autopanovideopro

MEDIUM

maintainer Emeric 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball (AutopanoVideoPro_Linux64_262_2017-05-23.tar.xz) from a personal domain (emeric.io) rather than from the official Kolor/GoPro distribution servers. The software itself is a commercial trial binary that is installed directly into /opt and executed. While the sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, the root of trust is the personal host — if emeric.io were compromised or the file swapped, users would execute arbitrary code. The original upstream (kolor.com) is defunct (the URL points to web.archive.org), so the maintainer is re-hosting the binary themselves, which is a legitimate workaround but still represents a supply-chain concern: there is no way to verify this binary matches what Kolor originally distributed. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain risk: an executed prebuilt binary from a non-official personal host with no upstream verification path.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:14 source=("https://emeric.io/CI/kolor/AutopanoVideoPro_Linux64_262_2017-05-23.tar.xz"

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball (AutopanoVideoPro_Linux64_262_2017-05-23.tar.xz) from a personal domain (emeric.io) rather than from the official Kolor/GoPro distribution servers. The software itself is a commercial trial binary that is installed directly into /opt and executed. While the sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, the root of trust is the personal host — if emeric.io were compromised or the file swapped, users would execute arbitrary code. The original upstream (kolor.com) is defunct (the URL points to web.archive.org), so the maintainer is re-hosting the binary themselves, which is a legitimate workaround but still represents a supply-chain concern: there is no way to verify this binary matches what Kolor originally distributed. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain risk: an executed prebuilt binary from a non-official personal host with no upstream verification path.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Emeric <emeric.grange@gmail.com>
    
      2# Created: 12/12/2016
    
      3pkgname=autopanovideopro
    
      4pkgver=2.6.2
    
      5pkgrel=3
    
      6pkgdesc="Stitch and create 360° videos automatically with Autopano Video Pro (trial version)."
    
      7arch=('x86_64')
    
      8url='https://web.archive.org/web/20180822070241/http://kolor.com/autopano-video/'
    
      9license=('custom: "commercial"')
    
      10optdepends=('autopanogiga: Edit control points manually'
    
      11            'gopro-vr-player: 360 video player')
    
      12install="$pkgname.install"
    
      13
    
      14source=("https://emeric.io/CI/kolor/AutopanoVideoPro_Linux64_262_2017-05-23.tar.xz"
    
      15        "$pkgname"
    
      16        "$pkgname.desktop")
    
      17
    
      18sha256sums=('f873cc22700b1805a6cb27cec1afa79e12797464029346fb6aaaa66f8d1cd8a2'
    
      19            'e8f01d2cd75a9e350d4e9b837dc342f2952f0b52125158f22f9e5b35ce71c885'
    
      20            '1c09f2253abf940361dbf38c8ae44895f553244ed7c48c6e5cdf1895383cef27')
    
      21
    
      22package() {
    
      23  cd "$srcdir/AutopanoVideoPro"
    
      24  install -dm755 $pkgdir/{opt/kolor,usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/}
    
      25  cp -r $srcdir/AutopanoVideoPro $pkgdir/opt/kolor/$pkgname
    
      26  #mv $pkgdir/opt/kolor/$pkgname/Copyright $pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/
    
      27  install -Dm755 $srcdir/$pkgname $pkgdir/usr/bin/$pkgname
    
      28  install -Dm644 "$srcdir/$pkgname.desktop" "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/$pkgname.desktop"
    
      29}
    
      30

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2