bittly

MEDIUM
maintainer icepie 1 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage (an executable binary) from res.bittly.sigechen.com, which is a subdomain of the project's own domain (bittly.sigechen.com). This is a personal/small-vendor host rather than a major forge like GitHub releases, meaning there is no independent verification of the artifact's provenance. A sha256sum is provided, which mitigates substitution attacks at build time, but does not help if the upstream host was compromised before the checksum was recorded. AppImages are self-contained executables that run arbitrary code, so the impact of a compromised artifact is full RCE. The host appears to be the official project distribution server (same domain as the project URL), which reduces but does not eliminate the concern — it is not a clearly unofficial or personal third-party host. Overall this is a genuine medium-risk pattern: an executed binary from a small, unauditable vendor host with no independent mirror or reproducible build.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:11 "${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage"::"https://res.bittly.sigechen.com/download/${pkgver}/bittly-${pkgver}-x64.AppImage"
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage (an executable binary) from res.bittly.sigechen.com, which is a subdomain of the project's own domain (bittly.sigechen.com). This is a personal/small-vendor host rather than a major forge like GitHub releases, meaning there is no independent verification of the artifact's provenance. A sha256sum is provided, which mitigates substitution attacks at build time, but does not help if the upstream host was compromised before the checksum was recorded. AppImages are self-contained executables that run arbitrary code, so the impact of a compromised artifact is full RCE. The host appears to be the official project distribution server (same domain as the project URL), which reduces but does not eliminate the concern — it is not a clearly unofficial or personal third-party host. Overall this is a genuine medium-risk pattern: an executed binary from a small, unauditable vendor host with no independent mirror or reproducible build.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: icepie <icepie.dev@gmail.com>
2pkgname=bittly
3pkgver=0.19.1
4pkgrel=1
5pkgdesc="不止是一个串口调试助手 (~ ̄▽ ̄)~"
6arch=("x86_64")
7url="https://bittly.sigechen.com"
8license=('custom')
9depends=('c-ares' 'ffmpeg' 'gtk3' 'libevent' 'libxslt' 'minizip' 'nss' 're2' 'snappy' 'fuse2')
10source=(
11 "${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage"::"https://res.bittly.sigechen.com/download/${pkgver}/bittly-${pkgver}-x64.AppImage"
12 "bittly.desktop"
13 "bittly.svg")
14sha256sums=(
15 '4608abc2da4cb74223391faae3b9b3aa3c0715c41fd06c7eb47b4cd1f316c274'
16 '0b9dbfae82faceb33c027d0686a21d14a3c50b04065458799d2ebe9df87edd03'
17 'a39dfb8e7dc3466c184cc564c3c8d341c5f38065fe46533d1c59620c4273ccd9')
18options=(!strip)
19
20package() {
21 install -Dm755 "${srcdir}/bittly-${pkgver}.AppImage" "${pkgdir}/opt/bittly/bittly.AppImage"
22 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/bittly.desktop" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/bittly.desktop"
23 # install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/bittly.svg" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/bittly.svg"
24 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/bittly.svg" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/scalable/apps/bittly.svg"
25
26 mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
27 ln -sf "${pkgdir}/opt/bittly/bittly.AppImage" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
28}
29

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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