chakracore-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer eggbertx 2 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball (containing an executable 'ch' and shared library 'libChakraCore.so') from 'chakra-core.shortdev.de', which is not the official Microsoft/chakra-core GitHub releases infrastructure. The official release artifacts for ChakraCore are hosted at github.com/chakra-core/ChakraCore/releases. This third-party mirror/redirect host introduces a genuine supply-chain risk: if the host is compromised or controlled by a malicious actor, the prebuilt binaries (which are installed as an executable and a shared library) could execute arbitrary code on the user's system. The SHA256 checksum provides some protection against in-transit tampering but does not protect against the host serving a malicious file that matches the recorded hash (if the hash was recorded from the same untrusted host). This is a textbook medium-severity supply-chain concern: executed binaries from a non-official host.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:15 source=("https://chakra-core.shortdev.de/releases/v$pkgver/cc_linux_x64_1_11_24.tar.gz")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 85%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball (containing an executable 'ch' and shared library 'libChakraCore.so') from 'chakra-core.shortdev.de', which is not the official Microsoft/chakra-core GitHub releases infrastructure. The official release artifacts for ChakraCore are hosted at github.com/chakra-core/ChakraCore/releases. This third-party mirror/redirect host introduces a genuine supply-chain risk: if the host is compromised or controlled by a malicious actor, the prebuilt binaries (which are installed as an executable and a shared library) could execute arbitrary code on the user's system. The SHA256 checksum provides some protection against in-transit tampering but does not protect against the host serving a malicious file that matches the recorded hash (if the hash was recorded from the same untrusted host). This is a textbook medium-severity supply-chain concern: executed binaries from a non-official host.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: eggbertx <eggbertxdev at gmail dot com>
2# Previous maintainer: Felix Golatofski <contact at xdfr dot de>
3# Contributor: michaelchou <michaeljchou at the hotmail domain which is .com>
4
5_pkgname=chakracore
6pkgname=chakracore-bin
7pkgver=1.11.24
8pkgrel=2
9pkgdesc='ChakraCore is an open source Javascript engine with a C API. This is the pre-built binaries from Microsoft.'
10arch=('x86_64')
11url='https://github.com/chakra-core/ChakraCore'
12license=('MIT')
13provides=('libChakraCore.so' 'ch')
14conflicts=('chakracore-git' 'chakracore')
15source=("https://chakra-core.shortdev.de/releases/v$pkgver/cc_linux_x64_1_11_24.tar.gz")
16sha256sums=('939283618139D6C4223842D79C176C3691296BCE5368D54CB9805616A94EB605')
17
18_dir="ChakraCoreFiles"
19
20package() {
21 install -Dm755 "$srcdir/$_dir/bin/ch" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/ch"
22
23 install -Dm644 "$srcdir/$_dir/lib/libChakraCore.so" "$pkgdir/usr/lib/libChakraCore.so"
24
25 for file in $srcdir/$_dir/include/*; do
26 install -Dm644 "$file" "$pkgdir/usr/include/$(basename $file)"
27 done
28
29 install -Dm644 "$srcdir/$_dir/LICENSE" "$pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$_pkgname/LICENSE"
30}
31

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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