berrydash

maintainer Lncvrt · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The package downloads a prebuilt binary (a Unity/game executable zip) from a personal/unofficial host (games-r2.lncvrt.xyz) operated by the maintainer themselves. This is a real supply-chain concern: the host is not an official upstream release mirror, there is no way to independently verify the binary's provenance, and if the host is compromised or the maintainer acts maliciously, arbitrary code would be executed on the user's system. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, but does not verify the binary's origin or trustworthiness. The binary is installed to /opt and executed directly. This is a classic AUR pattern for self-hosted game binaries and is not clearly malicious, but it does represent a genuine medium-severity supply-chain risk since the executed binary comes from an unverifiable personal host rather than an established upstream release channel.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:14 "https://games-r2.lncvrt.xyz/berry-dash/Berry-Dash-$pkgver-linux.zip"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt binary (a Unity/game executable zip) from a personal/unofficial host (games-r2.lncvrt.xyz) operated by the maintainer themselves. This is a real supply-chain concern: the host is not an official upstream release mirror, there is no way to independently verify the binary's provenance, and if the host is compromised or the maintainer acts maliciously, arbitrary code would be executed on the user's system. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, but does not verify the binary's origin or trustworthiness. The binary is installed to /opt and executed directly. This is a classic AUR pattern for self-hosted game binaries and is not clearly malicious, but it does represent a genuine medium-severity supply-chain risk since the executed binary comes from an unverifiable personal host rather than an established upstream release channel.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Lncvrt <lncvrtreal@gmail.com>
2
3pkgname=berrydash
4pkgver=26.1
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="A simple game where you catch berries with a leaderboard system and more."
7arch=('x86_64')
8url="https://berrydash.lncvrt.xyz/"
9license=('GPL3')
10depends=()
11makedepends=('unzip')
12options=(!strip !debug)
13source=(
14 "https://games-r2.lncvrt.xyz/berry-dash/Berry-Dash-$pkgver-linux.zip"
15 "berrydash.desktop"
16 "berrydash.png"
17)
18sha256sums=(
19 'd43ec9fd5acdfa210c674655a481343fdb9db7a60d0d0f3960ba44e433d768ca'
20 'a27dae1b8f41d289c04ce9ede426e4938be5ba882cd51d57fee35718ecea2829'
21 '79273f068c2ea02c96fb9ff095de6263bcea3ff0f7d3e5aa06efe2ccf5da027c'
22)
23
24prepare() {
25 mkdir -p "$srcdir/game"
26 bsdtar -xf "Berry-Dash-$pkgver-linux.zip" -C "$srcdir/game"
27}
28
29package() {
30 install -d "$pkgdir/opt/$pkgname"
31 cp -a "$srcdir/game/." "$pkgdir/opt/$pkgname/"
32 install -Dm755 /dev/stdin "$pkgdir/usr/bin/$pkgname" <<EOF
33#!/bin/bash
34cd /opt/$pkgname
35exec ./Berry\ Dash.x86_64
36EOF
37 install -Dm644 "$srcdir/$pkgname.desktop" "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/$pkgname.desktop"
38 install -Dm644 "$srcdir/$pkgname.png" "$pkgdir/usr/share/icons/hicolor/128x128/apps/$pkgname.png"
39}
40

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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