cloud66-toolbelt
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary (cx) from downloads.cloud66.com, which is the official Cloud66 distribution host for their toolbelt CLI. The binary is installed directly into /usr/bin without any source build. While downloads.cloud66.com is plausibly the vendor's own CDN/distribution endpoint (consistent with the official help URL referencing cloud66.com), it is still a prebuilt binary from a non-GitHub/non-distro-mirror host with no source build. The checksums (md5 + sha256) are present, which mitigates MITM risk but not a compromised upstream host. This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern: executed binary from a vendor host rather than compiled from source, which is the standard AUR concern for prebuilt binary packages. Not high because there is no evidence of malice, obfuscation, or unofficial/personal hosting — it is the vendor's own distribution infrastructure.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:14
source=("http://downloads.cloud66.com/cx/cx_${pkgver}_linux_amd64.tar.gz")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary (cx) from downloads.cloud66.com, which is the official Cloud66 distribution host for their toolbelt CLI. The binary is installed directly into /usr/bin without any source build. While downloads.cloud66.com is plausibly the vendor's own CDN/distribution endpoint (consistent with the official help URL referencing cloud66.com), it is still a prebuilt binary from a non-GitHub/non-distro-mirror host with no source build. The checksums (md5 + sha256) are present, which mitigates MITM risk but not a compromised upstream host. This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern: executed binary from a vendor host rather than compiled from source, which is the standard AUR concern for prebuilt binary packages. Not high because there is no evidence of malice, obfuscation, or unofficial/personal hosting — it is the vendor's own distribution infrastructure.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Jason Staten <jstaten07 gmail>
# PKGBUILD Source: https://sr.ht/~statianzo/PKGBUILD-cloud66-toolbelt
pkgname=cloud66-toolbelt
pkgver=0.1.111
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc='Cloud66 Toolbelt'
url='https://help.cloud66.com/toolbelt/toolbelt-introduction'
license=('unknown')
arch=('x86_64')
depends=()
makedepends=()
optdepends=()
source=("http://downloads.cloud66.com/cx/cx_${pkgver}_linux_amd64.tar.gz")
md5sums=('650a7a9de735bf9a11c522c1554fac4e')
sha256sums=('66f955d540df3faeaeb7d9703829b3bc4bd74593874bd3845238360040b33a8d')
package() {
cd "${srcdir}/cx_${pkgver}_linux_amd64/"
install -D -m755 "cx" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/cx"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |