cloud66-toolbelt

maintainer statenjason · 2 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary (cx) from downloads.cloud66.com, which is the official Cloud66 distribution host for their toolbelt CLI. The binary is installed directly into /usr/bin without any source build. While downloads.cloud66.com is plausibly the vendor's own CDN/distribution endpoint (consistent with the official help URL referencing cloud66.com), it is still a prebuilt binary from a non-GitHub/non-distro-mirror host with no source build. The checksums (md5 + sha256) are present, which mitigates MITM risk but not a compromised upstream host. This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern: executed binary from a vendor host rather than compiled from source, which is the standard AUR concern for prebuilt binary packages. Not high because there is no evidence of malice, obfuscation, or unofficial/personal hosting — it is the vendor's own distribution infrastructure.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:14 source=("http://downloads.cloud66.com/cx/cx_${pkgver}_linux_amd64.tar.gz")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary (cx) from downloads.cloud66.com, which is the official Cloud66 distribution host for their toolbelt CLI. The binary is installed directly into /usr/bin without any source build. While downloads.cloud66.com is plausibly the vendor's own CDN/distribution endpoint (consistent with the official help URL referencing cloud66.com), it is still a prebuilt binary from a non-GitHub/non-distro-mirror host with no source build. The checksums (md5 + sha256) are present, which mitigates MITM risk but not a compromised upstream host. This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern: executed binary from a vendor host rather than compiled from source, which is the standard AUR concern for prebuilt binary packages. Not high because there is no evidence of malice, obfuscation, or unofficial/personal hosting — it is the vendor's own distribution infrastructure.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Jason Staten <jstaten07 gmail>
2# PKGBUILD Source: https://sr.ht/~statianzo/PKGBUILD-cloud66-toolbelt
3
4pkgname=cloud66-toolbelt
5pkgver=0.1.111
6pkgrel=1
7pkgdesc='Cloud66 Toolbelt'
8url='https://help.cloud66.com/toolbelt/toolbelt-introduction'
9license=('unknown')
10arch=('x86_64')
11depends=()
12makedepends=()
13optdepends=()
14source=("http://downloads.cloud66.com/cx/cx_${pkgver}_linux_amd64.tar.gz")
15md5sums=('650a7a9de735bf9a11c522c1554fac4e')
16sha256sums=('66f955d540df3faeaeb7d9703829b3bc4bd74593874bd3845238360040b33a8d')
17
18package() {
19 cd "${srcdir}/cx_${pkgver}_linux_amd64/"
20 install -D -m755 "cx" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/cx"
21}
22

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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