brouwhulp

MEDIUM

maintainer woutifier 1 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from what appears to be the upstream vendor's own website (wittepaard.roodetoren.nl matches the official project URL listed in the 'url' field), not a random personal host. However, it is still an unofficial/personal domain rather than a well-known forge or distribution mirror, and the package installs a prebuilt binary directly without any source build. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, but does not protect against the host owner substituting a malicious binary. The .deb extraction and direct copy of usr/ into pkgdir is a standard pattern for binary-only packages. The risk is real but modest: if the domain were compromised or the maintainer turned malicious, arbitrary code could be executed on users' systems. This fits the medium supply-chain concern profile — executed binary from a non-standard host — but is not clearly malicious.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:10 source=("http://wittepaard.roodetoren.nl/phocadownload/userupload/${pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb")

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from what appears to be the upstream vendor's own website (wittepaard.roodetoren.nl matches the official project URL listed in the 'url' field), not a random personal host. However, it is still an unofficial/personal domain rather than a well-known forge or distribution mirror, and the package installs a prebuilt binary directly without any source build. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, but does not protect against the host owner substituting a malicious binary. The .deb extraction and direct copy of usr/ into pkgdir is a standard pattern for binary-only packages. The risk is real but modest: if the domain were compromised or the maintainer turned malicious, arbitrary code could be executed on users' systems. This fits the medium supply-chain concern profile — executed binary from a non-standard host — but is not clearly malicious.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Wouter de Vries <wouter@wbdv.nl>
    
      2pkgname=brouwhulp
    
      3pkgver=5.3.5.2
    
      4pkgrel=5
    
      5pkgdesc="a program to design and document beer brewing recipes"
    
      6url="http://wittepaard.roodetoren.nl/index.php/brouwhulp"
    
      7arch=("x86_64")
    
      8depends=("fann" "qt4pas" "openal")
    
      9provides=("brouwhulp")
    
      10source=("http://wittepaard.roodetoren.nl/phocadownload/userupload/${pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb")
    
      11sha256sums=('42286a2589fa923719258d9b0b600a11491e874f2555f6a7fa65f2cd8807759e')
    
      12
    
      13prepare() {
    
      14    tar -xaf data.tar.xz
    
      15}
    
      16
    
      17package() {
    
      18    cp -r usr "$pkgdir/"
    
      19}
    
      20

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2