berglas-bin

MEDIUM

maintainer orphaned 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary directly from a Google Cloud Storage bucket (storage.googleapis.com/berglas/...) and installs it as an executable. While this is the official upstream distribution channel used by the GoogleCloudPlatform/berglas project (the same bucket is referenced in their official README for installation), it is still a binary blob with only an MD5 checksum (cryptographically weak, collision-prone) rather than a stronger SHA256. The source is not a tagged GitHub release artifact with a verifiable provenance chain. If the GCS bucket were compromised or the object replaced, the MD5 check would not reliably catch a substitution attack. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: an executed binary from a non-standard (non-GitHub-releases) host with a weak integrity check, even if the host is operated by Google.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:9 source=("berglas_$pkgver::https://storage.googleapis.com/berglas/$pkgver/linux_amd64/berglas")

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary directly from a Google Cloud Storage bucket (storage.googleapis.com/berglas/...) and installs it as an executable. While this is the official upstream distribution channel used by the GoogleCloudPlatform/berglas project (the same bucket is referenced in their official README for installation), it is still a binary blob with only an MD5 checksum (cryptographically weak, collision-prone) rather than a stronger SHA256. The source is not a tagged GitHub release artifact with a verifiable provenance chain. If the GCS bucket were compromised or the object replaced, the MD5 check would not reliably catch a substitution attack. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: an executed binary from a non-standard (non-GitHub-releases) host with a weak integrity check, even if the host is operated by Google.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Jonathan Pettersson <anders.jonathan.p@gmail.com>
    
      2pkgname=berglas-bin
    
      3pkgver=0.5.3
    
      4pkgrel=1
    
      5pkgdesc="Berglas is a command line tool and library for storing and retrieving secrets on Google Cloud."
    
      6arch=('x86_64')
    
      7url="https://github.com/GoogleCloudPlatform/berglas"
    
      8license=('APACHE')
    
      9source=("berglas_$pkgver::https://storage.googleapis.com/berglas/$pkgver/linux_amd64/berglas")
    
      10md5sums=('7b5444655f73455eb9e15130bd823efd')
    
      11
    
      12package() {
    
      13  install -Dm755 "berglas_$pkgver" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/berglas"
    
      14}

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2