cmpl-bin
The package downloads prebuilt binaries (linux32/linux64 tarballs) from coliop.org rather than the official coin-or.org project host. coliop.org appears to be the developer's own site (COLIOP is the GUI companion to CMPL, developed by the same author), so this is not a random third-party host — it is the upstream developer's distribution site. However, it is still an unofficial/personal host rather than a canonical release mirror, served over plain HTTP (not HTTPS), and the binaries are executed directly (the 'coliop' binary is chmod +x'd and placed in /usr/bin, and 'cmpl' is symlinked to /usr/bin). The sha256 checksums provide some integrity protection, but the HTTP download means the checksums themselves could be bypassed by a MITM if the PKGBUILD were also tampered with. The core concern is prebuilt binaries from a non-canonical host over plain HTTP — a real but moderate supply-chain risk, consistent with MEDIUM severity.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:11
source_i686=("http://www.coliop.org/_download/Cmpl-$(echo $pkgver | sed s/\\./-/g)-linux32.tar.gz")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads prebuilt binaries (linux32/linux64 tarballs) from coliop.org rather than the official coin-or.org project host. coliop.org appears to be the developer's own site (COLIOP is the GUI companion to CMPL, developed by the same author), so this is not a random third-party host — it is the upstream developer's distribution site. However, it is still an unofficial/personal host rather than a canonical release mirror, served over plain HTTP (not HTTPS), and the binaries are executed directly (the 'coliop' binary is chmod +x'd and placed in /usr/bin, and 'cmpl' is symlinked to /usr/bin). The sha256 checksums provide some integrity protection, but the HTTP download means the checksums themselves could be bypassed by a MITM if the PKGBUILD were also tampered with. The core concern is prebuilt binaries from a non-canonical host over plain HTTP — a real but moderate supply-chain risk, consistent with MEDIUM severity.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: JonnyRobbie <dzhonny at yahoo dot com>
pkgname=cmpl-bin
pkgver=1.10.0
pkgrel=2
pkgdesc="A mathematical programming language and a system for mathematical programming and optimisation of linear optimisation problems."
arch=("i686" "x86_64")
url="https://projects.coin-or.org/Cmpl"
license=('GPL3')
depends=("java-runtime" "python2" "glpk" "coin-or-cbc")
source_i686=("http://www.coliop.org/_download/Cmpl-$(echo $pkgver | sed s/\\./-/g)-linux32.tar.gz")
source_x86_64=("http://www.coliop.org/_download/Cmpl-$(echo $pkgver | sed s/\\./-/g)-linux64.tar.gz")
sha256sums_i686=('2f26a63da4b0bd9be21320c07f02c483961c1427cd87a960f5a75ab2021cbc09')
sha256sums_x86_64=('3595425b4081c8316387572c8b2cceb2d663c6984e768a8bf7d951574e413daf')
prepare() {
sed -ri 's/\.\.\/Thirdparty\/(CBC|GLPK)/\/usr\/bin/' ${srcdir}/Cmpl/bin/cmpl.opt
sed -ri 's/\/usr\/share\/Cmpl/\/usr\/share\/cmpl/' ${srcdir}/Cmpl/cmpl
}
package() {
#appdata
mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/usr/share/cmpl"
cp -r "${srcdir}/Cmpl/." "${pkgdir}/usr/share/cmpl/"
rm -rf "${pkgdir}/usr/share/cmpl/Thirdparty"
#doc
mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/usr/share/doc/cmpl"
mv "${pkgdir}/usr/share/cmpl/doc/CMPL.pdf" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/doc/cmpl/CMPL.pdf"
rmdir "${pkgdir}/usr/share/cmpl/doc"
#bin symlink
mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
ln -s "/usr/share/cmpl/cmpl" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/cmpl"
#coilop
cp "${srcdir}/Cmpl/coliop" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
chmod +x "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/coliop"
rm ${pkgdir}/usr/share/cmpl/install
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |