com.screener-plugin.deepin

maintainer AlenYang · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt i386 .deb binary from com-store-packages.uniontech.com, which is the Deepin/UnionTech official app store CDN — this is the legitimate upstream distribution host for Deepin Linux packages. UnionTech (统信软件) is the company behind Deepin OS, so this is effectively the vendor's own infrastructure, not a random personal host. However, the package installs a prebuilt binary blob (a screenshot plugin) without source, and the extraction is done without verifying the .deb structure properly (no dpkg-deb, just raw tar on data.tar.*). The sha256sum provides integrity checking. The main concern is that this is an executed binary from a Chinese commercial vendor's CDN with no source code — while not clearly malicious, it represents a real supply-chain trust question for an executed binary. The medium rating is appropriate: it's a prebuilt binary from a vendor CDN (official but foreign commercial entity), not a personal/unofficial host, but still an opaque binary being installed and executed.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:15 source=("https://com-store-packages.uniontech.com/appstore/pool/appstore/c/com.screener-plugin.deepin/com.screener-plugin.deepin_1.0.0.2eepin1_i386.deb")

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt i386 .deb binary from com-store-packages.uniontech.com, which is the Deepin/UnionTech official app store CDN — this is the legitimate upstream distribution host for Deepin Linux packages. UnionTech (统信软件) is the company behind Deepin OS, so this is effectively the vendor's own infrastructure, not a random personal host. However, the package installs a prebuilt binary blob (a screenshot plugin) without source, and the extraction is done without verifying the .deb structure properly (no dpkg-deb, just raw tar on data.tar.*). The sha256sum provides integrity checking. The main concern is that this is an executed binary from a Chinese commercial vendor's CDN with no source code — while not clearly malicious, it represents a real supply-chain trust question for an executed binary. The medium rating is appropriate: it's a prebuilt binary from a vendor CDN (official but foreign commercial entity), not a personal/unofficial host, but still an opaque binary being installed and executed.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1
    
      2# Maintainer: Your Name <youremail@domain.com>
    
      3# Contributor: Asuka Minato
    
      4pkgname=com.screener-plugin.deepin
    
      5pkgver=1.0.0.2
    
      6pkgrel=1
    
      7pkgdesc="屏幕截图精灵"
    
      8arch=(x86_64)
    
      9url="https://deepin-wine.i-m.dev/"
    
      10license=(custom)
    
      11depends=(
    
      12"alsa-lib"
    
      13"glibc"
    
      14"glib2" gdk-pixbuf2 freetype2 libx11 pango xdg-utils at-spi2-core cairo fontconfig gtk2 bash)
    
      15source=("https://com-store-packages.uniontech.com/appstore/pool/appstore/c/com.screener-plugin.deepin/com.screener-plugin.deepin_1.0.0.2eepin1_i386.deb")
    
      16sha256sums=('a0732a6c456798ddc5c0f4269aff82bcb5f87b382902373266ca9ebcbe622e11')
    
      17
    
      18package() {
    
      19	tar -xvpf data.tar.* -C "$pkgdir"
    
      20	install -d "$pkgdir"/usr/share/icons
    
      21	find "$pkgdir" -name "*.desktop" -exec install -Dm644 {} -t "$pkgdir"/usr/share/applications/ \;
    
      22	find "$pkgdir" -name hicolor -type d -exec cp -av {} "$pkgdir"/usr/share/icons/ \;
    
      23}
    
      24

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2