betblocker

maintainer orphaned · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from betblocker.org/front/download/2 — a non-versioned, opaque URL on the project's own domain — and extracts it directly into the package root. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against a known-good hash, which mitigates the risk of silent substitution somewhat, but the URL is not a versioned/tagged release artifact (it's a generic download endpoint that could serve different content over time without changing the URL). The installed artifact is a prebuilt Electron application binary (/opt/BetBlocker/BetBlocker) that runs with user privileges. The host is the official project domain (betblocker.org), not a personal or third-party host, which reduces but does not eliminate supply-chain concern. The non-versioned download URL is the main concern: if the maintainer doesn't update the PKGBUILD when upstream changes the binary, the sha256sum check would catch it, but the URL itself gives no version guarantee. Overall this is a legitimate medium-risk pattern: prebuilt binary from the official vendor site with a checksum, but via a non-versioned endpoint.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:20 source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::https://betblocker.org/front/download/2"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from betblocker.org/front/download/2 — a non-versioned, opaque URL on the project's own domain — and extracts it directly into the package root. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against a known-good hash, which mitigates the risk of silent substitution somewhat, but the URL is not a versioned/tagged release artifact (it's a generic download endpoint that could serve different content over time without changing the URL). The installed artifact is a prebuilt Electron application binary (/opt/BetBlocker/BetBlocker) that runs with user privileges. The host is the official project domain (betblocker.org), not a personal or third-party host, which reduces but does not eliminate supply-chain concern. The non-versioned download URL is the main concern: if the maintainer doesn't update the PKGBUILD when upstream changes the binary, the sha256sum check would catch it, but the URL itself gives no version guarantee. Overall this is a legitimate medium-risk pattern: prebuilt binary from the official vendor site with a checksum, but via a non-versioned endpoint.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Dimitris Kiziridis <ragouel at outlook dot com>
2
3pkgname=betblocker
4pkgver=2.1.2
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="A free tool to help you control your gambling"
7arch=('x86_64')
8url="https://betblocker.org"
9license=("custom:${pkgname}")
10depends=('nodejs-js-yaml'
11 'libnotify'
12 'nss'
13 'libxss'
14 'xdg-utils'
15 'uuid'
16 'libappindicator-gtk3'
17 'libsecret')
18makedepends=('tar')
19options=('!strip')
20source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::https://betblocker.org/front/download/2"
21 'LICENSE')
22sha256sums=('b4aa86e0d8cf8f96fc47adbf925fd90bd98368fcc06f0ec1062548346b6619c6'
23 'c1a90c883551985f77391e693c6615e5b0e4e408d21bbfb9f90d4f03f0654c73')
24
25package() {
26 tar xvf "${srcdir}/data.tar.xz" -C "${pkgdir}/"
27 install -Dm644 LICENSE "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
28 install -d "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
29 ln -sf '/opt/BetBlocker/BetBlocker' "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/betblocker"
30 cd "${pkgdir}/usr/share/doc"
31 mv bet-blocker betblocker
32}
33

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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