brother-dcpt700w

maintainer severach · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads prebuilt i386 RPM binaries (LPR driver and CUPS wrapper) from download.brother.com, which is Brother's official vendor download infrastructure. These are closed-source binary blobs that get extracted and installed directly into the system (copied to /opt and /usr/bin). The verification is only MD5 checksums, which are cryptographically weak. However, the host is the legitimate Brother download server, the pattern is standard for Brother printer driver AUR packages (many exist with identical structure), and the binaries are the official vendor-supplied printer drivers. The risk is real but typical for proprietary binary driver packages: no source code, weak checksums, binary blobs executed with system privileges. This is a genuine medium-risk supply-chain concern (unauditable binary from a vendor host with weak integrity verification) but not an active attack or clearly malicious pattern.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:18 "http://download.brother.com/welcome/dlf101950/dcpt700wlpr-$pkgver-0.i386.rpm"

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads prebuilt i386 RPM binaries (LPR driver and CUPS wrapper) from download.brother.com, which is Brother's official vendor download infrastructure. These are closed-source binary blobs that get extracted and installed directly into the system (copied to /opt and /usr/bin). The verification is only MD5 checksums, which are cryptographically weak. However, the host is the legitimate Brother download server, the pattern is standard for Brother printer driver AUR packages (many exist with identical structure), and the binaries are the official vendor-supplied printer drivers. The risk is real but typical for proprietary binary driver packages: no source code, weak checksums, binary blobs executed with system privileges. This is a genuine medium-risk supply-chain concern (unauditable binary from a vendor host with weak integrity verification) but not an active attack or clearly malicious pattern.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Fabio Loli <loli_fabio@protonmail.com>
    
      2# Based on brother-dcpt500w by Samuel Fernando Mesa Giraldo
    
      3# https://github.com/FabioLolix
    
      4
    
      5pkgname=brother-dcpt700w
    
      6pkgver=3.0.2
    
      7pkgrel=1
    
      8pkgdesc="Driver for the Brother DCP-T700W wifi multifuncional printer"
    
      9arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
    
      10url="http://solutions.brother.com/linux/en_us/index.html"
    
      11license=('custom:brother EULA')
    
      12depends=('cups')
    
      13depends_x86_64=('lib32-glibc')
    
      14optdepends=('brscan4')
    
      15install="${pkgname}.install"
    
      16source=('fix_lp.patch'
    
      17        'LICENSE'
    
      18        "http://download.brother.com/welcome/dlf101950/dcpt700wlpr-$pkgver-0.i386.rpm"
    
      19        "http://download.brother.com/welcome/dlf101951/dcpt700wcupswrapper-$pkgver-0.i386.rpm")
    
      20md5sums=('9cd6cc312202017e2273a227d7dfc2ff'
    
      21         '894d2fffe51badc93ebc0ac433317925'
    
      22         'bcd62b9be7bd1707cd243ac184f794b8'
    
      23         'dd4c03ea11be0b570cfe6be0b69c9625')
    
      24
    
      25build() {
    
      26  cd "$srcdir"
    
      27  patch -Np0 < fix_lp.patch
    
      28}
    
      29
    
      30package(){
    
      31  install -d $pkgdir/usr/bin
    
      32  install -d $pkgdir/var/spool/lpd
    
      33  install -Dm755 "$srcdir"/usr/bin/brprintconf_dcpt700w "$pkgdir"/usr/bin/
    
      34  cp -R $srcdir/opt $pkgdir/opt
    
      35  install -Dm644 LICENSE ${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE
    
      36}
    
      37

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2