brother-dcpj562dw-cups-bin

maintainer marlxx · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt i386 .deb binary (a CUPS wrapper, which is an executed binary/library) from download.brother.com, which is Brother's official download server. The host is legitimate — Brother routinely distributes printer drivers this way, and many AUR packages for Brother printers follow this exact pattern. However, the package installs a prebuilt binary without any signature verification beyond a single MD5 checksum (which is cryptographically weak and provides minimal integrity assurance). The binary is executed/installed directly into the system. This is a standard AUR pattern for Brother printer drivers and the host is the official vendor CDN, so the supply-chain risk is real but low in practice. The cheaper model's MEDIUM rating is defensible but slightly over-cautious given the well-known legitimate vendor origin. Still, because it is an unverified prebuilt binary (not source-built), medium is technically appropriate per the rating criteria.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:11 source=("http://download.brother.com/welcome/dlf102104/dcpj562dwcupswrapper-1.0.0-0.i386.deb")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt i386 .deb binary (a CUPS wrapper, which is an executed binary/library) from download.brother.com, which is Brother's official download server. The host is legitimate — Brother routinely distributes printer drivers this way, and many AUR packages for Brother printers follow this exact pattern. However, the package installs a prebuilt binary without any signature verification beyond a single MD5 checksum (which is cryptographically weak and provides minimal integrity assurance). The binary is executed/installed directly into the system. This is a standard AUR pattern for Brother printer drivers and the host is the official vendor CDN, so the supply-chain risk is real but low in practice. The cheaper model's MEDIUM rating is defensible but slightly over-cautious given the well-known legitimate vendor origin. Still, because it is an unverified prebuilt binary (not source-built), medium is technically appropriate per the rating criteria.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: marlxx <marlxxja77@gmail.com>
2
3pkgname=brother-dcpj562dw-cups-bin
4pkgver=1.0.0
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="CUPS wrapper for Brother DCP-J562DW printer"
7arch=("i686" "x86_64")
8url="http://support.brother.com/g/b/producttop.aspx?c=gb&lang=en&prod=dcpj562dw_eu_as"
9license=("EULA")
10groups=("base-devel")
11source=("http://download.brother.com/welcome/dlf102104/dcpj562dwcupswrapper-1.0.0-0.i386.deb")
12md5sums=("a409c03e3aab1c8c28bb2ffcc860b6cd")
13
14package() {
15 tar -xf data.tar.gz -C "${pkgdir}"
16}
17

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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