bit4id-xpki
The PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary .deb package (a shared library libbit4xpki.so and associated files) from repository.infonotary.com. InfoNotary is a Bulgarian qualified trust service provider (CA) that distributes Bit4ID smart card middleware for their PKI infrastructure, so this is a plausible legitimate vendor mirror rather than a random personal host. However, it is still a third-party binary distribution host (not the upstream bit4id.com itself), the license is listed as 'unknown', and the package installs executed native code (smart card middleware/library) directly from this host. An md5sum is provided but MD5 is cryptographically weak. The supply-chain concern is real: if repository.infonotary.com were compromised, arbitrary native code would be installed into /usr/lib. This fits the medium category — a prebuilt binary from an unofficial/third-party host with weak integrity verification, but not clearly malicious.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:20
source=('https://repository.infonotary.com/ra/Middleware/Bit4id/Linux/'$_file_name)
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary .deb package (a shared library libbit4xpki.so and associated files) from repository.infonotary.com. InfoNotary is a Bulgarian qualified trust service provider (CA) that distributes Bit4ID smart card middleware for their PKI infrastructure, so this is a plausible legitimate vendor mirror rather than a random personal host. However, it is still a third-party binary distribution host (not the upstream bit4id.com itself), the license is listed as 'unknown', and the package installs executed native code (smart card middleware/library) directly from this host. An md5sum is provided but MD5 is cryptographically weak. The supply-chain concern is real: if repository.infonotary.com were compromised, arbitrary native code would be installed into /usr/lib. This fits the medium category — a prebuilt binary from an unofficial/third-party host with weak integrity verification, but not clearly malicious.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Slavi Pantaleev <slavi at devture.com>
pkgname=bit4id-xpki
pkgver=1.4.10.682
pkgrel=2
pkgdesc="Bit4ID Universal Middleware (Smart Card driver)"
arch=('x86_64')
license=('unknown')
url="http://www.bit4id.com/"
install=$pkgname.install
options=('!strip')
# bit4id-ipki also provides /usr/lib/bit4id/libbit4xpki.so
conflicts=('bit4id-ipki')
md5sums=('bee113c3dfeb52b805fe211739c697a8')
# Goes from `X.Y.Z.A` to `X.Y.Z-A`, to match file names on the source server
pkgver_with_dash=$(echo "${pkgver}" | sed 's/\.\([0-9]\+\)$/-\1/')
_file_name='libbit4xpki-'$pkgver_with_dash'-bit4id-user.'$CARCH'.deb'
source=('https://repository.infonotary.com/ra/Middleware/Bit4id/Linux/'$_file_name)
package() {
ar -xv $_file_name || return 1
tar -xvf data.tar.xz -C $pkgdir || return 1
# Remove pinmanager. It's packaged separately (as `bit4id-pki-manager`).
rm -rf $pkgdir/usr/share/bit4id/x
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |