btcli

MEDIUM

maintainer Connor 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary (btcli) from concise.cc, a personal domain belonging to the maintainer, not from the official upstream GitLab repository (gitlab.com/a4to/btcli). While a PGP signature is present and validated (validpgpkeys), the binary artifact is self-hosted by the maintainer on their own infrastructure rather than being built from source or fetched from the official project's release infrastructure. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: if concise.cc is compromised or the maintainer silently swaps the artifact, users receive an arbitrary binary executed with install -Dm755. The arch=(any) designation is also suspicious for a compiled binary. The sha512sums provide some integrity protection but do not protect against the maintainer intentionally substituting a malicious binary. This pattern — prebuilt binary from a personal/unofficial host — is the canonical medium-risk supply-chain scenario.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:12 "https://concise.cc/pkg/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-$arch.pkg.tar.zst"

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary (btcli) from concise.cc, a personal domain belonging to the maintainer, not from the official upstream GitLab repository (gitlab.com/a4to/btcli). While a PGP signature is present and validated (validpgpkeys), the binary artifact is self-hosted by the maintainer on their own infrastructure rather than being built from source or fetched from the official project's release infrastructure. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: if concise.cc is compromised or the maintainer silently swaps the artifact, users receive an arbitrary binary executed with install -Dm755. The arch=(any) designation is also suspicious for a compiled binary. The sha512sums provide some integrity protection but do not protect against the maintainer intentionally substituting a malicious binary. This pattern — prebuilt binary from a personal/unofficial host — is the canonical medium-risk supply-chain scenario.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Connor Etherington <connor@concise.cc>
    
      2# ---
    
      3pkgname=btcli
    
      4pkgver=0.1.0
    
      5pkgrel=1
    
      6pkgdesc="A simple, easy to use, CLI bluetooth connections manager"
    
      7arch=(any)
    
      8url="https://gitlab.com/a4to/${pkgname}"
    
      9license=('MIT')
    
      10depends=()
    
      11source=(
    
      12  "https://concise.cc/pkg/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-$arch.pkg.tar.zst"
    
      13  "https://concise.cc/pkg/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-$arch.pkg.tar.zst.sig"
    
      14  )
    
      15sha512sums=(
    
      16  '61142e74ccd70ef40f25a4064235504ee32ed461b5f702c1d9d6159623f0b2f0b58d5146ad56c45a35c8e2a3b521b1054041a844c093103011ddb4e55f3fcfc4'
    
      17  'eeb5edbbabccd266ebbfb06656bc4d2bd983eb6b9c821b66f55d3cb6e94bcc022e0069b8f9c8fa38fa925c94b618ff71d1945349e2cac332d35f09fac3bcbe69'
    
      18  )
    
      19md5sums=(
    
      20  'da0f1e2749c1a4e9b143fcf3ba0e6ed1'
    
      21  '3f538d3a7747690c5906347a9b56acf7'
    
      22  )
    
      23validpgpkeys=('9A1F3F41DDA55A60331CB8DD3714CB0967D15980')
    
      24
    
      25package() {
    
      26    install -Dm644 usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
    
      27    install -Dm755 usr/bin/${pkgname} "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}"
    
      28}
    
      29

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2