byond

maintainer bug · 9 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary archive from secure.byond.com, which is the official BYOND vendor download server. The host is legitimate and well-known in the BYOND/SS13 community. However, the package installs closed-source, prebuilt executables (DreamDaemon, DreamMaker) directly from a binary-only distribution with only an MD5 checksum (which is cryptographically weak). There is no source code to audit, no GPG signature verification, and MD5 is insufficient to protect against a targeted substitution attack. The binaries are executed at runtime as a game server engine. This is a standard pattern for proprietary binary AUR packages (like steam, discord, etc.), but the weak integrity check and binary-only nature from a vendor host does represent a real, if low-probability, supply-chain concern. Rating medium is appropriate: it's not clearly malicious, but it is an executed binary from a non-open-source host with weak integrity verification.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 source=("https://secure.byond.com/games/download/build/${_pkgvermajor}/${pkgver}_byond_linux.zip")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary archive from secure.byond.com, which is the official BYOND vendor download server. The host is legitimate and well-known in the BYOND/SS13 community. However, the package installs closed-source, prebuilt executables (DreamDaemon, DreamMaker) directly from a binary-only distribution with only an MD5 checksum (which is cryptographically weak). There is no source code to audit, no GPG signature verification, and MD5 is insufficient to protect against a targeted substitution attack. The binaries are executed at runtime as a game server engine. This is a standard pattern for proprietary binary AUR packages (like steam, discord, etc.), but the weak integrity check and binary-only nature from a vendor host does represent a real, if low-probability, supply-chain concern. Rating medium is appropriate: it's not clearly malicious, but it is an executed binary from a non-open-source host with weak integrity verification.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Contributor: Bug <bug2000@gmail.com> [Thank you the all mighty omp!]
2# Maintainer: Bug <bug2000@gmail.com>
3pkgname=byond
4_pkgvermajor=516
5_pkgverminor=1681
6pkgver="$_pkgvermajor.$_pkgverminor"
7pkgrel=1
8pkgdesc="Game server based on the 'Byond' language [Build your own net dream]."
9arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
10url="https://www.byond.com/"
11license=('unknown')
12depends=('libpng' 'ncurses' 'gcc-libs')
13source=("https://secure.byond.com/games/download/build/${_pkgvermajor}/${pkgver}_byond_linux.zip")
14md5sums=('514d60dc4a7730bdb1c232d0b33eec43')
15build() {
16 cd "${srcdir}/${pkgname}"
17 chmod 644 man/man6/DreamDaemon.6
18 chmod 644 man/man6/DreamMaker.6
19
20 sed -i \
21 -e "/^BYOND_SYSTEM/s|=.*|= ${pkgdir}/usr/share/byond|" \
22 -e "/^BIN_DIR/s|=.*|= ${pkgdir}/usr/bin|" \
23 -e "/^LIB_DIR/s|=.*|= ${pkgdir}/usr/lib|" \
24 -e "/^MAN_DIR/s|=.*|= ${pkgdir}/usr/share/man|" \
25 -e "/ln -f -s/s|\$(BYOND_SYSTEM)|/usr/share/byond|" \
26 -e "s/libzip/libext/g" \
27 -e "/libpng/d" \
28 -e "/ldconfig/d" \
29 Makefile
30 make
31}
32
33package(){
34 cd "${srcdir}/${pkgname}"
35 mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/usr/"{bin,lib,share/byond,share/man/man6}
36 make install
37}
38

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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