bit4id-ipki
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb package (a Smart Card middleware driver containing shared libraries) from repository.infonotary.com, which is not the vendor's primary domain (bit4id.com). InfoNotary appears to be a Bulgarian certificate authority that redistributes Bit4ID software, so this is plausibly a legitimate redistribution mirror rather than a personal/rogue host. However, the source is still a third-party host for executed native code (shared libraries installed into /usr/lib), and there is no cryptographic verification beyond an MD5 checksum (which is weak). The package extracts and installs the .deb contents directly without any signature verification. This constitutes a real supply-chain concern: silent substitution at the redistribution host would result in arbitrary native code execution. The risk is genuine but not clearly malicious, consistent with a MEDIUM rating.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:24
source=('http://repository.infonotary.com/install/linux/DEBS22/pool/non-free/b/bit4id-ipki/'$_file_name)
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb package (a Smart Card middleware driver containing shared libraries) from repository.infonotary.com, which is not the vendor's primary domain (bit4id.com). InfoNotary appears to be a Bulgarian certificate authority that redistributes Bit4ID software, so this is plausibly a legitimate redistribution mirror rather than a personal/rogue host. However, the source is still a third-party host for executed native code (shared libraries installed into /usr/lib), and there is no cryptographic verification beyond an MD5 checksum (which is weak). The package extracts and installs the .deb contents directly without any signature verification. This constitutes a real supply-chain concern: silent substitution at the redistribution host would result in arbitrary native code execution. The risk is genuine but not clearly malicious, consistent with a MEDIUM rating.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Slavi Pantaleev <slavi at devture.com>
pkgname=bit4id-ipki
pkgver=1.4.10.542
pkgrel=3
pkgdesc="Bit4ID Universal Middleware (Smart Card driver)"
arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
license=('unknown')
url="http://www.bit4id.com/"
install=$pkgname.install
# bit4id-xpki also provides /usr/lib/bit4id/libbit4xpki.so
conflicts=('bit4id-xpki')
options=('!strip')
if [ "${CARCH}" = 'x86_64' ]; then
ARCH='amd64'
md5sums=('8ba2c1136d1b5cf005abf72e378d635a')
else
ARCH='i386'
md5sums=('03d84d958ed1ddaf27c2d1e12b43bdd8')
fi
_file_name=$pkgname'_'$pkgver'-1_'$ARCH'.deb'
source=('http://repository.infonotary.com/install/linux/DEBS22/pool/non-free/b/bit4id-ipki/'$_file_name)
package() {
ar -xv $_file_name || return 1
tar -xvf data.tar.xz -C $pkgdir || return 1
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |