clipdl

MEDIUM
maintainer Connor 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
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Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (.pkg.tar.zst) from a personal domain (concise.cc) rather than building from source. While a PGP signature is present and verified via validpgpkeys, the trust anchor is a personal key whose ownership cannot be independently verified, and the source host is a personal domain that could be compromised or swapped. The package installs an executable (usr/bin/clipdl) directly from this prebuilt artifact. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: if concise.cc is compromised or the key is substituted, arbitrary code executes on the user's system. The checksums provide integrity but not authenticity beyond the personal PGP key. This pattern — installing a prebuilt binary from a personal host with a self-signed key — is a real medium-severity supply-chain risk, not a false positive.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:12 "https://concise.cc/pkg/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-$arch.pkg.tar.zst"
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (.pkg.tar.zst) from a personal domain (concise.cc) rather than building from source. While a PGP signature is present and verified via validpgpkeys, the trust anchor is a personal key whose ownership cannot be independently verified, and the source host is a personal domain that could be compromised or swapped. The package installs an executable (usr/bin/clipdl) directly from this prebuilt artifact. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: if concise.cc is compromised or the key is substituted, arbitrary code executes on the user's system. The checksums provide integrity but not authenticity beyond the personal PGP key. This pattern — installing a prebuilt binary from a personal host with a self-signed key — is a real medium-severity supply-chain risk, not a false positive.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Connor Etherington <connor@concise.cc>
2# ---
3pkgname=clipdl
4pkgver=1.3
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="A simple script for downloading videos from linkss coppied to your primary clipboard"
7arch=(any)
8url="https://gitlab.com/a4to/${pkgname}"
9license=('MIT')
10depends=(yt-dlp dunst xclip)
11source=(
12 "https://concise.cc/pkg/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-$arch.pkg.tar.zst"
13 "https://concise.cc/pkg/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-$arch.pkg.tar.zst.sig"
14 )
15sha512sums=(
16 '2fff387d9d1615884d7dac8889a5b4c3974b86397a6e95d37f3345e9fcb663540ccce4e7526218a2f5d215a8e05ac801be1fb29b198b9dd093d6f7c77828e6d6'
17 '8dd81857b8b75257e4ac3bcd57aef0784afb545433a7cd5619a2baa27e0f58737dc6757f4cf9bf048c5ba1e363f602357723400c4b438bf969240897e9c656d8'
18 )
19md5sums=(
20 '4c4c17fef28bd1455389018f44315518'
21 'f58503e3500fefe3b772349702085f58'
22 )
23validpgpkeys=('9A1F3F41DDA55A60331CB8DD3714CB0967D15980')
24
25package() {
26 install -Dm644 usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
27 install -Dm755 usr/bin/${pkgname} "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}"
28}
29
30

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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