azardi

maintainer orphaned · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from an Amazon S3 bucket (azardi-download.s3.amazonaws.com) controlled by the vendor (Infogrid Pacific), not from the official project website directly. While S3 buckets can be swapped or taken over, sha512 checksums are present and verified, which mitigates the risk significantly. The binaries are extracted and installed directly without recompilation. The S3 bucket appears to be the vendor's own distribution channel (matching the vendor domain infogridpacific.com), making this more of a 'vendor distributes via S3' pattern than a truly unofficial host. However, since it installs prebuilt closed-source binaries from a non-canonical URL (not the project's primary domain), and the package is quite old (2016), there is a residual supply-chain concern. The checksums do provide meaningful protection against substitution attacks. This sits at the lower end of medium — it's a prebuilt binary from what appears to be the vendor's own S3 bucket with checksum verification, which is a common but not ideal packaging pattern.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:19 source=("https://azardi-download.s3.amazonaws.com/$_deb_file_name.deb"
PKGBUILD:20 "license.html::http://azardi.infogridpacific.com/azardi-license.html")

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from an Amazon S3 bucket (azardi-download.s3.amazonaws.com) controlled by the vendor (Infogrid Pacific), not from the official project website directly. While S3 buckets can be swapped or taken over, sha512 checksums are present and verified, which mitigates the risk significantly. The binaries are extracted and installed directly without recompilation. The S3 bucket appears to be the vendor's own distribution channel (matching the vendor domain infogridpacific.com), making this more of a 'vendor distributes via S3' pattern than a truly unofficial host. However, since it installs prebuilt closed-source binaries from a non-canonical URL (not the project's primary domain), and the package is quite old (2016), there is a residual supply-chain concern. The checksums do provide meaningful protection against substitution attacks. This sits at the lower end of medium — it's a prebuilt binary from what appears to be the vendor's own S3 bucket with checksum verification, which is a common but not ideal packaging pattern.

PKGBUILD

2 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Roman Beslik <me@beroal.in.ua>
    
      2pkgname=azardi
    
      3pkgver=43.1
    
      4pkgrel=2
    
      5arch=("x86_64" "i686")
    
      6url="http://azardi.infogridpacific.com/"
    
      7pkgdesc="The AZARDI book reader by Infogrid Pacific Pte Ltd."
    
      8if [ "$CARCH" = "x86_64" ]; then
    
      9	_arch_file_name="amd64"
    
      10	_azardi_deb_hash="3e4ac185f3a975f9ab335e3fe5fa86d693e61af50aba4b3024f06b1c021e119a03728a2b2dbfe1fece394fb4062daed8f4925b25dc18a607762e9360963895de"
    
      11fi
    
      12if [ "$CARCH" = "i686" ]; then
    
      13	_arch_file_name="i386"
    
      14	_azardi_deb_hash="dcc4e5d025dfd4b508d4dd48261cf391839efee99f0b296d01d45a48193256a1cfad44f98e05c31880d11f41f6b0865cb8505c76d2e8f431744e8578f3c09586"
    
      15fi
    
      16sha512sums=("$_azardi_deb_hash"
    
      17	"bee8db7a3f93387c6a529db26aa9a5351568d72aa6bc64d8b6ce061bfeaf6a7c73bfacb4b1cb63ca6d6924a83e49e6687f4e42fcacaab2eb845582df6ba280ea")
    
      18_deb_file_name="AZARDI_${pkgver}_20160728_$_arch_file_name"
    
      19source=("https://azardi-download.s3.amazonaws.com/$_deb_file_name.deb"
    
      20	"license.html::http://azardi.infogridpacific.com/azardi-license.html")
    
      21license=("custom:azardi")
    
      22install="_.install"
    
      23_src_bin_dir="pkg"
    
      24build() {
    
      25	cd "$srcdir"
    
      26	FILE_NAME=$(find . -name "data.*")
    
      27	mkdir --parents "$_src_bin_dir"
    
      28	tar --extract --auto-compress "--file=$FILE_NAME" -C "$_src_bin_dir"
    
      29	sed -i "s/Categories=Application;/Categories=Office;Viewer;/" "$_src_bin_dir/usr/share/applications/AZARDI.desktop"
    
      30}
    
      31package() {
    
      32	cp -r "$srcdir/$_src_bin_dir"/* "$pkgdir"
    
      33	# /opt/infogridpacific/azardi/LICENSE is the Mozilla license. WTF?
    
      34	install --mode=0644 -D "--target-directory=$pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname" "$srcdir/license.html"
    
      35}
    
      36

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2