chipdisco

maintainer milkii · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The package downloads a prebuilt JAR binary from a Firebase/Google Cloud Storage URL (the developer's personal app storage bucket) with a token-authenticated URL and SKIP'd checksum. While Firebase Storage is a legitimate hosting service and the URL appears to be the developer's own distribution channel (matching the official project URL domain echolevel.co.uk), the combination of: (1) a prebuilt executable JAR with no source build, (2) SKIP'd checksum providing zero integrity verification, and (3) a mutable token-authenticated URL that could be swapped at any time without detection, constitutes a genuine supply-chain concern. The JAR is executed directly via java -jar, so any substitution would result in code execution. This is a real medium-severity concern — not clearly malicious, but an unofficial/personal host serving an executed binary with no integrity check.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:22 source=("https://firebasestorage.googleapis.com/v0/b/echolevel-b069e.appspot.com/o/files%2FChipdisco6.1_Linux.zip?alt=media&token=82d65992-6dc9-4acc-8c05-4b3e0011884d")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt JAR binary from a Firebase/Google Cloud Storage URL (the developer's personal app storage bucket) with a token-authenticated URL and SKIP'd checksum. While Firebase Storage is a legitimate hosting service and the URL appears to be the developer's own distribution channel (matching the official project URL domain echolevel.co.uk), the combination of: (1) a prebuilt executable JAR with no source build, (2) SKIP'd checksum providing zero integrity verification, and (3) a mutable token-authenticated URL that could be swapped at any time without detection, constitutes a genuine supply-chain concern. The JAR is executed directly via java -jar, so any substitution would result in code execution. This is a real medium-severity concern — not clearly malicious, but an unofficial/personal host serving an executed binary with no integrity check.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Milk Brewster (milk on freenode irc)
2pkgname=chipdisco
3pkgver=6.1
4pkgrel=1
5epoch=
6pkgdesc="a dual-deck DJ app for tracker modules (.MOD/.XM/.S3M)"
7arch=('x86_64')
8url="https://echolevel.co.uk/post/1486312636973-Chipdisco"
9license=('unknown')
10groups=()
11depends=('unzip' )
12makedepends=()
13checkdepends=()
14optdepends=()
15provides=()
16conflicts=()
17replaces=()
18backup=()
19options=()
20install=
21changelog=
22source=("https://firebasestorage.googleapis.com/v0/b/echolevel-b069e.appspot.com/o/files%2FChipdisco6.1_Linux.zip?alt=media&token=82d65992-6dc9-4acc-8c05-4b3e0011884d")
23noextract=()
24md5sums=('SKIP')
25validpgpkeys=()
26#
27# prepare() {
28 # cd "$srcdir/Chipdisco6.1_Linux/
29# }
30#
31# build() {
32 # cd "$srcdir"
33# }
34#
35# check() {
36 # cd "$pkgname-$pkgver"
37 # make -k check
38# }
39#
40package() {
41 cd "$srcdir"
42 echo "#!/bin/sh" > chipdisco
43 echo "exec /usr/bin/java -jar '/usr/share/java/chipdisco/Chipdisco6.jar' '$@'" >> chipdisco
44 install -D -m755 "${srcdir}/chipdisco" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/chipdisco"
45 install -D -m755 "${srcdir}/Chipdisco6.1_Linux/lib/Chipdisco6.jar" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/java/chipdisco/Chipdisco6.jar"
46}
47

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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