bit4id-pki-manager

maintainer s.pantaleev · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary .deb package (libbit4xpki) from repository.infonotary.com, which is a Bulgarian Certificate Authority / PKI vendor site rather than the primary Bit4ID vendor host (bit4id.com). This is a third-party redistribution point for an executed binary, not the canonical upstream source. The package installs application binaries directly into the system. While infonotary.com is a real CA/PKI company and the host appears to be a legitimate mirror/distribution point for Bit4ID middleware, it is not the primary vendor host, creating a supply-chain risk if that host is compromised. An md5sum is provided but MD5 is cryptographically weak. The concern is real but not clearly malicious — this fits the medium category: an executed binary from a non-primary/unofficial host.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:21 source=('https://repository.infonotary.com/ra/Middleware/Bit4id/Linux/'$_file_name)
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary .deb package (libbit4xpki) from repository.infonotary.com, which is a Bulgarian Certificate Authority / PKI vendor site rather than the primary Bit4ID vendor host (bit4id.com). This is a third-party redistribution point for an executed binary, not the canonical upstream source. The package installs application binaries directly into the system. While infonotary.com is a real CA/PKI company and the host appears to be a legitimate mirror/distribution point for Bit4ID middleware, it is not the primary vendor host, creating a supply-chain risk if that host is compromised. An md5sum is provided but MD5 is cryptographically weak. The concern is real but not clearly malicious — this fits the medium category: an executed binary from a non-primary/unofficial host.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Slavi Pantaleev <slavi at devture.com>
2
3pkgname=bit4id-pki-manager
4pkgver=1.4.10.682
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="Bit4ID PKI Manager application"
7arch=('x86_64')
8license=('unknown')
9url="http://www.bit4id.com/"
10options=('!strip')
11md5sums=('bee113c3dfeb52b805fe211739c697a8')
12optdepends=(
13 'bit4id-ipki: Bit4ID Universal Middleware (Smart Card driver)'
14 'bit4id-xpki: Bit4ID Universal Middleware (Smart Card driver)'
15)
16
17# Goes from `X.Y.Z.A` to `X.Y.Z-A`, to match file names on the source server
18pkgver_with_dash=$(echo "${pkgver}" | sed 's/\.\([0-9]\+\)$/-\1/')
19_file_name='libbit4xpki-'$pkgver_with_dash'-bit4id-user.'$CARCH'.deb'
20
21source=('https://repository.infonotary.com/ra/Middleware/Bit4id/Linux/'$_file_name)
22
23package() {
24 ar -xv $_file_name || return 1
25 tar -xvf data.tar.xz -C $pkgdir || return 1
26
27 # Remove drivers. They are packaged separately (as `bit4id-xpki`).
28 rm -rf $pkgdir/usr/lib/bit4id
29 rm -rf $pkgdir/usr/share/bit4id/ccid
30}
31

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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