clone-tracker

maintainer orphaned · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary directly from clonetracker.com (the project's own domain), extracts it, and installs the contents. This is a standard pattern for proprietary AppImage-based AUR packages. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates casual tampering. The main concern is that this is a closed-source binary from a commercial vendor's own domain — not an unofficial or personal host — so the supply-chain risk is the same as any other proprietary binary package (e.g. zoom, slack, discord in the AUR). The cheaper model's 'non-whitelisted host' concern is a false positive in the sense that clonetracker.com is the canonical upstream. However, the package installs an opaque, unauditable proprietary binary with broad system access (webkit2gtk, GTK3, etc.), which is a genuine medium-level concern by AUR standards: executed binary from a non-open-source, single-vendor host with no source transparency. This is not high (no obfuscation, no exfiltration evidence, no unofficial mirror), but medium is defensible given the fully closed binary nature and the fact that the vendor is not a well-known entity.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:23 source=("https://clonetracker.com/dl/clone-tracker_${pkgver}_amd64.AppImage")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary directly from clonetracker.com (the project's own domain), extracts it, and installs the contents. This is a standard pattern for proprietary AppImage-based AUR packages. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates casual tampering. The main concern is that this is a closed-source binary from a commercial vendor's own domain — not an unofficial or personal host — so the supply-chain risk is the same as any other proprietary binary package (e.g. zoom, slack, discord in the AUR). The cheaper model's 'non-whitelisted host' concern is a false positive in the sense that clonetracker.com is the canonical upstream. However, the package installs an opaque, unauditable proprietary binary with broad system access (webkit2gtk, GTK3, etc.), which is a genuine medium-level concern by AUR standards: executed binary from a non-open-source, single-vendor host with no source transparency. This is not high (no obfuscation, no exfiltration evidence, no unofficial mirror), but medium is defensible given the fully closed binary nature and the fact that the vendor is not a well-known entity.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Asuka Minato <youremail@domain.com>
2pkgname=clone-tracker
3pkgver=1.22.0
4pkgrel=1
5pkgdesc="コピペコードに悩まされてきた開発環境へスマートなコード管理を実現"
6arch=(x86_64)
7url="https://clonetracker.com"
8license=('custom')
9depends=(webkit2gtk
10 libsoup
11 gdk-pixbuf2
12 bash
13 glibc
14 pango
15 gtk3
16 zlib
17 perl
18 gcc-libs
19 glib2
20 cairo
21 hicolor-icon-theme
22)
23source=("https://clonetracker.com/dl/clone-tracker_${pkgver}_amd64.AppImage")
24sha256sums=('286359478deffbef57e2653f40a8e4eb18adb34686e47d2be7bc792b83b0df0c')
25options=(!emptydirs)
26
27prepare() {
28 chmod +x ./*.AppImage
29 ./*.AppImage --appimage-extract
30 pushd squashfs-root
31 rm usr/lib/lib*
32 rm -r usr/share/glib-2.0
33 rm usr/bin/xdg-open
34 rm -r usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/{gtk-3.0,gdk-pixbuf-2.0,webkit2gtk-4.0,gio}
35 find . -xtype l -delete
36 find . -name "*.desktop" -print -exec sed -i 's/Exec=.*/Exec=GDK_BACKEND=x11 clone-tracker/' {} \;
37 popd
38 rm *.AppImage
39}
40
41package() {
42 cp -av $srcdir/squashfs-root/usr $pkgdir
43}
44

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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