cnijfilter2-mg7500
The source is a prebuilt .deb binary package from gdlp01.c-wss.com, which is Canon's official global download server (used across many Canon driver packages in the AUR and elsewhere). The package extracts and installs pre-compiled printer driver binaries directly into the system (usr/bin, usr/lib). While the host is Canon's legitimate CDN, the concern is that: (1) the binaries are closed-source and cannot be audited, (2) they are installed with chmod 0755 into system library paths, and (3) the integrity check is only MD5 (weak). However, this is a well-known pattern for proprietary Canon printer drivers in the AUR, and gdlp01.c-wss.com is Canon's official distribution host. The medium rating is appropriate because executed closed-source binaries from a vendor CDN with only MD5 verification represent a real but not clearly malicious supply-chain concern — the host is official but the binaries are opaque and the checksum algorithm is weak.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:14
source=(http://gdlp01.c-wss.com/gds/5/0100006265/01/cnijfilter2-${_pkgver}-deb.tar.gz)
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The source is a prebuilt .deb binary package from gdlp01.c-wss.com, which is Canon's official global download server (used across many Canon driver packages in the AUR and elsewhere). The package extracts and installs pre-compiled printer driver binaries directly into the system (usr/bin, usr/lib). While the host is Canon's legitimate CDN, the concern is that: (1) the binaries are closed-source and cannot be audited, (2) they are installed with chmod 0755 into system library paths, and (3) the integrity check is only MD5 (weak). However, this is a well-known pattern for proprietary Canon printer drivers in the AUR, and gdlp01.c-wss.com is Canon's official distribution host. The medium rating is appropriate because executed closed-source binaries from a vendor CDN with only MD5 verification represent a real but not clearly malicious supply-chain concern — the host is official but the binaries are opaque and the checksum algorithm is weak.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Yuto Tokunaga <toku DOT yuuto AT gmail DOT com>
# Based on the PKGBUILD for mg6400 series by Vincenzo Mantova (xworld21)
pkgname=cnijfilter2-mg7500
pkgver=5.00
pkgrel=1
_pkgver=5.00-1
pkgdesc="Canon InkJet Printer Driver (MG7500, MG6600, MG5600, MG2900, MB5300, MB5000, MB2300, MB2000, IP110, IB4000, E460 Series)"
arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
url="http://cweb.canon.jp/drv-upd/ij-mfp/linux-pd-20142h-500.html"
license=('custom')
depends=('libcups' 'libxml2')
provides=("cnijfilter2=$pkgver")
source=(http://gdlp01.c-wss.com/gds/5/0100006265/01/cnijfilter2-${_pkgver}-deb.tar.gz)
md5sums=('433e5d53041067deb90584397daec07d')
package() {
local _pkgarch=$(echo -n "${CARCH}" | sed 's/x86_/amd/' | sed 's/i6/i3/')
local _debdir="${srcdir}/cnijfilter2-${_pkgver}-deb/packages"
cd $pkgdir
ar -x "${_debdir}/cnijfilter2_${_pkgver}_${_pkgarch}.deb" "data.tar.gz"
tar -xzf data.tar.gz && rm -f data.tar.gz
mkdir -p usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}
mv usr/share/doc/cnijfilter2/LICENSE* usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}
# Weird permissions error from namcap
chown root usr/lib/bjlib2/cnnet.ini
chgrp root usr/lib/bjlib2/cnnet.ini
chmod 0755 $(find usr/bin -type f)
chmod 0755 $(find usr/lib -type f)
chmod 0644 $(find usr/share -type f)
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |