buttercup
This PKGBUILD has two real but non-malicious concerns: (1) It downloads a precompiled binary from GitHub releases with sha256sums='SKIP', meaning no integrity verification of the binary being installed to /usr/bin. The binary is from a small personal project (Wraient/buttercup) with no checksum pinning. (2) The build() step runs 'npm install -g webtorrent-cli' which installs an npm package globally into the system (outside $pkgdir), bypassing pacman's package management entirely. webtorrent-cli is a legitimate well-known package, but installing it globally via npm in build() is non-standard and leaves untracked files on the system. Neither pattern constitutes active malware/RCE/exfiltration, but the combination of an unverified binary + a global npm install that escapes pacman's control is a genuine medium-severity packaging concern. The pkgver() function also fetches from the GitHub API at build time, which is unusual but not malicious.
Triggered rules
npm_install_external
Runs `npm/yarn/pnpm install <package>` for a package not in source=(), pulling unpinned, unreviewed code at build time. Severity downgraded: the package declares/looks like a Node.js consumer, where build-time installs are expected.
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PKGBUILD:22
npm install -g webtorrent-cli
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): This PKGBUILD has two real but non-malicious concerns: (1) It downloads a precompiled binary from GitHub releases with sha256sums='SKIP', meaning no integrity verification of the binary being installed to /usr/bin. The binary is from a small personal project (Wraient/buttercup) with no checksum pinning. (2) The build() step runs 'npm install -g webtorrent-cli' which installs an npm package globally into the system (outside $pkgdir), bypassing pacman's package management entirely. webtorrent-cli is a legitimate well-known package, but installing it globally via npm in build() is non-standard and leaves untracked files on the system. Neither pattern constitutes active malware/RCE/exfiltration, but the combination of an unverified binary + a global npm install that escapes pacman's control is a genuine medium-severity packaging concern. The pkgver() function also fetches from the GitHub API at build time, which is unusual but not malicious.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Wraient <rushikeshwastaken@gmail.com>
pkgname='buttercup'
pkgver=1.1.0
pkgrel=2
pkgdesc="Watch TV Shows / Movies from torrent."
arch=("x86_64")
url="https://github.com/Wraient/buttercup"
license=('GPL')
depends=('mpv' 'rofi' 'npm')
source=("buttercup::https://github.com/Wraient/buttercup/releases/latest/download/buttercup")
sha256sums=('SKIP')
pkgver() {
# Fetch the latest release tag from GitHub and set it as pkgver
local latest_release
latest_release=$(curl -s https://api.github.com/repos/Wraient/buttercup/releases/latest | grep -Po '"tag_name": "\K.*?(?=")')
echo "${latest_release#v}"
}
build() {
# Install webtorrent-cli globally via npm
npm install -g webtorrent-cli
}
package() {
# Install the precompiled binary into /usr/bin
install -Dm755 "$srcdir/buttercup" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/buttercup"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |