chromiumos-snapshot-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer antgame11 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

Two real concerns here: (1) A prebuilt binary archive is downloaded from download-chromium.appspot.com with sha256sums=('SKIP'), meaning no integrity verification. While download-chromium.appspot.com is a Google-operated service that serves Chromium snapshots, the lack of checksum means any MITM or server-side substitution would go undetected. (2) The package hardcodes real Google API credentials (GOOGLE_API_KEY, GOOGLE_DEFAULT_CLIENT_ID, GOOGLE_DEFAULT_CLIENT_SECRET) in a world-readable shell script — these are the well-known public Chromium build keys, not a secret exfiltration, but worth noting. The primary concern remains the SKIP'd checksum on an executed binary: even from a legitimate host, this is a genuine supply-chain risk since the binary is executed directly on the user's system. The host itself (appspot.com/Google) is semi-official for Chromium snapshots, which keeps this from being high severity, but the missing integrity check on an executed binary warrants medium.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:11 source=("chromiumos.zip::https://download-chromium.appspot.com/dl/Linux_ChromiumOS_Full?type=snapshots")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): Two real concerns here: (1) A prebuilt binary archive is downloaded from download-chromium.appspot.com with sha256sums=('SKIP'), meaning no integrity verification. While download-chromium.appspot.com is a Google-operated service that serves Chromium snapshots, the lack of checksum means any MITM or server-side substitution would go undetected. (2) The package hardcodes real Google API credentials (GOOGLE_API_KEY, GOOGLE_DEFAULT_CLIENT_ID, GOOGLE_DEFAULT_CLIENT_SECRET) in a world-readable shell script — these are the well-known public Chromium build keys, not a secret exfiltration, but worth noting. The primary concern remains the SKIP'd checksum on an executed binary: even from a legitimate host, this is a genuine supply-chain risk since the binary is executed directly on the user's system. The host itself (appspot.com/Google) is semi-official for Chromium snapshots, which keeps this from being high severity, but the missing integrity check on an executed binary warrants medium.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1pkgname=chromiumos-snapshot-bin
2pkgver=1
3pkgrel=1
4pkgdesc="ChromiumOS compiled for Linux and can run ChromeOS kiosk enterprise apps"
5pkgbase=pkgbase
6arch=('x86_64')
7url="https://download-chromium.appspot.com/"
8license=('BSD')
9depends=('glibc')
10makedepends=('unzip')
11source=("chromiumos.zip::https://download-chromium.appspot.com/dl/Linux_ChromiumOS_Full?type=snapshots")
12sha256sums=('SKIP')
13
14build() {
15 :
16}
17
18package() {
19 install -d "$pkgdir/usr/bin/chrome"
20
21 unzip "$srcdir/chromiumos.zip" -d "$srcdir"
22
23 cp -r "$srcdir/chrome-chromeos/"* "$pkgdir/usr/bin/chrome/"
24
25 install -d "$pkgdir/usr/bin"
26 cat << 'EOF' > "$pkgdir/usr/bin/chromiumos"
27#!/bin/bash
28
29export GOOGLE_API_KEY="AIzaSyCkfPOPZXDKNn8hhgu3JrA62wIgC93d44k"
30export GOOGLE_DEFAULT_CLIENT_ID="77185425430.apps.googleusercontent.com"
31export GOOGLE_DEFAULT_CLIENT_SECRET="OTJgUOQcT7lO7GsGZq2G4IlT"
32
33/usr/bin/chrome/chrome --login-manager
34EOF
35
36 chmod +x "$pkgdir/usr/bin/chromiumos"
37
38 install -d "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications"
39
40 cat << EOF > "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/chromiumos.desktop"
41[Desktop Entry]
42Type=Application
43Name=ChromiumOS
44Exec=/usr/bin/chromiumos
45Icon=/usr/bin/chrome/product_logo_48.png
46Terminal=false
47Categories=Network;WebBrowser;
48EOF
49}
50

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

Report a package

Reports go to the AURWatch maintainer (one person) and are read by hand. No login required.

0 / 4000
Your suggestion