bit4id-ipki

maintainer s.pantaleev · 4 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb package (a Smart Card middleware driver containing shared libraries) from repository.infonotary.com, which is not the vendor's primary domain (bit4id.com). InfoNotary appears to be a Bulgarian certificate authority that redistributes Bit4ID software, so this is plausibly a legitimate redistribution mirror rather than a personal/rogue host. However, the source is still a third-party host for executed native code (shared libraries installed into /usr/lib), and there is no cryptographic verification beyond an MD5 checksum (which is weak). The package extracts and installs the .deb contents directly without any signature verification. This constitutes a real supply-chain concern: silent substitution at the redistribution host would result in arbitrary native code execution. The risk is genuine but not clearly malicious, consistent with a MEDIUM rating.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:24 source=('http://repository.infonotary.com/install/linux/DEBS22/pool/non-free/b/bit4id-ipki/'$_file_name)
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb package (a Smart Card middleware driver containing shared libraries) from repository.infonotary.com, which is not the vendor's primary domain (bit4id.com). InfoNotary appears to be a Bulgarian certificate authority that redistributes Bit4ID software, so this is plausibly a legitimate redistribution mirror rather than a personal/rogue host. However, the source is still a third-party host for executed native code (shared libraries installed into /usr/lib), and there is no cryptographic verification beyond an MD5 checksum (which is weak). The package extracts and installs the .deb contents directly without any signature verification. This constitutes a real supply-chain concern: silent substitution at the redistribution host would result in arbitrary native code execution. The risk is genuine but not clearly malicious, consistent with a MEDIUM rating.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Slavi Pantaleev <slavi at devture.com>
2
3pkgname=bit4id-ipki
4pkgver=1.4.10.542
5pkgrel=3
6pkgdesc="Bit4ID Universal Middleware (Smart Card driver)"
7arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
8license=('unknown')
9url="http://www.bit4id.com/"
10install=$pkgname.install
11# bit4id-xpki also provides /usr/lib/bit4id/libbit4xpki.so
12conflicts=('bit4id-xpki')
13options=('!strip')
14
15if [ "${CARCH}" = 'x86_64' ]; then
16 ARCH='amd64'
17 md5sums=('8ba2c1136d1b5cf005abf72e378d635a')
18else
19 ARCH='i386'
20 md5sums=('03d84d958ed1ddaf27c2d1e12b43bdd8')
21fi
22
23_file_name=$pkgname'_'$pkgver'-1_'$ARCH'.deb'
24source=('http://repository.infonotary.com/install/linux/DEBS22/pool/non-free/b/bit4id-ipki/'$_file_name)
25
26package() {
27 ar -xv $_file_name || return 1
28 tar -xvf data.tar.xz -C $pkgdir || return 1
29}
30

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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