celeste-client-bin

maintainer orphaned · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt snap binary from api.snapcraft.io and extracts/installs the binary directly. api.snapcraft.io is Canonical's official Snap Store API, so this is a legitimate vendor distribution channel (analogous to downloading from the Ubuntu Snap Store). However, the concern is real from an Arch packaging perspective: snap binaries are not the upstream source, they are pre-compiled opaque blobs from a third-party distribution channel rather than the project's own GitHub releases. The binary is installed directly to /usr/bin without any source build. The sha256sum pins a specific snap revision (_snap token includes revision _36), which mitigates substitution risk somewhat, but the snap store could theoretically serve different content under the same URL in the future. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: an executed binary from a non-primary distribution channel (not GitHub releases, not the project's own hosting), even if Canonical's infrastructure is generally trustworthy. The pattern is common in AUR for snap-based packages but does represent a real risk compared to building from source or downloading from the project's own release page.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:31 source=("${pkgname%-bin}-${pkgver}.snap::https://api.snapcraft.io/api/v1/snaps/download/${_snap}.snap")

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt snap binary from api.snapcraft.io and extracts/installs the binary directly. api.snapcraft.io is Canonical's official Snap Store API, so this is a legitimate vendor distribution channel (analogous to downloading from the Ubuntu Snap Store). However, the concern is real from an Arch packaging perspective: snap binaries are not the upstream source, they are pre-compiled opaque blobs from a third-party distribution channel rather than the project's own GitHub releases. The binary is installed directly to /usr/bin without any source build. The sha256sum pins a specific snap revision (_snap token includes revision _36), which mitigates substitution risk somewhat, but the snap store could theoretically serve different content under the same URL in the future. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: an executed binary from a non-primary distribution channel (not GitHub releases, not the project's own hosting), even if Canonical's infrastructure is generally trustworthy. The pattern is common in AUR for snap-based packages but does represent a real risk compared to building from source or downloading from the project's own release page.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: zxp19821005 <zxp19821005 at 163 dot com>
    
      2# Contributor: Fabio 'Lolix' Loli <fabio.loli@disroot.org> -> https://github.com/FabioLolix
    
      3#_getverurl="https://github.com/flathub/com.hunterwittenborn.Celeste/blob/master/com.hunterwittenborn.Celeste.yml"
    
      4_pkgname=celeste
    
      5pkgname="${_pkgname}-client-bin"
    
      6_appname=com.hunterwittenborn.Celeste
    
      7pkgver=0.8.3
    
      8_snap="a9zAmHVl4doDwIGkptVyA7VI7fMlPPpE_36"
    
      9pkgrel=3
    
      10pkgdesc="GUI file synchronization client that can sync with any cloud provider "
    
      11arch=('x86_64')
    
      12url="https://github.com/hwittenborn/celeste"
    
      13license=('GPL-3.0-or-later')
    
      14provides=(
    
      15    "${pkgname%-bin}=${pkgver}"
    
      16    "${_pkgname}=${pkgver}"
    
      17)
    
      18conflicts=(
    
      19    "${pkgname%-bin}"
    
      20    "${_pkgname}"
    
      21)
    
      22depends=(
    
      23    'libadwaita'
    
      24    'rclone'
    
      25)
    
      26makedepends=(
    
      27    'squashfs-tools'
    
      28)
    
      29source=()
    
      30
    
      31source=("${pkgname%-bin}-${pkgver}.snap::https://api.snapcraft.io/api/v1/snaps/download/${_snap}.snap")
    
      32sha256sums=('b8dc5d75c795930529018096523ade359aff22543a18c9eaeff8b20bbf0d7f38')
    
      33prepare() {
    
      34    unsquashfs -f "${srcdir}/${pkgname%-bin}-${pkgver}.snap"
    
      35    sed -e "
    
      36        s/Exec=${_pkgname}/Exec=${pkgname%-bin}/g
    
      37        s/Icon=${_appname}/Icon=${pkgname%-bin}/g
    
      38    " -i "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/usr/share/applications/${_appname}.desktop"
    
      39    sed -i "s/${_appname}/${pkgname%-bin}/g" "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/usr/share/metainfo/${_appname}.metainfo.xml"
    
      40}
    
      41package() {
    
      42    install -Dm755 "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/usr/bin/${_pkgname}" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname%-bin}"
    
      43    install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/usr/share/applications/${_appname}.desktop" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/${pkgname%-bin}.desktop"
    
      44    install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/usr/share/icons/hicolor/scalable/apps/${_appname}.svg" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/scalable/app/${pkgname%-bin}.svg"
    
      45}

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2