bit4id-xpki

MEDIUM
maintainer s.pantaleev 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary .deb package (a shared library libbit4xpki.so and associated files) from repository.infonotary.com. InfoNotary is a Bulgarian qualified trust service provider (CA) that distributes Bit4ID smart card middleware for their PKI infrastructure, so this is a plausible legitimate vendor mirror rather than a random personal host. However, it is still a third-party binary distribution host (not the upstream bit4id.com itself), the license is listed as 'unknown', and the package installs executed native code (smart card middleware/library) directly from this host. An md5sum is provided but MD5 is cryptographically weak. The supply-chain concern is real: if repository.infonotary.com were compromised, arbitrary native code would be installed into /usr/lib. This fits the medium category — a prebuilt binary from an unofficial/third-party host with weak integrity verification, but not clearly malicious.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:20 source=('https://repository.infonotary.com/ra/Middleware/Bit4id/Linux/'$_file_name)
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary .deb package (a shared library libbit4xpki.so and associated files) from repository.infonotary.com. InfoNotary is a Bulgarian qualified trust service provider (CA) that distributes Bit4ID smart card middleware for their PKI infrastructure, so this is a plausible legitimate vendor mirror rather than a random personal host. However, it is still a third-party binary distribution host (not the upstream bit4id.com itself), the license is listed as 'unknown', and the package installs executed native code (smart card middleware/library) directly from this host. An md5sum is provided but MD5 is cryptographically weak. The supply-chain concern is real: if repository.infonotary.com were compromised, arbitrary native code would be installed into /usr/lib. This fits the medium category — a prebuilt binary from an unofficial/third-party host with weak integrity verification, but not clearly malicious.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Slavi Pantaleev <slavi at devture.com>
2
3pkgname=bit4id-xpki
4pkgver=1.4.10.682
5pkgrel=2
6pkgdesc="Bit4ID Universal Middleware (Smart Card driver)"
7arch=('x86_64')
8license=('unknown')
9url="http://www.bit4id.com/"
10install=$pkgname.install
11options=('!strip')
12# bit4id-ipki also provides /usr/lib/bit4id/libbit4xpki.so
13conflicts=('bit4id-ipki')
14md5sums=('bee113c3dfeb52b805fe211739c697a8')
15
16# Goes from `X.Y.Z.A` to `X.Y.Z-A`, to match file names on the source server
17pkgver_with_dash=$(echo "${pkgver}" | sed 's/\.\([0-9]\+\)$/-\1/')
18_file_name='libbit4xpki-'$pkgver_with_dash'-bit4id-user.'$CARCH'.deb'
19
20source=('https://repository.infonotary.com/ra/Middleware/Bit4id/Linux/'$_file_name)
21
22package() {
23 ar -xv $_file_name || return 1
24 tar -xvf data.tar.xz -C $pkgdir || return 1
25
26 # Remove pinmanager. It's packaged separately (as `bit4id-pki-manager`).
27 rm -rf $pkgdir/usr/share/bit4id/x
28}
29

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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