brother-mfcj430w-cups-bin

maintainer Manos · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt i386 .deb binary from download.brother.com, which is Brother's official download server. The binary contains a proprietary CUPS wrapper filter (cupswrappermfcj430w) that will be executed by the CUPS daemon with elevated privileges when printing. While download.brother.com is the legitimate vendor host, there is no GPG signature verification — only an MD5 checksum, which provides weak integrity guarantees. The binary is architecture-specific (i386) and runs as a CUPS filter, meaning any silent replacement or compromise of the upstream binary would result in code execution. This is a real supply-chain concern (executed proprietary binary, weak integrity check, no signature), though not clearly malicious. The pattern is common for Brother printer drivers in the AUR, but the risk profile remains medium due to the executed binary nature and MD5-only verification.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:16 source=("https://download.brother.com/welcome/dlf006572/mfcj430wcupswrapper-3.0.0-1.i386.deb")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt i386 .deb binary from download.brother.com, which is Brother's official download server. The binary contains a proprietary CUPS wrapper filter (cupswrappermfcj430w) that will be executed by the CUPS daemon with elevated privileges when printing. While download.brother.com is the legitimate vendor host, there is no GPG signature verification — only an MD5 checksum, which provides weak integrity guarantees. The binary is architecture-specific (i386) and runs as a CUPS filter, meaning any silent replacement or compromise of the upstream binary would result in code execution. This is a real supply-chain concern (executed proprietary binary, weak integrity check, no signature), though not clearly malicious. The pattern is common for Brother printer drivers in the AUR, but the risk profile remains medium due to the executed binary nature and MD5-only verification.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Manos Wagner <manos.wagner@gmail.com>
2# Contributor: Silvano Sallese <silvano.sallese@ik.me>
3
4pkgname=brother-mfcj430w-cups-bin
5_printer=mfcj430w
6pkgver=3.0.0
7pkgrel=1
8pkgdesc="CUPS wrapper for Brother MFC-J430W printer"
9arch=("i686" "x86_64")
10url="https://support.brother.com/g/b/downloadend.aspx?c=us&lang=en&prod=mfcj430w_all&os=128&dlid=dlf006572_000&flang=4&type3=561"
11license=("EULA")
12depends=("cups")
13optdepends=("brscan4: scanner support"
14 "brscan-skey: scan key support")
15groups=("base-devel")
16source=("https://download.brother.com/welcome/dlf006572/mfcj430wcupswrapper-3.0.0-1.i386.deb")
17md5sums=("01f8fdb5ff7d047d947fadf17d5d4f60")
18install="brother-mfcj430w-cups-bin.install"
19
20package() {
21 tar -xf data.tar.gz -C "${pkgdir}"
22
23 install -Dm644 "$pkgdir/opt/brother/Printers/$_printer/cupswrapper/brother_${_printer}_printer_en.ppd" \
24 -t "$pkgdir/usr/share/ppd/Brother"
25
26 install -Dm644 "$pkgdir/opt/brother/Printers/$_printer/cupswrapper/brother_${_printer}_printer_en.ppd" \
27 -t "$pkgdir/usr/share/cups/model/Brother"
28
29
30 mkdir -p -m755 "$pkgdir/usr/lib/cups/filter"
31 ln -s "/opt/brother/Printers/$_printer/cupswrapper/cupswrapper${_printer}" \
32 "$pkgdir/usr/lib/cups/filter"
33}
34
35

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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