backer-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer orphaned 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from cache.getlazarus.org (the vendor's own CDN/cache subdomain, not a random personal host, but still not a primary official distribution channel like GitHub releases or a distro mirror). More critically, the checksum is 'SKIP', meaning there is zero integrity verification on the downloaded executable. The package extracts and installs a binary directly into the system path. While getlazarus.org appears to be the legitimate upstream vendor for Lazarus IDE-related tools, the combination of: (1) a prebuilt binary from a cache/CDN subdomain rather than a canonical release URL, and (2) no checksum verification whatsoever, creates a genuine supply-chain risk — if the host is compromised or the file is substituted, users would install arbitrary code with no detection. This is a textbook medium-severity concern: not clearly malicious, but a real code-execution risk from an unverified binary source.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 source=("${pkgname}-${_pkgver}.tar.gz::https://cache.getlazarus.org/debs/backer_${_pkgver}-amd64.deb")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from cache.getlazarus.org (the vendor's own CDN/cache subdomain, not a random personal host, but still not a primary official distribution channel like GitHub releases or a distro mirror). More critically, the checksum is 'SKIP', meaning there is zero integrity verification on the downloaded executable. The package extracts and installs a binary directly into the system path. While getlazarus.org appears to be the legitimate upstream vendor for Lazarus IDE-related tools, the combination of: (1) a prebuilt binary from a cache/CDN subdomain rather than a canonical release URL, and (2) no checksum verification whatsoever, creates a genuine supply-chain risk — if the host is compromised or the file is substituted, users would install arbitrary code with no detection. This is a textbook medium-severity concern: not clearly malicious, but a real code-execution risk from an unverified binary source.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Dimitris Kiziridis <ragouel at outlook dot com>
2
3pkgname=backer-bin
4pkgver=1.0.2
5_pkgver=1.0-2
6pkgrel=1
7pkgdesc="A simple program to automate rsync backups to multiple devices on OSX and Linux"
8arch=('x86_64')
9url='https://www.getlazarus.org/apps/backer'
10depends=('gtk2')
11license=('GPL3')
12provides=('backer')
13source=("${pkgname}-${_pkgver}.tar.gz::https://cache.getlazarus.org/debs/backer_${_pkgver}-amd64.deb")
14sha256sums=('SKIP')
15
16package() {
17 tar xvf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}/"
18 cd "${pkgdir}/usr"
19 mv local/bin .
20 rm -rf local
21 chmod -R 755 "${pkgdir}/usr/"
22 chmod 644 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/Backer.desktop"
23 chmod 644 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/pixmaps/Backer.png"
24}

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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