brouwhulp

MEDIUM

maintainer woutifier 1 votes scanned 2026-11-01 00:21:48.120785

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from what appears to be the upstream vendor's own website (wittepaard.roodetoren.nl matches the official project URL listed in the 'url' field), not a random personal host. However, it is still an unofficial/personal domain rather than a well-known forge or distribution mirror, and the package installs a prebuilt binary directly without any source build. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, but does not protect against the host owner substituting a malicious binary. The .deb extraction and direct copy of usr/ into pkgdir is a standard pattern for binary-only packages. The risk is real but modest: if the domain were compromised or the maintainer turned malicious, arbitrary code could be executed on users' systems. This fits the medium supply-chain concern profile — executed binary from a non-standard host — but is not clearly malicious.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:10 source=("http://wittepaard.roodetoren.nl/phocadownload/userupload/${pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb")

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from what appears to be the upstream vendor's own website (wittepaard.roodetoren.nl matches the official project URL listed in the 'url' field), not a random personal host. However, it is still an unofficial/personal domain rather than a well-known forge or distribution mirror, and the package installs a prebuilt binary directly without any source build. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, but does not protect against the host owner substituting a malicious binary. The .deb extraction and direct copy of usr/ into pkgdir is a standard pattern for binary-only packages. The risk is real but modest: if the domain were compromised or the maintainer turned malicious, arbitrary code could be executed on users' systems. This fits the medium supply-chain concern profile — executed binary from a non-standard host — but is not clearly malicious.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Wouter de Vries <wouter@wbdv.nl>
    
      2pkgname=brouwhulp
    
      3pkgver=5.3.5.2
    
      4pkgrel=5
    
      5pkgdesc="a program to design and document beer brewing recipes"
    
      6url="http://wittepaard.roodetoren.nl/index.php/brouwhulp"
    
      7arch=("x86_64")
    
      8depends=("fann" "qt4pas" "openal")
    
      9provides=("brouwhulp")
    
      10source=("http://wittepaard.roodetoren.nl/phocadownload/userupload/${pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb")
    
      11sha256sums=('42286a2589fa923719258d9b0b600a11491e874f2555f6a7fa65f2cd8807759e')
    
      12
    
      13prepare() {
    
      14    tar -xaf data.tar.xz
    
      15}
    
      16
    
      17package() {
    
      18    cp -r usr "$pkgdir/"
    
      19}
    
      20

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-11-01 00:21:48	Medium	2
2026-10-31 00:07:41	Medium	2
2026-10-30 00:29:30	Medium	2
2026-10-29 00:13:55	Medium	2
2026-10-28 00:06:54	Medium	2
2026-10-27 00:23:28	Medium	2
2026-10-26 00:12:40	Medium	2
2026-10-25 00:20:48	Medium	2
2026-10-24 00:14:55	Medium	2
2026-10-23 00:02:19	Medium	2
2026-10-22 00:13:10	Medium	2
2026-10-21 00:12:50	Medium	2
2026-10-20 00:10:31	Medium	2
2026-10-19 00:03:55	Medium	2
2026-10-18 00:06:55	Medium	2
2026-10-17 00:21:55	Medium	2
2026-10-16 00:12:47	Medium	2
2026-10-15 00:28:05	Medium	2
2026-10-14 00:06:47	Medium	2
2026-10-13 00:23:45	Medium	2