrary code. The original upstream (kolor.com) is defunct (the URL points to web.archive.org), so the maintainer is re-hosting the binary themselves, which is a legitimate workaround but still represents a supply-chain concern: there is no way to verify this binary matches what Kolor originally distributed. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain risk: an executed prebuilt binary from a non-official personal host with no upstream verification path.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Emeric <emeric.grange@gmail.com>
    
      2# Created: 12/12/2016
    
      3pkgname=autopanovideopro
    
      4pkgver=2.6.2
    
      5pkgrel=3
    
      6pkgdesc="Stitch and create 360° videos automatically with Autopano Video Pro (trial version)."
    
      7arch=('x86_64')
    
      8url='https://web.archive.org/web/20180822070241/http://kolor.com/autopano-video/'
    
      9license=('custom: "commercial"')
    
      10optdepends=('autopanogiga: Edit control points manually'
    
      11            'gopro-vr-player: 360 video player')
    
      12install="$pkgname.install"
    
      13
    
      14source=("https://emeric.io/CI/kolor/AutopanoVideoPro_Linux64_262_2017-05-23.tar.xz"
    
      15        "$pkgname"
    
      16        "$pkgname.desktop")
    
      17
    
      18sha256sums=('f873cc22700b1805a6cb27cec1afa79e12797464029346fb6aaaa66f8d1cd8a2'
    
      19            'e8f01d2cd75a9e350d4e9b837dc342f2952f0b52125158f22f9e5b35ce71c885'
    
      20            '1c09f2253abf940361dbf38c8ae44895f553244ed7c48c6e5cdf1895383cef27')
    
      21
    
      22package() {
    
      23  cd "$srcdir/AutopanoVideoPro"
    
      24  install -dm755 $pkgdir/{opt/kolor,usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/}
    
      25  cp -r $srcdir/AutopanoVideoPro $pkgdir/opt/kolor/$pkgname
    
      26  #mv $pkgdir/opt/kolor/$pkgname/Copyright $pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/
    
      27  install -Dm755 $srcdir/$pkgname $pkgdir/usr/bin/$pkgname
    
      28  install -Dm644 "$srcdir/$pkgname.desktop" "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/$pkgname.desktop"
    
      29}
    
      30

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2