cn.com.10jqka

maintainer lightning1141 · 3 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from resource.thsi.cn, which is the CDN/resource host for 同花顺 (Tonghuashun/10jqka), a well-known Chinese stock trading application. The domain thsi.cn is the official backend domain for 10jqka.com.cn (THSI = Tonghuashun Information). This is not a random personal host — it is the vendor's own resource server. However, the concern remains legitimate at medium severity: (1) it is a prebuilt proprietary binary blob being extracted and installed directly, (2) the host is not a widely recognized official distribution channel like a distro mirror or GitHub releases, and (3) the package installs executables from a Chinese financial software vendor with no source build. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution risk somewhat, but does not address the trustworthiness of the binary itself. This is a classic medium-risk pattern: a closed-source binary from a vendor-adjacent but non-standard host. Not clearly malicious, but a real supply-chain concern for anyone installing financial software as a binary blob.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:16 "http://resource.thsi.cn/soft/${pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from resource.thsi.cn, which is the CDN/resource host for 同花顺 (Tonghuashun/10jqka), a well-known Chinese stock trading application. The domain thsi.cn is the official backend domain for 10jqka.com.cn (THSI = Tonghuashun Information). This is not a random personal host — it is the vendor's own resource server. However, the concern remains legitimate at medium severity: (1) it is a prebuilt proprietary binary blob being extracted and installed directly, (2) the host is not a widely recognized official distribution channel like a distro mirror or GitHub releases, and (3) the package installs executables from a Chinese financial software vendor with no source build. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution risk somewhat, but does not address the trustworthiness of the binary itself. This is a classic medium-risk pattern: a closed-source binary from a vendor-adjacent but non-standard host. Not clearly malicious, but a real supply-chain concern for anyone installing financial software as a binary blob.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: lightning1141 <lightning1141@gmail.com>
2
3pkgname='cn.com.10jqka'
4# the versin is from deb package
5pkgver=2.7.1.2
6pkgrel=3
7pkgdesc="cn.com.10jqka(royalflush/tonghuashun/同花顺) - a tool for scanning the stock infomation."
8arch=("x86_64")
9url="https://www.10jqka.com.cn"
10# url="http://activity.10jqka.com.cn/acmake/cache/1380.html"
11license=('custom')
12depends=()
13
14install='cn.com.10jqka.install'
15source=(
16 "http://resource.thsi.cn/soft/${pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb"
17 update_config.sh
18)
19sha256sums=(
20 '40c9a5c551cdc48e10b51e003e70254919d89aa0a1481ab63324a37a363648fd'
21 '269df82f6723982b7d9aaa3d90fc680dcbdc3a555e32340cc2de0439ac581c46'
22)
23
24package() {
25 tar xf data.tar.xz -C ${pkgdir}/
26
27 # remove apps dir
28 mv "${pkgdir}/opt/apps/cn.com.10jqka" "${pkgdir}/opt/"
29 rm -r "${pkgdir}/opt/apps"
30 sed -i 's/apps\///' "${pkgdir}/opt/cn.com.10jqka/entries/applications/cn.com.10jqka.desktop"
31
32 chmod 755 -R "${pkgdir}/opt/cn.com.10jqka/files"
33
34 # fix cannot find deps error
35 sed -i '/\.a"/,+2 d' "${pkgdir}/opt/cn.com.10jqka/files/HevoNext.B2CApp.deps.json"
36
37 install -d "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications"
38 install -m644 "${pkgdir}/opt/cn.com.10jqka/entries/applications/cn.com.10jqka.desktop" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/"
39 install -D -m755 -t "$pkgdir/opt/cn.com.10jqka/" "$srcdir/update_config.sh"
40}
41

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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