cider-polybar

LOW
maintainer Nixuge 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD fetches source from the official upstream GitHub repo via git+https, which is legitimate. The `npm install pkg @types/node --save-dev` step pulls build-time dependencies from the official npm registry — this is a common pattern for TypeScript/Node projects that don't vendor their build tools. While it does introduce npm supply-chain exposure (as any npm-based build does), this is not materially different from any other AUR package that uses npm/yarn during build, and both `pkg` and `@types/node` are well-known, widely-used packages on the official registry. The use of `pkg` to bundle a self-contained binary is a standard Node.js packaging approach. The node12 target is old but not malicious. No unofficial or personal hosts are involved, no obfuscation, no exfiltration. This is sloppy (undeclared npm deps, git+SKIP hash, old node target) but not a genuine supply-chain threat beyond the normal npm ecosystem risk that applies to all Node.js AUR packages.

Triggered rules

Low AI review downgraded a static finding llm_review

The static rules flagged this MEDIUM, but an AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed the full PKGBUILD and judged it LOW (confidence 75%): The PKGBUILD fetches source from the official upstream GitHub repo via git+https, which is legitimate. The `npm install pkg @types/node --save-dev` step pulls build-time dependencies from the official npm registry — this is a common pattern for TypeScript/Node projects that don't vendor their build tools. While it does introduce npm supply-chain exposure (as any npm-based build does), this is not materially different from any other AUR package that uses npm/yarn during build, and both `pkg` and `@types/node` are well-known, widely-used packages on the official registry. The use of `pkg` to bundle a self-contained binary is a standard Node.js packaging approach. The node12 target is old but not malicious. No unofficial or personal hosts are involved, no obfuscation, no exfiltration. This is sloppy (undeclared npm deps, git+SKIP hash, old node target) but not a genuine supply-chain threat beyond the normal npm ecosystem risk that applies to all Node.js AUR packages.

1 higher static finding superseded - not the current verdict (shown for transparency)
Medium npm/yarn/pnpm install of an undeclared external package npm_install_external

Runs `npm/yarn/pnpm install <package>` for a package not in source=(), pulling unpinned, unreviewed code at build time. Severity downgraded: the package declares/looks like a Node.js consumer, where build-time installs are expected.

  • PKGBUILD:21 npm install pkg @types/node --save-dev

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Nixuge
2
3pkgname=cider-polybar
4pkgver=1.2.0
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc='A PolyBar custom script to interact with Cider - An open-source, community-oriented Apple Music'
7url=https://github.com/tnguye20/cider-polybar
8arch=(x86_64)
9license=(GNU3)
10conflicts=('cider-polybar-bin')
11makedepends=('typescript' 'nodejs' 'npm' 'git')
12options=(!strip)
13source=("git+https://github.com/tnguye20/cider-polybar.git")
14sha256sums=('SKIP')
15_pkgname="cider-polybar"
16
17build() {
18 cd "${srcdir}/${_pkgname}"
19
20 # Install the requirements (pkg & types) to build
21 npm install pkg @types/node --save-dev
22
23 # Compile
24 tsc -p .
25}
26
27package() {
28 cd "${srcdir}/${_pkgname}"
29
30 # Install the License
31 install -Dm644 "LICENSE" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/cider-polybar/LICENSE"
32
33 # Unset the dev tag
34 unset CIDER_DEV
35
36 # Package with pkg*
37 node node_modules/pkg/lib-es5/bin.js . \
38 --output "${pkgdir}/usr/local/bin/cider-polybar" \
39 --targets node12-linux-x64
40}
41#*Using node12 since for some weird reason pkg
42# doesn't seem to like other versions at all

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Low 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Low 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Low 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Low 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Low 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Low 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Low 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Low 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Low 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Low 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Low 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Low 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Low 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Low 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Low 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Low 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Low 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Low 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Low 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Low 2

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