clipdl

MEDIUM

maintainer Connor 0 votes scanned 2026-11-01 00:21:48.120785

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (.pkg.tar.zst) from a personal domain (concise.cc) rather than building from source. While a PGP signature is present and verified via validpgpkeys, the trust anchor is a personal key whose ownership cannot be independently verified, and the source host is a personal domain that could be compromised or swapped. The package installs an executable (usr/bin/clipdl) directly from this prebuilt artifact. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: if concise.cc is compromised or the key is substituted, arbitrary code executes on the user's system. The checksums provide integrity but not authenticity beyond the personal PGP key. This pattern — installing a prebuilt binary from a personal host with a self-signed key — is a real medium-severity supply-chain risk, not a false positive.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:12 "https://concise.cc/pkg/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-$arch.pkg.tar.zst"

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (.pkg.tar.zst) from a personal domain (concise.cc) rather than building from source. While a PGP signature is present and verified via validpgpkeys, the trust anchor is a personal key whose ownership cannot be independently verified, and the source host is a personal domain that could be compromised or swapped. The package installs an executable (usr/bin/clipdl) directly from this prebuilt artifact. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: if concise.cc is compromised or the key is substituted, arbitrary code executes on the user's system. The checksums provide integrity but not authenticity beyond the personal PGP key. This pattern — installing a prebuilt binary from a personal host with a self-signed key — is a real medium-severity supply-chain risk, not a false positive.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Connor Etherington <connor@concise.cc>
    
      2# ---
    
      3pkgname=clipdl
    
      4pkgver=1.3
    
      5pkgrel=1
    
      6pkgdesc="A simple script for downloading videos from linkss coppied to your primary clipboard"
    
      7arch=(any)
    
      8url="https://gitlab.com/a4to/${pkgname}"
    
      9license=('MIT')
    
      10depends=(yt-dlp dunst xclip)
    
      11source=(
    
      12  "https://concise.cc/pkg/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-$arch.pkg.tar.zst"
    
      13  "https://concise.cc/pkg/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-$arch.pkg.tar.zst.sig"
    
      14  )
    
      15sha512sums=(
    
      16  '2fff387d9d1615884d7dac8889a5b4c3974b86397a6e95d37f3345e9fcb663540ccce4e7526218a2f5d215a8e05ac801be1fb29b198b9dd093d6f7c77828e6d6'
    
      17  '8dd81857b8b75257e4ac3bcd57aef0784afb545433a7cd5619a2baa27e0f58737dc6757f4cf9bf048c5ba1e363f602357723400c4b438bf969240897e9c656d8'
    
      18  )
    
      19md5sums=(
    
      20  '4c4c17fef28bd1455389018f44315518'
    
      21  'f58503e3500fefe3b772349702085f58'
    
      22  )
    
      23validpgpkeys=('9A1F3F41DDA55A60331CB8DD3714CB0967D15980')
    
      24
    
      25package() {
    
      26    install -Dm644 usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
    
      27    install -Dm755 usr/bin/${pkgname} "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}"
    
      28}                                              
    
      29
    
      30

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-11-01 00:21:48	Medium	2
2026-10-31 00:07:41	Medium	2
2026-10-30 00:29:30	Medium	2
2026-10-29 00:13:55	Medium	2
2026-10-28 00:06:54	Medium	2
2026-10-27 00:23:28	Medium	2
2026-10-26 00:12:40	Medium	2
2026-10-25 00:20:48	Medium	2
2026-10-24 00:14:55	Medium	2
2026-10-23 00:02:19	Medium	2
2026-10-22 00:13:10	Medium	2
2026-10-21 00:12:50	Medium	2
2026-10-20 00:10:31	Medium	2
2026-10-19 00:03:55	Medium	2
2026-10-18 00:06:55	Medium	2
2026-10-17 00:21:55	Medium	2
2026-10-16 00:12:47	Medium	2
2026-10-15 00:28:05	Medium	2
2026-10-14 00:06:47	Medium	2
2026-10-13 00:23:45	Medium	2