bide

MEDIUM
maintainer Eragon 3 votes scanned 2026-11-01 00:21:48.120785
View on AUR
Why flagged

The source is a prebuilt JAR file downloaded from planet-casio.com (a French calculator community site), not from the official GitHub repository (github.com/Zezombye/BIDE). The JAR is executed at runtime by the user's JVM, making it effectively an executed binary from a third-party host. While planet-casio.com is a well-known community site for Casio calculator software and this appears to be a legitimate community distribution point for this tool, it is not the upstream's own release infrastructure. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against a known-good hash, which mitigates (but does not eliminate) the supply-chain risk of the host being compromised or the file being swapped. The risk is real but modest: a compromised planet-casio.com download could deliver a malicious JAR. This fits the medium category — an executed binary from an unofficial/non-primary host with integrity checking present.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:14 "${pkgname}-${pkgver}.zip::https://www.planet-casio.com/Fr/logiciels/dl_logiciel.php?id=118&file=1"
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The source is a prebuilt JAR file downloaded from planet-casio.com (a French calculator community site), not from the official GitHub repository (github.com/Zezombye/BIDE). The JAR is executed at runtime by the user's JVM, making it effectively an executed binary from a third-party host. While planet-casio.com is a well-known community site for Casio calculator software and this appears to be a legitimate community distribution point for this tool, it is not the upstream's own release infrastructure. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against a known-good hash, which mitigates (but does not eliminate) the supply-chain risk of the host being compromised or the file being swapped. The risk is real but modest: a compromised planet-casio.com download could deliver a malicious JAR. This fits the medium category — an executed binary from an unofficial/non-primary host with integrity checking present.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Eragon <eragon at eragon dot re>
2
3pkgname=bide
4pkgver=4.4
5pkgrel=5
6pkgdesc="BIDE, Basic IDE by Zezombye"
7arch=("any")
8url="https://github.com/Zezombye/BIDE"
9license=('GPL')
10depends=("java-runtime=8")
11makedepends=("unzip")
12provides=("bide")
13source=(
14 "${pkgname}-${pkgver}.zip::https://www.planet-casio.com/Fr/logiciels/dl_logiciel.php?id=118&file=1"
15 "bide.desktop")
16sha256sums=(
17 'c1dab3f491405c4d395379e2042ad5eec4507bd50cedf39651cb71fb9a83ec65'
18 '3916d089e4aba7483e2a846dd3422b2d6dcd4d187d8b983c2e696d78f0814aaa')
19
20build() {
21 unzip -o "${pkgname}-${pkgver}.zip"
22 unzip -o BIDE.jar
23}
24
25package() {
26 mkdir -p $pkgdir/opt/bide
27 cp BIDE.jar $pkgdir/opt/bide/bide.jar
28 cp images/BIDEicon.png $pkgdir/opt/bide/bide_icon.png
29 mkdir -p $pkgdir/usr/share/applications/
30 cp bide.desktop $pkgdir/usr/share/applications/bide.desktop
31}
32

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-11-01 00:21:48 Medium 2
2026-10-31 00:07:41 Medium 2
2026-10-30 00:29:30 Medium 2
2026-10-29 00:13:55 Medium 2
2026-10-28 00:06:54 Medium 2
2026-10-27 00:23:28 Medium 2
2026-10-26 00:12:40 Medium 2
2026-10-25 00:20:48 Medium 2
2026-10-24 00:14:55 Medium 2
2026-10-23 00:02:19 Medium 2
2026-10-22 00:13:10 Medium 2
2026-10-21 00:12:50 Medium 2
2026-10-20 00:10:31 Medium 2
2026-10-19 00:03:55 Medium 2
2026-10-18 00:06:55 Medium 2
2026-10-17 00:21:55 Medium 2
2026-10-16 00:12:47 Medium 2
2026-10-15 00:28:05 Medium 2
2026-10-14 00:06:47 Medium 2
2026-10-13 00:23:45 Medium 2

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