bootstrap-studio

maintainer nathawat_a · 14 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The package downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from releases.bootstrapstudio.io, which is the official vendor release host for Bootstrap Studio (bootstrapstudio.io). This is a legitimate commercial application distributed by its vendor via their own subdomain. The b2sums are pinned, providing integrity verification. However, the pattern of installing a prebuilt proprietary binary from a vendor-controlled (non-GitHub/GitLab) host does carry a real supply-chain risk: if the vendor's release server were compromised or the binary swapped, users would execute arbitrary code. This is the standard medium-risk pattern for prebuilt proprietary AppImage packages in the AUR — not clearly malicious, but not from a universally auditable source. The PKGBUILD itself is straightforward: extract AppImage, copy to /opt, create launcher script. No obfuscation, no exfiltration, no piracy concerns (this is a paid commercial tool being packaged, not cracked).

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:24 source=("https://releases.bootstrapstudio.io/${pkgver}/Bootstrap%20Studio.AppImage"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from releases.bootstrapstudio.io, which is the official vendor release host for Bootstrap Studio (bootstrapstudio.io). This is a legitimate commercial application distributed by its vendor via their own subdomain. The b2sums are pinned, providing integrity verification. However, the pattern of installing a prebuilt proprietary binary from a vendor-controlled (non-GitHub/GitLab) host does carry a real supply-chain risk: if the vendor's release server were compromised or the binary swapped, users would execute arbitrary code. This is the standard medium-risk pattern for prebuilt proprietary AppImage packages in the AUR — not clearly malicious, but not from a universally auditable source. The PKGBUILD itself is straightforward: extract AppImage, copy to /opt, create launcher script. No obfuscation, no exfiltration, no piracy concerns (this is a paid commercial tool being packaged, not cracked).

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: nathawat <nathawat at noreply dot codeberg dot org>
2# Contributor: Mohamed tarek <Mokhamed_tarek@mail.ru>
3# Contributor: rotzelbart <tausendkubik@gmail.com>
4# Contributor: TechVio <68242352+techvio1@users.noreply.github.com>
5# Contributor: chn <g897331845@gmail.com>
6# Contributor: Hunter Wittenborn <git@hunterwittenborn.me>
7# Contributor: Alfin Bakhtiar Ilhami <alfin at nuclea dot id>
8# Contributor: Jan-Tarek Butt <tarek at ring0 dot de>
9
10pkgname=bootstrap-studio
11pkgver=8.0.1
12pkgrel=1
13pkgdesc="Bootstrap Studio is a powerful tool which web developers and designers use to create layouts and fully functional websites using the Bootstrap framework."
14arch=("x86_64")
15license=("custom")
16url="https://bootstrapstudio.io/"
17depends=(
18 'alsa-lib'
19 'gtk3'
20 'libcups'
21 'nss'
22)
23
24source=("https://releases.bootstrapstudio.io/${pkgver}/Bootstrap%20Studio.AppImage"
25 "bstudio.desktop")
26b2sums=('c7dd0e6493fb6317cf4f6da7f2bd83a0e13de4de44a9f8a2455521de07240a8b86512a6ccfbbc0799ff17c09753502b16a9aaefc34ecefee91874775e448a814'
27 '6588d6c99396a05eafa74ca0e4d0c1113ff927f0fc6afc6cf549bf251b1f03a742d0a39d5e1b8bffd0052b49196357daafef371c1ebd49efc16ef353ab3d9daa')
28prepare() {
29 # Extract AppImage
30 echo "Extracting AppImage..."
31 mv "Bootstrap%20Studio.AppImage" "Bootstrap Studio.AppImage"
32 chmod +x "Bootstrap Studio.AppImage"
33 ./"Bootstrap Studio.AppImage" --appimage-extract &> /dev/null
34}
35
36package() {
37 # Copy package files
38 echo "Copying package files..."
39 mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}"
40 cp -Lr "${srcdir}/squashfs-root" "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}"
41
42 # Set permissions
43 chmod a+rx "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}/" -R
44
45 # Create launcher script
46 mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
47 cat > "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}" << EOF
48#!/bin/bash
49if [ \$# -eq 0 ]; then
50 /opt/${pkgname}/squashfs-root/AppRun
51else
52 /opt/${pkgname}/squashfs-root/AppRun "\$@"
53fi
54EOF
55 chmod +x "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}"
56
57 # Copy .desktop file
58 mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications"
59 cp -Lr "${srcdir}/bstudio.desktop" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/"
60
61 # Copy icons
62 mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/"{128x128,192x192,256x256,512x512}"/apps/"
63 for i in 128x128 192x192 256x256 512x512; do
64 cp -Lr "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/usr/share/icons/hicolor/0x0/apps/bstudio.png" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/${i}/apps/"
65 done
66}
67

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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