cloud66-toolbelt
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary (cx) from downloads.cloud66.com, which is the official Cloud66 distribution host for their toolbelt CLI. The binary is installed directly into /usr/bin without any source build. While downloads.cloud66.com is plausibly the vendor's own CDN/distribution endpoint (consistent with the official help URL referencing cloud66.com), it is still a prebuilt binary from a non-GitHub/non-distro-mirror host with no source build. The checksums (md5 + sha256) are present, which mitigates MITM risk but not a compromised upstream host. This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern: executed binary from a vendor host rather than compiled from source, which is the standard AUR concern for prebuilt binary packages. Not high because there is no evidence of malice, obfuscation, or unofficial/personal hosting — it is the vendor's own distribution infrastructure.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:14
source=("http://downloads.cloud66.com/cx/cx_${pkgver}_linux_amd64.tar.gz")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary (cx) from downloads.cloud66.com, which is the official Cloud66 distribution host for their toolbelt CLI. The binary is installed directly into /usr/bin without any source build. While downloads.cloud66.com is plausibly the vendor's own CDN/distribution endpoint (consistent with the official help URL referencing cloud66.com), it is still a prebuilt binary from a non-GitHub/non-distro-mirror host with no source build. The checksums (md5 + sha256) are present, which mitigates MITM risk but not a compromised upstream host. This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern: executed binary from a vendor host rather than compiled from source, which is the standard AUR concern for prebuilt binary packages. Not high because there is no evidence of malice, obfuscation, or unofficial/personal hosting — it is the vendor's own distribution infrastructure.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Jason Staten <jstaten07 gmail>
# PKGBUILD Source: https://sr.ht/~statianzo/PKGBUILD-cloud66-toolbelt
pkgname=cloud66-toolbelt
pkgver=0.1.111
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc='Cloud66 Toolbelt'
url='https://help.cloud66.com/toolbelt/toolbelt-introduction'
license=('unknown')
arch=('x86_64')
depends=()
makedepends=()
optdepends=()
source=("http://downloads.cloud66.com/cx/cx_${pkgver}_linux_amd64.tar.gz")
md5sums=('650a7a9de735bf9a11c522c1554fac4e')
sha256sums=('66f955d540df3faeaeb7d9703829b3bc4bd74593874bd3845238360040b33a8d')
package() {
cd "${srcdir}/cx_${pkgver}_linux_amd64/"
install -D -m755 "cx" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/cx"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |