capacities-bin

MEDIUM

maintainer BoredYama 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

View on AUR

Why flagged

The package downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from a DigitalOcean Spaces CDN bucket (capacities-desktop-app.fra1.cdn.digitaloceanspaces.com). This is a common pattern for Electron/AppImage-based AUR packages where the vendor hosts release artifacts on a CDN rather than GitHub releases. The URL structure (project-named bucket, versioned filename) is consistent with an official vendor CDN. A sha256sum is provided, which mitigates substitution risk at download time. However, this is still an executed binary (AppImage is extracted and run during prepare(), and installed for execution) from a non-primary domain with no GPG signature verification. If the CDN bucket were compromised or the maintainer's checksum were wrong/manipulated, arbitrary code would execute. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: a prebuilt binary from a non-GitHub/non-primary-domain host with only a sha256 checksum and no upstream signature verification. Not clearly malicious, but not clean either.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:14 source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage::https://capacities-desktop-app.fra1.cdn.digitaloceanspaces.com/Capacities-${pkgver}.AppImage")

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from a DigitalOcean Spaces CDN bucket (capacities-desktop-app.fra1.cdn.digitaloceanspaces.com). This is a common pattern for Electron/AppImage-based AUR packages where the vendor hosts release artifacts on a CDN rather than GitHub releases. The URL structure (project-named bucket, versioned filename) is consistent with an official vendor CDN. A sha256sum is provided, which mitigates substitution risk at download time. However, this is still an executed binary (AppImage is extracted and run during prepare(), and installed for execution) from a non-primary domain with no GPG signature verification. If the CDN bucket were compromised or the maintainer's checksum were wrong/manipulated, arbitrary code would execute. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: a prebuilt binary from a non-GitHub/non-primary-domain host with only a sha256 checksum and no upstream signature verification. Not clearly malicious, but not clean either.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: BoredYama sagargaud88@gmail.com
    
      2
    
      3pkgname=capacities-bin
    
      4pkgver=1.54.17
    
      5pkgrel=1
    
      6pkgdesc="A note-taking app for organizing your knowledge"
    
      7arch=('x86_64')
    
      8url="https://capacities.io"
    
      9license=('custom')
    
      10depends=('fuse2' 'zlib' 'hicolor-icon-theme')
    
      11provides=('capacities')
    
      12conflicts=('capacities')
    
      13options=(!strip)
    
      14source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage::https://capacities-desktop-app.fra1.cdn.digitaloceanspaces.com/Capacities-${pkgver}.AppImage")
    
      15sha256sums=('e40f8bad35f5a4c4b12575ff23b8101b266f6617f841be4cd2c66711cb8fd844')
    
      16
    
      17prepare() {
    
      18    chmod +x "${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage"
    
      19    ./"${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage" --appimage-extract
    
      20}
    
      21
    
      22package() {
    
      23    # Install the AppImage
    
      24    install -Dm755 "${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage" \
    
      25        "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.AppImage"
    
      26    
    
      27    # Create launcher script
    
      28    install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
    
      29    cat > "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/capacities" << 'EOF'
    
      30#!/bin/sh
    
      31exec /opt/capacities-bin/capacities-bin.AppImage "$@"
    
      32EOF
    
      33    chmod +x "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/capacities"
    
      34    
    
      35    # Install desktop file
    
      36    install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/capacities.desktop" \
    
      37        "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/capacities.desktop"
    
      38    
    
      39    # Fix Exec line in desktop file
    
      40    sed -i 's|Exec=AppRun|Exec=/usr/bin/capacities|g' \
    
      41        "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/capacities.desktop"
    
      42    
    
      43    # Install icons
    
      44    for size in 16 32 48 64 128 256 512; do
    
      45        if [ -f "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/usr/share/icons/hicolor/${size}x${size}/apps/capacities.png" ]; then
    
      46            install -Dm644 \
    
      47                "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/usr/share/icons/hicolor/${size}x${size}/apps/capacities.png" \
    
      48                "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/${size}x${size}/apps/capacities.png"
    
      49        fi
    
      50    done
    
      51    
    
      52    # Fallback icon
    
      53    if [ -f "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/capacities.png" ]; then
    
      54        install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/capacities.png" \
    
      55            "${pkgdir}/usr/share/pixmaps/capacities.png"
    
      56    fi
    
      57}
    
      58

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2