bitscope-dso

maintainer xblack · 5 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt proprietary binary (.deb) from the official vendor domain (bitscope.com) and installs it directly without compilation. This is a legitimate pattern for closed-source hardware vendor software, and the host is the official vendor site rather than a personal or unofficial mirror. However, the package installs an unauditable prebuilt binary with SHA1 checksums (SHA1 is weak but still provides some integrity), and the package() function extracts data.tar.gz directly into pkgdir without any verification of the .deb structure. The main concern is that this is an executed binary from a proprietary source with no source code available for review — a standard supply-chain risk for binary AUR packages. The cheaper model's assessment is essentially correct: this is a real medium-severity concern (prebuilt binary installation) but not an active attack. The official vendor host reduces the risk compared to a personal host, but the pattern of installing unauditable binaries remains a legitimate medium-risk classification.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:23 source=("http://www.bitscope.com/download/files/${_DSOPKG}")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt proprietary binary (.deb) from the official vendor domain (bitscope.com) and installs it directly without compilation. This is a legitimate pattern for closed-source hardware vendor software, and the host is the official vendor site rather than a personal or unofficial mirror. However, the package installs an unauditable prebuilt binary with SHA1 checksums (SHA1 is weak but still provides some integrity), and the package() function extracts data.tar.gz directly into pkgdir without any verification of the .deb structure. The main concern is that this is an executed binary from a proprietary source with no source code available for review — a standard supply-chain risk for binary AUR packages. The cheaper model's assessment is essentially correct: this is a real medium-severity concern (prebuilt binary installation) but not an active attack. The official vendor host reduces the risk compared to a personal host, but the pattern of installing unauditable binaries remains a legitimate medium-risk classification.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer : Marco Camilli <marco@emavap.be>
2# Old Maintainer : William Swanson <swansontec@gmail.com>
3# vim: set ts=2 sw=2 et:
4
5pkgname="bitscope-dso"
6pkgver="2.8.FE22H"
7pkgrel=1
8pkgdesc="Bitscope dso software for oscilloscopes"
9arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
10url="http://www.bitscope.com"
11license=('custom')
12depends=(atk gdk-pixbuf2 gtk2 pango cairo)
13
14if [ "${CARCH}" == "x86_64" ]; then
15 _BITSCOPEARCH='amd64'
16 _BITSCOPESHA1='8a430dca83efe9ae330ec12515ce5439d582eb1f'
17else
18 _BITSCOPEARCH='i386'
19 _BITSCOPESHA1='d2875a326793fdf93ca22d354df62685e7056325'
20fi
21
22_DSOPKG="bitscope-dso_${pkgver}_${_BITSCOPEARCH}.deb"
23source=("http://www.bitscope.com/download/files/${_DSOPKG}")
24sha1sums=("${_BITSCOPESHA1}")
25
26package() {
27 tar -xzf "${srcdir}/data.tar.gz" -C "${pkgdir}"
28}
29

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

Report a package

Reports go to the AURWatch maintainer (one person) and are read by hand. No login required.

0 / 4000
Your suggestion