cinc-workstation-bin

maintainer infertux · 3 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from downloads.cinc.sh and installs it directly. Cinc is the open-source fork of Chef, and downloads.cinc.sh is the project's official distribution host, not a personal or unofficial mirror. However, the concern is real: a prebuilt binary blob is extracted and installed into /opt, with symlinks into /usr/bin. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, but there is no GPG signature verification. The host is the official Cinc project host, making this comparable to other -bin AUR packages that pull from vendor release servers (e.g., google-chrome, slack-desktop). This is a standard -bin packaging pattern with the usual supply-chain caveat of trusting the upstream binary distribution. The risk is not elevated beyond the normal medium concern for any prebuilt binary package: if downloads.cinc.sh were compromised, the sha256 would catch substitution only if the attacker also updated the PKGBUILD. Overall this is a legitimate but inherently medium-risk pattern for binary packages.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:14 source=("http://downloads.cinc.sh/files/stable/cinc-workstation/${pkgver}/ubuntu/24.04/cinc-workstation_${pkgver}-1_amd64.deb")

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from downloads.cinc.sh and installs it directly. Cinc is the open-source fork of Chef, and downloads.cinc.sh is the project's official distribution host, not a personal or unofficial mirror. However, the concern is real: a prebuilt binary blob is extracted and installed into /opt, with symlinks into /usr/bin. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, but there is no GPG signature verification. The host is the official Cinc project host, making this comparable to other -bin AUR packages that pull from vendor release servers (e.g., google-chrome, slack-desktop). This is a standard -bin packaging pattern with the usual supply-chain caveat of trusting the upstream binary distribution. The risk is not elevated beyond the normal medium concern for any prebuilt binary package: if downloads.cinc.sh were compromised, the sha256 would catch substitution only if the attacker also updated the PKGBUILD. Overall this is a legitimate but inherently medium-risk pattern for binary packages.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Cedric Felizard <cedric@felizard.fr>
    
      2# Contributor: Simon Stridsberg <aur@devsn.se>
    
      3# Contributor: kiromantia <aur@dataclast.network>
    
      4
    
      5pkgname=cinc-workstation-bin
    
      6pkgver=26.0.1
    
      7pkgrel=1
    
      8pkgdesc="The Cinc installation package includes everything you need to start converging your machines."
    
      9arch=('x86_64')
    
      10url="https://cinc.sh/download/"
    
      11license=('Apache-2.0')
    
      12depends=(libxcrypt-compat)
    
      13conflicts=(chef chef-solo chef-dk chef-client cinc)
    
      14source=("http://downloads.cinc.sh/files/stable/cinc-workstation/${pkgver}/ubuntu/24.04/cinc-workstation_${pkgver}-1_amd64.deb")
    
      15sha256sums=('851638127c032c86db64c420d8d9db562dc8592afa58892eacc49cade80e6ebe')
    
      16
    
      17package() {
    
      18  cd "$srcdir"
    
      19  bsdtar -xf data.tar.xz -C "$pkgdir"
    
      20
    
      21  # link executables
    
      22  binaries="cinc cinc-apply cinc-auditor cinc-cli cinc-client cinc-shell cinc-solo cookstyle kitchen knife ohai"
    
      23
    
      24  mkdir -p $pkgdir/usr/bin
    
      25
    
      26  for binary in $binaries; do
    
      27    ln -s /opt/cinc-workstation/bin/$binary $pkgdir/usr/bin/ || error_exit "Cannot link $binary to /usr/bin"
    
      28  done
    
      29  chown -Rh 0:0 $pkgdir
    
      30  chmod 755 $pkgdir/opt
    
      31}
    
      32

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2