codemao-wood-uos

maintainer Integral · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from home-store-packages.uniontech.com, which is the UOS (UnionTech OS / Deepin) official app store package repository — not a random personal host, but also not the upstream vendor (codemao.cn) directly. The binary is an Electron/Chromium-based application executed as root-installed code. There is a sha512sum check, which mitigates tampering risk somewhat, but the source is a third-party app store mirror rather than the upstream developer's own distribution channel. The extracted binary runs with broad filesystem permissions (chmod -R 755) and is an Electron app launched with --no-sandbox. This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern: prebuilt closed binary from a non-upstream host with a checksum but no GPG signature, representing a real supply-chain concern if the app store host is compromised. Not clearly malicious, but not clean either.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:12 "https://home-store-packages.uniontech.com/appstore/pool/appstore/c/cn.codemao.wood/cn.codemao.wood_${pkgver}_amd64.deb"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 75%): The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from home-store-packages.uniontech.com, which is the UOS (UnionTech OS / Deepin) official app store package repository — not a random personal host, but also not the upstream vendor (codemao.cn) directly. The binary is an Electron/Chromium-based application executed as root-installed code. There is a sha512sum check, which mitigates tampering risk somewhat, but the source is a third-party app store mirror rather than the upstream developer's own distribution channel. The extracted binary runs with broad filesystem permissions (chmod -R 755) and is an Electron app launched with --no-sandbox. This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern: prebuilt closed binary from a non-upstream host with a checksum but no GPG signature, representing a real supply-chain concern if the app store host is compromised. Not clearly malicious, but not clean either.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Integral <integral@member.fsf.org>
2
3pkgname=codemao-wood-uos
4pkgver=0.1.3
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="海龟编辑器 Turtle Editor (An editor tailed for programming for kids)."
7arch=('x86_64')
8url="https://python.codemao.cn/"
9license=('custom')
10depends=('gtk3' 'nss' 'alsa-lib')
11source=(
12 "https://home-store-packages.uniontech.com/appstore/pool/appstore/c/cn.codemao.wood/cn.codemao.wood_${pkgver}_amd64.deb"
13)
14sha512sums=('95251a01149c92f4db220c4ff0cfa5178122bd691fbfe4ace2c2da958f9d351f4ab1f692f5187a6342e5ae1c626dacff61fba5d5d45cef54ed0510997e179dcc')
15
16package() {
17 echo " -> Extracting the data.tar.xz..."
18 bsdtar -xvf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}/"
19 chmod -R 755 "${pkgdir}/"
20
21 echo " -> Installing..."
22 # Launcher
23 mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/"
24 ln -s "/opt/apps/cn.codemao.wood/files/cn.codemao.wood" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}"
25 # Desktop Entry
26 sed -i '4{s/$/ --no-sandbox/g}' "${pkgdir}/opt/apps/cn.codemao.wood/entries/applications/cn.codemao.wood.desktop"
27 install -Dm644 "${pkgdir}/opt/apps/cn.codemao.wood/entries/applications/cn.codemao.wood.desktop" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/"
28 # License
29 install -Dm644 "${pkgdir}/opt/apps/cn.codemao.wood/files/LICENSE" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/"
30 install -Dm644 "${pkgdir}/opt/apps/cn.codemao.wood/files/LICENSES.chromium.html" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/"
31}
32

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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