buttercup
This PKGBUILD has two real but non-malicious concerns: (1) It downloads a precompiled binary from GitHub releases with sha256sums='SKIP', meaning no integrity verification of the binary being installed to /usr/bin. The binary is from a small personal project (Wraient/buttercup) with no checksum pinning. (2) The build() step runs 'npm install -g webtorrent-cli' which installs an npm package globally into the system (outside $pkgdir), bypassing pacman's package management entirely. webtorrent-cli is a legitimate well-known package, but installing it globally via npm in build() is non-standard and leaves untracked files on the system. Neither pattern constitutes active malware/RCE/exfiltration, but the combination of an unverified binary + a global npm install that escapes pacman's control is a genuine medium-severity packaging concern. The pkgver() function also fetches from the GitHub API at build time, which is unusual but not malicious.
Triggered rules
npm_install_external
Runs `npm/yarn/pnpm install <package>` for a package not in source=(), pulling unpinned, unreviewed code at build time. Severity downgraded: the package declares/looks like a Node.js consumer, where build-time installs are expected.
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PKGBUILD:22
npm install -g webtorrent-cli
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): This PKGBUILD has two real but non-malicious concerns: (1) It downloads a precompiled binary from GitHub releases with sha256sums='SKIP', meaning no integrity verification of the binary being installed to /usr/bin. The binary is from a small personal project (Wraient/buttercup) with no checksum pinning. (2) The build() step runs 'npm install -g webtorrent-cli' which installs an npm package globally into the system (outside $pkgdir), bypassing pacman's package management entirely. webtorrent-cli is a legitimate well-known package, but installing it globally via npm in build() is non-standard and leaves untracked files on the system. Neither pattern constitutes active malware/RCE/exfiltration, but the combination of an unverified binary + a global npm install that escapes pacman's control is a genuine medium-severity packaging concern. The pkgver() function also fetches from the GitHub API at build time, which is unusual but not malicious.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Wraient <rushikeshwastaken@gmail.com>
pkgname='buttercup'
pkgver=1.1.0
pkgrel=2
pkgdesc="Watch TV Shows / Movies from torrent."
arch=("x86_64")
url="https://github.com/Wraient/buttercup"
license=('GPL')
depends=('mpv' 'rofi' 'npm')
source=("buttercup::https://github.com/Wraient/buttercup/releases/latest/download/buttercup")
sha256sums=('SKIP')
pkgver() {
# Fetch the latest release tag from GitHub and set it as pkgver
local latest_release
latest_release=$(curl -s https://api.github.com/repos/Wraient/buttercup/releases/latest | grep -Po '"tag_name": "\K.*?(?=")')
echo "${latest_release#v}"
}
build() {
# Install webtorrent-cli globally via npm
npm install -g webtorrent-cli
}
package() {
# Install the precompiled binary into /usr/bin
install -Dm755 "$srcdir/buttercup" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/buttercup"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |