brouwhulp

maintainer woutifier · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from what appears to be the upstream vendor's own website (wittepaard.roodetoren.nl matches the official project URL listed in the 'url' field), not a random personal host. However, it is still an unofficial/personal domain rather than a well-known forge or distribution mirror, and the package installs a prebuilt binary directly without any source build. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, but does not protect against the host owner substituting a malicious binary. The .deb extraction and direct copy of usr/ into pkgdir is a standard pattern for binary-only packages. The risk is real but modest: if the domain were compromised or the maintainer turned malicious, arbitrary code could be executed on users' systems. This fits the medium supply-chain concern profile — executed binary from a non-standard host — but is not clearly malicious.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:10 source=("http://wittepaard.roodetoren.nl/phocadownload/userupload/${pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb")

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from what appears to be the upstream vendor's own website (wittepaard.roodetoren.nl matches the official project URL listed in the 'url' field), not a random personal host. However, it is still an unofficial/personal domain rather than a well-known forge or distribution mirror, and the package installs a prebuilt binary directly without any source build. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, but does not protect against the host owner substituting a malicious binary. The .deb extraction and direct copy of usr/ into pkgdir is a standard pattern for binary-only packages. The risk is real but modest: if the domain were compromised or the maintainer turned malicious, arbitrary code could be executed on users' systems. This fits the medium supply-chain concern profile — executed binary from a non-standard host — but is not clearly malicious.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Wouter de Vries <wouter@wbdv.nl>
    
      2pkgname=brouwhulp
    
      3pkgver=5.3.5.2
    
      4pkgrel=5
    
      5pkgdesc="a program to design and document beer brewing recipes"
    
      6url="http://wittepaard.roodetoren.nl/index.php/brouwhulp"
    
      7arch=("x86_64")
    
      8depends=("fann" "qt4pas" "openal")
    
      9provides=("brouwhulp")
    
      10source=("http://wittepaard.roodetoren.nl/phocadownload/userupload/${pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb")
    
      11sha256sums=('42286a2589fa923719258d9b0b600a11491e874f2555f6a7fa65f2cd8807759e')
    
      12
    
      13prepare() {
    
      14    tar -xaf data.tar.xz
    
      15}
    
      16
    
      17package() {
    
      18    cp -r usr "$pkgdir/"
    
      19}
    
      20

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2